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Introduction
"In the name of God the merciful, the compassionate, citizens,
during these very difficult circumstances Egypt is going through,
President Hosni Mubarak has decided to step down from the
office of president of the republic and has charged the Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces to administer the affairs of the
country. May God help everybody?" 1
That was the short speech Omar Suliman, the vice president and the former head of the Egyptian
intelligence agency, made to announce the stepping down of Mubarak after three decades of
ruling the country.
The unprecedented popular uprising started on January 25, 2011 in protest against the
unsatisfactory living conditions, and political and economic corruption under the rule of
Mubarak.
The Tunisian people's uprising that overthrew President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had a great
effect in sparking anger in Egypt toward the continuation of Mubarak's regime.

1

“Egypt Crisis: President Hosni Mubarak Resigns as Leader.” BBC News. Accessed May 6, 2014.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12433045.
“Egypt’s Mubarak Resignation Speech, by VP Suleiman.“ February 11, 2011.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H4ft5k1YyZw&feature=youtube_gdata_player.
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Mubarak and his regime were known as one of the most stable authoritarian regimes in the
region. Thus the outbreak of the uprising by massive numbers of Egyptians was unpredictable
the way it happened.
A revolution was predictable and foreseen for scholars, politicians, and even the regime itself;
there were many official reports about the coming revolution. There were even Egyptian movies
that predicted a revolution, a hunger revolution.
Many factors led to the uprising:
● Corruption: a nation-wide survey conducted in mid-2009 by the Cairo-based AlAhram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies found that 47 percent of small and
medium businesses in Egypt were forced to offer government clerks cash bribes in
order to obtain business licenses and then had to continually bribe them in order to
avoid fines.2
● Economic problems and poverty
● Police force misconduct
● The emergency law
● Unemployment levels
● Rigging and manipulation of elections
● Preparation for the presidential election (Gamal Mubarak)
Unpredictably, middle class activists initiated the uprising, and many of the other classes
joined them at the beginning, then within few days, it was massive protests from all levels and
classes against the regime.

2

Miller, David E. “Alarming corruption rates in Egypt.” Jerusalem Post, July 29, 2010.
http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=183000.
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This middle class of people, which is the backbone of any society, was almost eradicated by
Mubarak’s regime. Middle and high-class youth started everything on a Facebook page, they
created a group months prior to the uprising, and the name of the group was “We are all Khalid
Said”. The aim of the group was to highlight the police forces’ misconduct against Egyptians.
Khalid Said was a victim who was beaten to death by police officers in the streets. This case was
widely exposed in the media and became one of the most controversial cases for the public.
Almost everyone blamed the Ministry of the Interior for his murder as part of the systematic
misconduct of police officers to torture people. This group was created to encourage the
Egyptians into challenging the governmental practice against human rights.
At the beginning, the members of the group encouraged all Egyptians to join them in Tahreer
Square, in downtown Cairo, in their peaceful protest against the practice of the government
against the political freedom for Egyptians.
All the political parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which was one of the biggest
political movements in Egypt and was considered one of the radical Islamic groups as well,
refused to participate and they announced that they would not participate. 3 Their reaction was
common and justifiable, as all the political entities used to coordinate with the former regime
before acting. The initiators of this uprising were the youth who did not belong to any political
party and had never participated in political life before; they started it with no unified leadership

3

http://www.alwafd.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12821&cpage=30.
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and with few demands, but with the silence from the government side as to their demands, these
demands went higher and higher.
Three days later, when it became clear that something different would happen this time, all
the political groups started to appear in the square, all of them claiming that they were there
from the beginning, and some groups like the Muslim Brotherhood went further and claimed that
they were the initiators of the uprising.
During eighteen days of massive protests, which were initiated on Facebook by these
unorganized youths that reacted against the misconduct of Mubarak’s regime in Egypt, the
uprising switched gears to fall into the Muslim Brotherhood’s hands after just three days. During
the protests, trained members of the Muslim Brotherhood organized everything for the
unorganized youths. They provided logistics, established field hospitals, and coordinated with the
media, which was the most important. The Muslim Brotherhood used to have a good relationship
with Aljazeera, so they misused this relationship in order to do two important tasks during these
days:

●
●

To act as if they were the creators of the uprising and they were the coordinators for it.
To advocate for the protests to guarantee more numbers of people would come,
otherwise they would lose everything. They took advantage of people by getting the
media to show that all of these normal people were followers.

9

The legality of the uprising is comparable to Professor Bruce Ackerman’s idea as set forth in
his seminal “constitutional moments” 4. He distinguishes between normal politics and
constitutional politics: Normal politics is what people normally looking for themselves and their
benefits, constitutional politics, we are talking about larger issues such the structure of the
government. He is talking about the American constitution but it applies to all constitutions.
In his analysis, there were three clear moments of constitution politics in United States history,
each of these was technically illegal at the time but each of these also came to be legitimate by
American people.
1- The founding of the United States when they went from confederation to the federal
structure, and it was debated it at the time, people came out of the constitutional
convention and basically they said under the article of the confederation you need
unanimous consent from all of the state to change it. The convention created this new
document “the constitution” and decided that if two third of the states agreed on it, it
will pass. It was a fundamental moment, people was asking at the time what kind of a
government should we have, then after this moment we find landmark cases in the
supreme court that shaped and defined federalism.
2- Civil war, the issue was the southern states claim this is still the confederation and if we
want to leave, we can, they just wanted their independence. President Lincoln said, you

4

Ackerman, Bruce. We the People, Volume 2: Transformations. Harvard University Press, 1991.
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can’t leave and if you try to leave we will use force to prevent you from leaving. At the
end of that war, some of the values had changed, one of them was the national
citizenship, which used to be driven from the state citizenship and this is what Dred Scott
v. Sandford case was about. This case was a landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in
which the Court held that African Americans, whether enslaved or free, could not be
American citizens and therefore had no standing to sue in federal court. It is noticeable
that the first line of the fourteenth amendment which was passed after the civil war
stated that “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.” This amendment was a way to say every person who is born
a slave in this country, is a citizen of the United States. This amendment changed the
nature of the federal relationship.
3- In 1937 there was no constitution amendment but it was a major change in the way we
evaluated government power. Before 1937 the US Supreme Court ruled that the federal
government had only limited power to regulate the economy. After the economic crisis
in 1937 the Supreme Court judges changed their mind and basically said that federal
government can regulate the economy.

11

Each of these three times is a constitutional moment; they questioned the legitimacy and
there was a perceived resolution and there is some legitimacy to that. Even if the first case was
unconstitutional, and there was no constitutional amendment in the third, people now accept
that as a legitimate change.
There are these moments when these issues get wide spread discussion and debates and
there is a resolution of it, then people take it as legitimate.
This is very relevant for emerging democracy; people get out in the streets demonstrating
against their current government and talking widely about changes in the basic fundamental
structure of their country, and there was a resolution and people keep reinterpreting these
moments.

There is the constitutional moment when people broadly speaking, debating and acting to get
rid of the old regime, then there is a resolution and acceptance by people, this what happened.
Even if this is not written, there is a law passed in this regard, or even all of these acts were illegal
at the time, these moments in history and people participation in them has some legitimacy and
meaning as far as government and its structure is concerned.
Gordon Wood in his book The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 5 described these
movements as “The People out of Doors", they are massive discussion and action of people as

5

Wood, Gordon S. The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787. UNC Press Books, 2011.
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people and not by their elected representative, just mobilization of all kind of regular people
getting involved in this constitutional moment, not normal politics. For the people, they want to
see that if they went out and did something, that matters, and what they did is accepted as
legitimate afterwards, even if it was illegal at the time. There are other in depth and
comprehensive ways of achieving legitimacy, may be apparent being the surface formal
constitution. This is the reality, and how it works. These are the founding times, and everybody
was seeking changes. This is especially true in developing countries, this was the only way to
change.
Later, after Mubarak stepped down, the Muslim Brotherhood led the mob to destroy the
buildings of the State Security Investigation Service (SSIS), one of the Egyptian intelligence
agencies 6 and the agency that was responsible for fighting the Muslim Brotherhood and other
radical Islamic groups. This agency had the worst reputation ever in the country, 7 because during
Mubarak’s rule it switched its moral task of protecting the country against terrorism and anything
related to the national security, to that of an agency that would do anything to protect Mubarak’s
regime. The SSIS officers have immunity from any consequences for their actions in torturing
people and manipulating elections. Although they do not have legal immunity by law, it exists in

6

“Storming HQ of Egyptian State Security Central Complex, March 5th, 2011, Cairo.”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fEj5FZnVB64.
7
“BBC Arabic -  اﻷوﺳط اﻟﺷرق- ﻣﺻر:  اﻣن ﻟﻣﺑﺎﺣث اﻟرﺋﯾﺳﻲ اﻟﻣﻘر اﻗﺗﺣﺎم،ﻟﻠداﺧﻠﯾﺔ ﺟدﯾد ووزﯾر اﻟدوﻟﺔ.” Accessed July 3, 2014.
http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2011/03/110305_security_demos_egypt.shtml.
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practice. During last few months before the uprising happened, three major incidents happened
with the SSIS. These incidents illustrated how powerful the SSIS was against the law.
In one of the SSIS offices in a town called Rashid in the Egyptian Delta, the SSIS arbitrary
detained dozens of citizens who were part of an illegal human smuggling ring from Egypt to Italy
through the Mediterranean Sea. The SSIS officer kept them in detention even after the general
prosecutor’s decision to release them, so the lawyers of these people reported their illegal
detention to the general prosecutor. When the general prosecutor tried to approach the police
station where these people were detained, the SSIS officer threatened him and ordered the
soldiers to open fire on him and his assistants if they tried to approach. There were no
consequences for this incident, it appeared on the news once and then the SSIS prevented all the
media from mentioning the incident again.
On New Year’s Eve 2011, there was a suicide bombing in front of one of the most crowded
churches in Alexandria, 8 the second biggest city in Cairo. Dozens of people died as a result of the
attack. All terrorist attacks used to be investigated by the SSIS, however, with out-of-date
methods of investigation, when the SSIS arrested hundreds of one of the Islamic groups to
investigate them, investigation in this case meant torture. During the investigation a 30-year-old
father (Said Belal) died while he was being tortured, and the SSIS officers just sent him to a
hospital.

8

Stack, Liam and David D. Kirkpatrick. “Egypt Tries to Calm Ire over Attack at Coptic Mass.” The New York Times,
January 2, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/world/middleeast/03egypt.html.
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What happened next was really provocative for everyone. First, they forced the hospital to
announce to the public that they had found Belal alive in front of the hospital and that he then
died of a heart attack. 9
Second, they forced his family to take his dead body and bury his dead body secretly at night,
and prevented them from taking any legal steps immediately.
Third, when human rights organizations filed a case against the SSIS to prove that Belal died
by torture, the SSIS intervened and made the general prosecutor announce that there was no
suspicion of any criminal acts in his death. The general prosecutor’s speech itself was very
provocative because it was not professional and conflicted many times with legal rules and with
logic.
Finally, they forced the leader of this Islamic group in Alexandria to announce that Belal’s
death was a mistake and to give a long speech about how Muslims are supposed to be patient
and to encourage his followers not to react for their friend’s murder.10
The third incident was the parliamentary elections which happened in December 2010, where
the SSIS manipulated the majority of the elections and controlled them for the National
Democratic Party (NDP), the ruling party in Egypt for more than 50 years. They even intervened
in the social and professional associations’ elections.

9

“Egypt: Death of Church-Bombing Suspect While in Police Custody Prompts Protests.” Los Angeles Times Blogs Babylon & Beyond, January 11, 2011. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2011/01/egypt-death-ofchurch-bombing-suspect-prompts-protests.html.
10
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HOtmMqDmLl0.
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The intervention in this election was very severe. The elections were held in a political
atmosphere of narrowing public freedoms, and the Executive abandoned the promises made in
its program for the presidential and legislative elections of 2005 of achieving political and
constitutional reform. Restrictions were put on the forming of parties and serious guarding was
imposed on the professional syndicates and trade unions. Even the activities of political and social
protest movements were restricted and deprived of their right to peaceful assembly and
demonstration. Violence was used against their activities, and political activists were brought to
military trials. This was a climate that did not allow for the holding of free and fair elections.
The elections were held under a legislative environment that disregarded the principle of
equality of opportunities between the candidates and allowed the Executive to intervene in the
electoral process. After constitutional amendments, judicial supervision of elections was
replaced by a commission with limited powers, and the Executive could intervene in its formation
in accordance with Law No. 18 of 2007. The Ministry of the Interior administered the electoral
process in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 38 of 1972 in the People's Assembly. The
Ministry of the Interior also played an important role during the re-division of the
constituencies. 11

11

In accordance with Law no. 68 of 2010 amending Law 206 of 1990 on the electoral constituencies of the People’s
Assembly, and Resolution no. 1340 of 2010 sectors to amend the provisions of Resolution 293 of 1984 to organize
some matters that are related to the organization of some elections procedures.
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The Elections Committee and the Ministry of the Interior refused to implement the rulings of
the Administrative Court, which warranted the inclusion of some of the candidates who were
excluded from the final schedules.
The two rounds of the elections witnessed security interventions, and violence from the NDP.
Since its independence, various forms of political policy and methods have been implemented
in Egypt. There were a variety of political actors, dominated by the state of exception, which we
will discuss fully in chapter two 12. All of the traditional political actors faced the new political
protest movements that requested the free circulation of power through free and transparent
elections.
The most important highlight of this stage was the transition from “the rule of law” to "the
law of the ruler", and the move from the unified regime consolidated to “partial regimes”.13
In the last three decades, globalization, international human rights, and international
humanitarian laws have undermined the foundations of the state sovereignty. In general,
national sovereignty was invoked as an excuse to exercise internal repression on a large scale.
But the international community has not been able to impose democratization in the Arab region,
despite its attempts to do so.

12

Agamben, Giorgio. State of Exception. University of Chicago Press, 2008.
Camus, Michel and Gilles Massardier, eds. Démocraties et autoritarismes: fragmentation et hybridation des
régimes. Éditions Karthala, 2009.
13
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The political culture and the rule of law
It was expected by Egyptians throughout the history of the republic since 1952, that every
election would be rigged: the presidential elections, referendums, parliamentary elections, local
council elections, professional association elections, and even social and sports club elections
and student union elections in the universities. It might be that high school and pre-high school
student council elections were the only types of elections that were not fixed.
These expectations and the expectation for the Executive not to obey the law were the result
of decades of the Executive’s practice of manipulating the law to serve the Head of the State/the
regime’s best interest.
The regimes’ political practice varied between pure dictatorship in the name of protecting the
nascent revolution under the Nasser era, and Sadat’s regime which allowed some democratic
practice and gave the courts more rule and more independence in order to attract direct foreign
investment. Mubarak’s regime gave more space compared to his predecessors, it was a
combination of a dictatorship and some democratic practice - upholding the rule of law and the
Judiciary’s independence, but with some exceptions and some controls over the courts to make
sure some areas were untouchable. These areas were related to the president and his regime’s
best interest of staying in power, and national security, fighting terrorism, and the stability of the
country were always the justifications for these practices.

18

National security was the justification for all of the manipulations of the elections, and all of
this started with the military coup in 1952, and that when the state of exception begun.
In 1954 when Naguib tried to apply democracy and allow people to choose their president
through free elections, the Military Council arrested him and Gamal Abd-Elnasser took power.
Nasser was the first one who rigged the elections for himself in order to be the president forever
until he died; Nasser prevented the formation of any political parties and suspended all the
existing ones. He formed one political entity, named The Socialism Union; you had to be a
member of this union in order to participate in politics or to be qualified to have a government
position. Nasser severed democratic action by suspending the State Council, which was an
independent court that specialized in administrative cases against the Executive. By manipulating
the political sphere and controlling the Judiciary, Nasser started his dictatorship in modern Egypt.
This practice became a pattern that every regime used, even a freely elected regime, like the
Muslim Brotherhood one in 2012.
Nasser adapted Arabian Nationalism as his own agenda to make Egypt a great country, and he
supported all the liberalization movements in all of the Arab countries and in Africa. In order to
achieve his dream to unite all the Arab countries, he had to be in charge, so he justified to himself
that it was in the country’s best interest to have him as president, and he continued his policy to
forge the people’s will. His justification to the public was that Egypt was in the middle of a war
and that it would be stable under his regime.
19

When Sadat came to power, he followed almost the same dictatorship claims, that Egypt was
in the middle of a war and that it needed to be united and stable under one leader. After Sadat’s
victory in the 1973 war, and his great step to achieve permanent peace with Israel, he justified
all his acts against democracy, claiming that it was a moral task, to achieve and maintain peace
with Israel.
In 1981 Mubarak came to power with the best set-up ever to justify anti-democratic actions.
Former President Sadat had been assassinated by one of the radical Islamic groups, as part of a
plan to take over power in Egypt. Parliament announced the emergency law for a temporary
period in order to help stabilize the country. This temporary period lasted for 30 years.
It was Mubarak’s choice to keep the emergency law as the best tool against his opponents. He
claimed all the time that the emergency law would be used for nothing else but fighting terrorism
and drug cartels. In the name of fighting terrorism, Mubarak’s regime was successful in
eliminating or at least minimizing his opponents’ influence in the political arena.
As a result of these practices, all of the political powers were neutralized, and the only group
that remained was the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), in light of their Islamic ideology. The MB
became the most effective group in Egyptian political life. The MB was made illegitimate by a
court ruling in 1965 after an assassination attempt committed by the group. Even though they
were a very organized entity, and fought hard to form their political party, they failed. They were
exposed to severe actions from the Mubarak regime especially during the last 10 years, when the
20

State Security Investigation Service (SSIS), one of the Egyptian intelligence agencies, discovered
a top secret MB document that contained a plan they called the “Invasion of Egypt”.
The “Invasion of Egypt” contained their plan to take control of the whole country from the
bottom, up. Because of their repeated failure in the parliamentary elections as a result of the
SSIS manipulation of the elections, and their failure to form a political party, the MB decided
instead to enter all the social, professional, and political entities in the country and run for the
elections in all of these entities in order to control them all to achieve two main goals:
First, control over the majority of these entities would give them more power against the
government, and give them the opportunity to recruit more members.
Second, by showing people by example how good they were at running and administrating
public and social entities, they were advocating for themselves to be given the bigger
responsibility of governing.
That leads us to an important point, as a result of what I mentioned above, that Egyptians
never trust any elections because they are always expecting a manipulation in some way or
another. That might happen before the election, for example by eliminating some MB members
from the election, during the election by rigging the votes, or after the voting by announcing false
results.
Rigging elections has become a part of the Egyptian political culture, almost everyone has
participated in one way or another in manipulating elections. The SSIS was manipulating this
election by coordinating with everyone, including judges, election officers, the candidates
21

themselves, and even the opponents. Many deals were done between the SSIS as a
representative of the government and the MB to allow top important candidates from the
National Democratic Party to win, in return for allowing candidates from the MB to run for seats
in other geographic areas, and sometimes allowing them to manipulate their own election to
guarantee the seat. 14
This political culture has had a great impact on Egyptian’s lives and it needs time to change. I
think the absence of the rule of law leads us to this political culture. Even with this long history
of rigging and manipulating all kinds of elections, none of the officials who participated in it were
ever charged. Moreover, it never happened that anyone sued officials, individuals, or
organizations for their illegal actions. Forgery is a felony in Egyptian law but no cases have ever
reached the court. Many law suits were filed to challenge the election results as being rigged but
it never happened that the forger himself was convicted.
Egypt does not have big issues with the laws. As a civil law country, the Egyptian laws were
based on the French codes and they were well written except for a few laws that were recently
adapted or changed to achieve certain benefits for certain people or for a certain group of people.
On the other hand, the whole country has a big issue with the rule of law in practice. No one
respects the law in Egypt, even the government itself, and everyone tries to manipulate the law
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as much as he can, in order to win. Police officers are well known as the worst at breaching laws,
all the officials used to manipulate the law in one way or another. This practice has become
expected, acceptable, and widely encouraged.
The real changes started with the escalation of unorganized protest movements in the street.
One of the main movements that started the political changes was the Egyptian Movement for
Change, known in Arabic as “kefāya” or “Enough”. 15 The movement was founded in 2004, and
caused controversy and mobility in stagnant waters, and boldly criticized a lot of unprecedented
political, social, and economic policies of the Egyptian regime, especially with regard to what is
known as the issue of the inheritance of power to Mubarak’s son. The movement attracted many
of the political power elite previously housed in traditional political parties and movements, as
well as popular forces and citizens who saw in the movement’s criticism of the regime’s practice
an expression of their political and social oppression.
All of these practices and the interaction between the regime and the political powers formed
the political culture in Egypt. This culture did not change even with a severe change like the 2011
uprising and the ouster of Mubarak. It seemed like it was a temporary change in the people’s
behavior, while the political culture remained the same with a slight change regarding
participation in the political arena and in the elections.
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That leads us to examine what happened in the first so-called democratic referendum to
amend the Egyptian Constitution on March 19, 2011.
This referendum was manipulated in three different ways:
● First, this referendum should not have existed as it was supposed to amend the 1971
Constitution, which had already failed as a result of the revolution. All the
independent scholars, the ones who were not members of the MB, were against the
idea for many reasons: it was not legally acceptable to amend a void constitution, it
was not publicly acceptable to keep the same constitution that was part of the former
regime that people had struggled to end, it was a waste of time and money at time
when the country was already suffering from severe financial issues, the security
situation was not good enough to run a country-wide project like the referendum,
and there was not enough administrative or logistical preparation for it.
● Second, it was clear that the deal between the MB and the Military Council was to
legitimize the MB and allow them to form their own political party, and have the
freedom to advocate for themselves. There was a clear nexus between the MB and
the Military Council; the MB wanted the parliamentary elections as soon as possible,
which would give them the opportunity to win the majority of the Parliament. So they
advocated for voting “yes” to the amendment by basically saying that it was God’s
word to say yes, and with 40 percent of uneducated people in Egypt that was very
popular, which many politicians considered manipulation from the source.
● Third, with all of the rush to do the referendum, there was not enough preparation,
which led to manipulation by unintentional mistakes in the polls. Moreover, the
results themselves were suspicious, since it did not make any sense that although all
the political entities, and all the political figures, and even some religious figures and
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all of their followers said no to the amendment, the results showed that only 30
percent said no.

Religious orientation impact on the political culture and political practice in Egypt
The majority of Egyptians are religious people, and they adhere to their religion, but
unfortunately that has had a bad impact on the political practice in Egypt. It is part of the political
culture that people vote for candidates from the same religion; it rarely happens that people vote
on a political or party agenda basis instead of a religious basis.
The most effective and powerful political movement was the Muslim Brotherhood, the
movement which was established by Hassan Elbana in 1928 to fight against the English
colonization in Egypt, the corruption in political parties, and to reestablish the Islamic Caliphate.
The name of this movement is clearly based on religion, and the most successful way to advocate
for the movement was to say that they were the true believers of Islam and their agenda was to
apply the Islamic law/rules on society.
The MB used their Islamic agenda to achieve their political goals, and they used this agenda
to attract as many followers as they could. They used all of these followers to put pressure on
Mubarak’s regime, which allowed them to make good political deals with this regime. They have
always coordinated with the governing regimes in order to make deals that would allow them to
grow more and more.
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They never announced to the public that they coordinated with the government on any of the
political issues, because one of the most important points that gave them credit in front of people
was that they always appeared to be against Mubarak’s regime, and any coordination with this
regime would make them lose credibility.
The other big Islamic group was the Salafy group; the name refers to ancestors of the Prophet
Muhammad and means predecessors. This group had more followers than the MB, but they were
not as organized as the MB and in the past they never participated in politics. The majority of
them referred to democracy as infidel practice.
They have always had their own radical interpretation to Islamic rules, and they were reluctant
to enter the political arena because their view was that it was better and more effective to reform
societies from the bottom, up. Their strategy therefore was to reform individuals, which would
lead to reform of families, neighborhoods, cities and then the entire society. They never
participated in any elections and they never even participated in the last uprising as they
considered that it was not permissible to oppose the governor of the state, a president, or a king.
Although the majority of countries turn out to be ruled by democracy, the situation in the Arab
countries is different. According to Freedom House, not a single Arab country qualifies as an
electoral democracy. 16 Some Arab countries launched programs of political liberalization but it
was only part of a strategy designed to increase the legitimacy of the rulers of these countries.
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There were some partial exceptions in countries like Jordon, Morocco, Lebanon, Kuwait, Qatar,
and in the Palestinian Authority.
The Arab leaders refused to share their power to make sure that they would be able to protect
their personal interests, and citizens of these countries do not have democratic values and
attitudes. The institutional changes are not enough; the most important thing is that people
transition toward democratic attitudes.
In his study about Islam and democracy, Tessler 17 stated that there is nothing in Islam that
conflicts with democracy and that Islam as a way of life advocates for democracy. He mentioned
that there are many Muslim scholars who have emphasized that Islam advocates and urges rule
by democracy, although there are many other scholars who take the opposite view.
The author used questionnaires about democracy in four Arab countries (Egypt, Morocco,
Algeria, and Jordan) and analyzed the statistics that came out of these questionnaires to prove
that there is nothing in Islam that contradicts with democracy, and that the Islamic orientation
of the majority of Muslims has little impact on their perspectives about democracy. The author
mentioned that he used these four countries since they represent two-thirds of the Arab
population, which would give good indications and better results.
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Although I agree with the author that there is nothing in Islam that contradicts with
democracy, and even I see Islamic rules that advocate for democracy, I disagree with him that
the Muslims’ approach to democracy is the same, and that Muslims see democracy as a good
way of governing in the same way as all other nations.
I will prove in my thesis that the majority of Muslims nowadays do not understand their
religion in good way, and because of this they are close-minded, and follow the formality instead
of the essence of their religion.
I oppose the credibility of the questionnaires themselves as they did not take into account the
different cultures in the Arab countries, and even if the samples were from countries which
contained two-thirds of the Arab population, this does not give information about Arab Muslims
in the Arab Peninsula. The questionnaires did not take into account the culture of the target
population and that they would like to appear more democratic even if they do not believe in
democracy, or that some of them understand that democracy is freedom of speech for
himself/herself only and would never tolerate opposition to his/her opinions.
I will prove all of this through my analysis of the last referendum to amend the Egyptian
Constitution. The referendum became a fight between Muslims who were part of the Islamic
groups “which were considered radical” on one side, and Christians and liberal politicians who
advocated for a secular country on the other side.
The Muslim groups claimed that if you said no to the amendments that would open the door
to change the second article in the Constitution, which proclaimed Islamic rules as the main
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source of legislation, which they were against. It was very clear that their attitude was part of the
deal between them and the Military Council, to accelerate the procedures for the parliamentary
elections, and to guarantee that the majority of seats would go to the MB.
The other side saw the amendments as a waste of time and as having no meaning. The
Christians saw it as a threat from Muslims to their freedom in the country and they advocated
and made every church member vote “no”. So the battle became a religious battle instead of a
political battle.
Although the Egyptian uprising was an extreme change for Egyptians, we cannot call it a
revolution.
Decades of political culture were filled with fears of changes, fears of dictators and a desire
for political stability and development. Some Islamic scholars participated in the interpretation
of some of the Islamic rules as meaning that you cannot disagree with your ruler. Some
sociologists went further and analyzed the Egyptian characteristics as inherited; the way ancient
Egyptians saw the Pharaohs as Gods, modern-day Egyptians by nature see their leaders as Gods.
For decades Egyptians never said no, and never complained, and there were two significant
law cases regarding people who opposed Mubarak.
The first one was against an Egyptian-American sociologist, Saad-Eldeen Ibrahim.
Dr. Ibrahim founded the Ibn Khaldun Center in 1988 with seed money from an academic
prize awarded for his pioneering work in sociology. The focus of the center ranged from the
promotion of democracy to training for non-governmental organizations on public policy issues.
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All center reports reflected the reality of Egyptian life, and he was always expressing his
opinion about Mubarak and his regime and his opposition for Mubarak, and that Mubarak should
step down. Ibrahim was the first one who outspokenly and directly opposed any of the Egyptian
presidents and criticized him and his strategy for running the country.
Mubarak’s reaction was to jail Ibrahim on June 30, 2000 for no real reason. The charges against
him included accepting foreign funds without authorization, disseminating false information
harmful to Egypt's interest, and embezzlement.
Usually political opponents can be jailed in Egypt without a court order, based on the
emergency law that had applied since 1981, which gave the president the right to put a person
in prison for three months in order to maintain order and fight terrorism and organized crime.
There are two critical issues about this right: first, it can be renewed forever, and second, the
president can delegate this right to the Minister of the Interior.
Ibrahim’s case was different; Ibrahim was American as well as Egyptian. He was a professor at
the American University in Cairo, and his reputation and his fame would not allow the regime to
just put him in jail.
In conclusion, the 2011 uprising was characterized by being without a leader or the leadership
of a political party, and without a specific program, or clear ideology. It was characterized by
broad-based public participation by millions in many public places, predominantly Al-Tahrir
Square, Manshia Square in Alexandria, and 40 Square in Suez. The protesters went out in the
street to express their anger against the repressive regime without fear and in a non-violent way.
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Political elites exploited all the signs that preceded January 25 in mobilizing the public to
achieve their political goals by urging for more political participation, and interference in the
decision-making process.
Globalization and access to the Internet played an important role by increasing the discontent
and awareness of the citizen's rights and demands for freedom and change.
The development of a culture of social and political protest in the street, and Egyptians
becoming more positive and courageous in demanding their rights, contributed to the outbreak
of the massive uprising.
The upper middle class had a pivotal role in the uprising; it was concentrated in the urban
governorates of Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez.
The main political reasons behind the uprising at this time included: the inability of the regime
to perform its basic functions, multiple crises that the regime failed to prevent or recover after,
misconduct in political practice by the Executive (based on personalization of power and the
existence of a defect in the state) and the lack of confidence in the regime and its ability to
achieve political and economic development. The government ignored public opinion, and the
emergence of many community-based crises and of the diversity of the media, which have made
the public well-informed of the course of internal and global arenas, and which led to
psychological rebellion against the regime and caused a revolution against authority, especially
with the increasing amount of political frustration.
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Social media played a significant role in organizing and urging people, which made a qualitative
leap in participant numbers. Digital communication means, mobile phones, and cameras, used
by young people in photographing the revolutionary events moment-by-moment, led to the
spreading of the word and urged people and classes of people who had never participated in any
political activity before.
The spontaneous revolutionary uprising and the absence of an alternative capable of taking
power, made it easy for the SCAF to receive power, even if the military did not initiate it, like
what happened in the 1952 coup.
The study will examine the main elements that formed the political culture in Egypt and
caused the failure of real change in Egypt after the ouster of Mubarak’s regime.
The study will examine the history of the political culture and how Egyptians were involved in
the political life, and the fear, restrictions and the hopes behind their participation. It will also
consider the way the Executive used the state of exception to remain in power, and the
justifications for extending the state of exception for decades. It will additionally examine how
the rule of law was manipulated to achieve the Executive’s goals, and the struggle of the Judiciary
to have full independence against the Executive’s will and how the Executive was able to adapt
policy to have a legitimate justification on its face but reality proved it was just fake legitimacy.
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Chapter 1: The Political Culture and Rule of Law
in Egypt
This chapter will examine the political culture in Egypt which influences the political views of
the citizens. Specifically, this chapter will examine the origin of Egyptian political beliefs, the
reasons behind these beliefs and the means through which these beliefs were formed over time.
This chapter will also discuss the manipulation of the law by the Executive and the methods they
employed to pass their agenda, while claiming it was in the best interest of the country. The
Islamist influence on political culture will also be considered, in addition to the effectiveness of
an Islamic agenda in Egyptian politics. The state of exception and emergency laws in the country
will be discussed briefly in this chapter and in more detail in chapter two.
The 2011 uprising in Egypt, or the so-called Arab Spring, was the product of the interaction
between the political culture that had formed in Egypt since the republic of 1952, and the
globalization, communication and social media revolution, which led to the exposure to the world
and the vision of other lives.
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It was expected by Egyptians that every election would be fixed: 18 the presidential elections,
referendums, parliamentary elections, local council elections, professional association elections,
and even social and sports club elections and student union elections in the universities.
Free Officers Movement and the 1952 Military Coup
National security was the justification for all of the electoral manipulation, which started with
the military coup in 1952. 19 Although it started as a military coup by a movement called the Free
Officers, 20 when Egyptians supported the new military government, the Nasser regime called it a
“revolution” instead of a military coup. The Military Council (MC) which took power announced
that they would form a transitional government, and would apply democracy to allow the people
to rule themselves and choose their own government.
The Military Council announced General Mohamed Naguib 21 as the first Egyptian president.
He was the first Egyptian to rule Egypt in a long time, as Egypt had been governed by foreigners
since the end of the rule of the Pharaohs. Despite the talk of democracy, this was the beginning
of an era of unchecked authoritarian rule, and the concentration of power in the hands of the
Executive.
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On December 10, 1952 the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) introduced a
crucial change to the Egyptian political system when it abolished the Constitution of 1923 22 and
the bicameral system.
Then

in

1953,

the

RCC

issued

a Constitutional

Announcement 23 to

“reflect

the transitional nature of the initial phase of the revolutionary era”, which gave the power of the
legislature to the Cabinet, so the Cabinet became both the legislator and the Executive. 24 The
prime minister was General Mohamed Naguib, the head of the RCC, and the RCC appointed the
Cabinet as well.
The Free Officers Movement did not have the societal understanding or political vision to run
the country after they overthrew the king. The Free Officers had an anti-democratic tendency,
and they never trusted the public to share power with them; democracy to them meant a return
to a party system that had already failed.
It became clear after a few weeks that there were two options before them: either finish what
they started and take command of Egypt, or hand over power to civilians, which would mean a
return to their barracks. The majority of the Officers chose to stay in power, not for the best
interest of the country, but for their own personal benefit.
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The Free Officers began to take actual control of the government on August 11, 1952 when
the MC issued a statement calling for the cleansing of the parties. On Sept. 7, the Officers took a
new step and dismissed Ali Maher - who had headed the government for 47 days - and appointed
General Mohammed Naguib as Prime Minister and the Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief
of the armed forces. 25 Subsequently, Law No. 179 of 1952 26 on the regulation of political parties
was passed which regulated the organization of parties. It required notification of the Minister
of the Interior, who had the right to object to the formation of the party within one month of
receiving notification. That was the first step in imposing restrictions on the parties and political
life in general.
Later, the Constitutional Declaration of 1953 was issued which abolished all the political
parties and confiscated of all their money for the people.
The new regime used the law to control the political arena, and eliminate its opponents in
order to control the country. The Executive issued laws and constitutional declarations to set up
new rules, even though it did not have the jurisdiction to do so. The new regime imposed the
de facto state on the country by issuing constitutional declarations, and based its decisions in the
future on these declarations and other laws that were issued by them regardless of their legality.
The justification was to protect the people’s revolution against the old regime and its corrupted
personals.
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Obstacles to the Rule of the Officers 27
The way to rule Egypt was unclear to the Free Officers. Overthrowing the king did not end the
colonial presence in Egypt. Although the British occupation had taken a neutral stance about the
movement of the Free Officers, under the influence of the United States, there were still 75,000
British troops on the banks of the Suez Canal.
Despite the support that they acquired when they overthrew the king, the Free Officers
needed to gather more public support. They therefore took actions to create and increase their
popularity through an agrarian reform law 28 and a foreign investment law. The agrarian reform
law, issued after Prime Minister Mohammed Nagiub was appointed in September 1952,
identified a maximum ownership of 200 acres per person and 300 acres per family. This land
reform was limited since it included only those at the top layer of senior owners. However, the
target of the law was to strike at the upper segment of the large landowners, and to transfer
investments in agricultural land to industry, in addition to gaining public support. The foreign
investment law raised the proportion of foreign capital contribution in Egyptian companies to 51
percent from 49 percent. This law was aimed at encouraging foreign investment, and American
investment in particular.
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However, the fundamental challenge that emerged for the Officers at that stage, which
seemed to be an impediment to their ambitions to rule Egypt, was the mass movement that had
grown over the past few years. The three forces that stood in the Officers’ way were the
opposition parties, other political parties and labor unions.
The Al- Wafd Party, 29 the most popular party, was one of the main forces the Free Officers
needed to get rid of. Once Nagiub became Prime Minister, all of the parties’ leaders were
arrested, starting with Fouad Serageldin, the President of Al-Wafd 30 prior to the Political Parties
Reorganization Act.
The RCC realized that the Officers would not be able to continue in power if the country went
down the parliamentary road because they did not have enough public support to rely upon, to
win in an election against the old parties.
In this context, the Constitution of 1923, 31 which was the basis of the parliamentary system
and protected individual rights and freedoms, was annulled in December 1952. A law was then
passed on January 16, 1953 to abolish all the political parties and confiscate their money. The
next day, there was an official announcement of the formation of the "Revolutionary Command

29

“Wafd Party.” Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Accessed December 31, 2014.
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wafd_Party&oldid=640325570.
30
Wells, Samuel F. and Mark A. Bruzonsky, eds. Security in the Middle East: Regional Change and Great Power
Strategies. Westview Press, 1987.
31
“Farouk of Egypt: 1936-1952.” http://www.faroukmisr.net/report86.htm.

38

Council". 32 On January 23 Egypt became a one-party country when the formation of the
“Liberation Organization“ 33 was announced.
On February 10, 1953 an interim constitution was issued and Egypt was ruled under it for a
transition period of three years. The interim constitution provisions gave full control to the RCC
and the Free Officers to control the political arena. The constitution gave all the powers to the
RCC, 34 including legislative and executive powers.
In September 1953 the rule of the so-called “Revolutionary Court” began, which mainly
prosecuted members of the political parties, particularly Al-Wafd. The Court tried all of its
members under the age of sixty, and sentenced many of them to jail.
Another force was the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which had a close relationship with the Free
Officers Movement before July 23, 1952.
During the following months, the friendly relationship continued between the Officers and the
Muslim Brotherhood. Members of the Brotherhood who had been convicted in assassination
cases were released. Moreover, when the party reorganization law was passed to ban all the
parties, Nasser sought to exclude the Muslim Brotherhood, since they were one of the biggest
supporters of the Free Officers Movement. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood followed the
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direction of Nasser, and changed their declaration of establishment to make sure they would not
be considered a political party. 35
However, this situation did not last long. The MB wanted to have a partnership role in the
government, which was rejected by the Officers.
From the beginning of 1953 until March 1954, the relationship between the Officers and the
MB was unstable. The Officers, and Abdel-Nasser in particular, sought to attract one wing of the
group, led by the head of the Secret Organization of the MB, 36 Abdul Rahman Al-Sindi, against
the other wing, led by Hudaibi, which was seen to take a conservative position on military
rule. The result of this conflict was the exclusion of Al-Sindi’s wing, and he was fired as the head
of the Secret Organization. The MB actively attracted a number of army and police officers, and
sought to contact Muhammad Nagiub when they felt signs of conflict between him and Nasser.
Continued tension between the two sides to the situation exploded on January 12, 1954
during the celebration of the anniversary of the martyrs of the battle of the Suez Canal, when
clashes occurred between students of the Muslim Brotherhood and other students due to the
decision by the Brotherhood to host the leader of the Iranian Islamic group. On January 14 the
RRC issued a decision to dissolve the group; the Council voted by majority with the decision
except Mohamed Naguib who was the only dissenting vote. The Council issued a statement
accusing the group of spying on the movement and recruitment of officers from the military and
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police, and of contacting the British Embassy. An arrest order for Hudaibi and 450 other members
of the group accompanied the statement.
The MB played a key role in the demonstrations that erupted in February 1954 to demand the
return of Nagiub. However, Abdel Nasser was able to neutralize them through the release of their
detainees. Abdel Nasser met Alhudibi in March 1954, 37 and made an agreement on the neutrality
of the MB in the dispute between Nasser and Naguib. The relations between Nasser and the MB
continued to be peaceful until the attempted assassination of Nasser by the MB, known as the
accident of Mansheya, 38 in October of the same year, after which the relationship between them
turned bloody.
Nasser founded the so-called “People’s Court”, on November 1, 1954, four days after the AlMansheya accident.
It is important to note that the court itself was illegal since Nasser did not have the authority
to form such courts. It was an exception court, in which all the judges were military officers. It
was reported that Gamal Salim, the chief justice of the court had not studied law, nor did he have
a law degree. The court’s jurisdiction was very broad and very vague. The court had jurisdiction
over any citizens whose acts were considered treasonous or against the country’s safety or
against the regime or the basis of the revolution. The court’s decisions were final and could not
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be challenged in any way. Exception courts were one of the tools Nasser regime used to set up
the state of exception, which will be discussed in details in the next chapter.
The court issued harsh sentences without regard for its illegality (the People’s Court is
discussed in more detail in the Judiciary Chapter).
Moreover, Nasser started a practice of releasing and detaining opponents with no court
orders, nor judicial review. Nasser released and detained members of the MB according to their
attitude toward him, and whether or not they would agree to support him.
The third force, which was less influential than Al-Wafd and the Brotherhood, were the
Communists. Before July 23, 1952 the Free Officers had established a close relationship with the
Democratic Movement for National Liberation (DMNL), 39 or “HDTO” in Arabic, one of
the Egyptian communist organizations. HDTO used to print the Free Officers’ publications on
their press. When the organization learned that the army was planning to overthrow the king,
they prepared publications to support the Officers Movement. In return, the RCC released all of
the political prisoners, with the exception of 17 Communists.
When the decision was made to pardon the accused in political crimes the Communists were
excluded on the grounds that their crimes were against the economic and social system of the
state.
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When a strike occurred in August 1952 in Kafr El-Dawar, the RCC executed Mustafa Khamis
and Mohamed Albakary. 40 The execution was met with widespread international condemnation
and caused severe embarrassment to HDTO. But that did not lead them to decrease their
cooperation with the Free Officers yet, instead HDTO accused the imperialists of driving a wedge
between the revolution and the Communists.
At the beginning of 1953, many Communists were arrested and dozens of newspapers and
magazines were confiscated. HDTO lost some of its supporters to the Egyptian Communist Party,
which opposed the Officers as a fascist regime.
On January 18, 1953, all political parties were dissolved and banned by Law 17 of 1953 41. A
three year transition period was proclaimed during which the RCC would rule. On February 10,
the Liberation Rally, headed by Nasser, was launched to serve as an organization for the
mobilization of popular support for the new government.
As a result of the escalation of repression against all political groups, the Communists, AlWafd, the Socialist Party, and the Muslim Brotherhood formed a new alliance, the National
Democratic Front (NDF). The NDF demanded the return of the military forces to their barracks,
the restoration of parliamentary life and the rights of political organizations, and the building of
relationships with countries to face Britain. NDF was against the negotiations between the
Egyptian regime and the British to evacuate the English troops from Egypt. NDF opposed the
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agreement to allow ten thousand British soldiers, in the British military base in the Suez Canal
area, to stay. Several members of the Front were arrested in November 1953. At the end of the
year, most of the leaders of the communist organizations and several of their members were
arrested.
In addition, the labor unions represented an important challenge for the Officers to remain in
power. The first step in the effort to control the activities of labor unions occurred in August
1952, when ten thousand workers at the Misr Company for Spinning and Weaving in Kafr ElDawar, went on strike, demanding higher wages and the election of union leaders. Nasser stood
decisively in opposition to the strike. The company was besieged by military tanks, and police
forces opened fire on the workers and arrested about 500 workers, two of whom were executed
after a summary trial.42
The regime dealt with the strike in this manner in order to achieve several goals. On one hand, it
wanted to inform the labor movement that the regime would not tolerate any acts that breached
its stability. On the other hand, it wanted to reassure the local capital and the world that the new
regime had no alliance with the left, and instead was on the capital’s side.
In its efforts to control the labor unions, the regime undermined the independent labor unions
and worked to assure the loyalty of the new labor unions’ leaders to the regime. The fact that
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large numbers of communists and labor union leaders were in prison was helpful to their
mission. Then there was the approval of the law of mediation in labor disputes, which established
the principle of preventing arbitrary dismissal because of union activity, but denied workers the
right to strike or to refrain from working in any way. The prevailing view within the RCC at this
time was that foreign capital was needed to put pressure on workers in order to encourage
investment

and

stability.

Division within the Free Officers
A split within the leadership of the Free Officers appeared in the first weeks of their term of
rule. Over the next two years, this division escalated until it reached its peak in March 1954.
Since the movement was developed by junior officers who had their own agendas, and
originated in the light of the decomposition of the parliamentary system, the officers did not have
any confidence in this system. Nagiub belonged to another generation who considered the
parliamentary system as the best way to rule, and believed that military forces should not be
involved in politics at all.
On June 18, 1952 Egypt was declared a republic and the monarchy was abolished, ending the
rule of Muhammad Ali's dynasty. By October 1955 the new regime had jailed 2,943 political
prisoners,

most

of

whom

were

sentenced

by

the

exception

court.43

Naguib was able to gain widespread public support, unlike other members of the leadership of
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the Free Officers who were seen as anti-democracy. Within a few months the Revolutionary
Command Council, led by Abdel Nasser, started to gain more power and marginalize Naguib.
Hence, democracy had become the slogan of the conflict.

March Crisis 44
The March Crisis was part of the struggle over how to rule Egypt. The crisis began on February
24, 1954 when Nagiub decided to resign from the presidency of the RCC. The next day the Council
appointed Nasser as prime minister, and announced Nagiub's resignation from all his posts. This
announcement was met with rejection from the Cavalry and the public. Massive
demonstrations45 were held in the streets of Cairo and at the universities demanding the return
of Nagiub and the imprisonment of Abdel Nasser and Salah Salem. Former parties, most notably
Al- Wafd, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Communists, participated in the demonstrations. The
crisis was temporarily ended by Nasser's decision, based on a delegation from the RCC, to
reinstate Nagiub as President of the Republic.
This development did not resolve the dispute. The police had arrested dozens of the
demonstrators, and Nagib called for the release of these detainees and an investigation of the
attack on the demonstrators but he did not have enough power to give orders to the Ministry of
Interior, which was controlled by Nasser. The RCC met on March 5 and decided to take action
44
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immediately to elect a constituent assembly to meet in July of the same year to discuss the new
constitution. The Council decided to cancel press censorship and abolish martial law before the
parliamentary elections.
Each party sought during the next few weeks to assert its authority against the other. Naguib
focused on gaining public support by holding public meetings with trade unions, political parties,
and pro-democracy forces. In order to enhance his party’s strength in the face of its opponents,
Nagiub called for a public referendum to vote on his presidency. 46
The RCC took another route; they tried to solve the disputes between the Officers, and to
establish a new party that reflected the Council.
The RCC met on March 25 and issued important decisions which included allowing the
establishment of political parties, resolving the RCC on July 24 (the same day as the upcoming
parliament) and prohibiting the Council from forming a political party. These decisions coincided
with the release of the detainees, including the members of the Muslim Brotherhood and their
leader. Abdel Nasser visited the leader of the MB immediately after his release. This visit signaled
a pivotal change in the position of the Muslim Brotherhood; they were allowed to resume their
activities in exchange for taking a neutral position on the conflict.
It is important to mention that the majority of military officers opposed these decisions. 47
During the past two years, these officers enjoyed unprecedented benefits either through their
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participation in the management of the ministries, or by slipping into cronyism as followers of
some leaders. Therefore, in general, the trend among these officers was the refusal to return to
their barracks, not only for fear of accountability, but also in order to maintain their new
privileged status.
Following the issuance of the March 25 decisions, the Liberation Rally secretary and the
secretary general of the Federation of Transport Workers organized a workers’ sit-down, claiming
fear of losing the rights they gained after the “Revolution” such as the prevention of unfair
dismissal. The Federation of Trade Unions in Upper Egypt paralyzed all methods of
transportation, and demonstrated - demanding the fall of “Democracy”. There were reports that
numbers of soldiers wearing civilian clothes took part in the demonstrations. 48
Many of the civil society organizations demonstrated and demanded democratic reform, the
immediate abolition of martial law, the demise of its offshoots, and the release of detainees. At
the top of these organizations were the Press Syndicate Council, the lawyers’ association and
Cairo University students. Protesters demanded the immediate end of the Revolutionary
Command Council and the formation of an alliance government to run the elections.
In this struggle, Nasser’s wing was more organized and the majority of the military officers
supported him, therefore they were victorious. On March 29, the RCC decided to defer the March
5 and March 25 decisions. On April 15, the Council met again and took action to degrade their
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opponents, the so-called “anti-revolution powers”, by announcing the pressing of charges against
former officials for political corruption in previous eras, and depriving them of any political rights,
and fighting corruption by cleansing the press. On the same day the RCC also dissolved the
Syndicate of Journalists and the Lawyers’ Council. The RCC’s decision prevented all former
ministers who held office between February 6, 1943 and July 23, 1952 from engaging in any
political activities. This decision affected the leadership of the popular political parties.

Special Courts
The new regime used the special courts to avoid the Judiciary and to secure desired rulings
against the opposition, which meant that they would not be rejected by the normal judges nor
would the image of the Judiciary be tarnished.
As seen after the Kafr al-Dawar labor strike, the RCC appointed military officers as judges in a
special military tribunal to try “the enemies of the revolution”. The court’s mandate and
procedures were questionable, and the court decided within a week to execute two of the labor
union leaders.49
In September 1953, the RCC responded to the discovery of a so-called “cell of old regime
supporters” (which, funded by aid from foreign governments, aimed to restore the regime), by
issuing a decree to form the “Revolution Court”. 50 The RCC once more appointed its members as
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judges of the court, and the court’s mandate was wide and flexible in order to try individuals for
the newly created crime of “working against the interests of the country and against the integrity
of the Revolution”.51 The court targeted the Al-Wafd party and other old political party leaders
in order to neutralize them and prevent them from forming a political party that could oppose
the new regime. The court put the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood on trial for the
assassination attempt of Nasser, and decided to execute a number of them. It was clear that the
court was formed to serve a political purpose. Attempted murder is a well-defined crime in the
Egyptian Penal Code and therefore they did not need a special court to be set up. The leaders
were not charged with a crime under Egyptian law but still, they were tried and sentenced.
Along the same line, the “People’s Court” was formed in November 1954, and the court’s
mandate gave it jurisdiction over all crimes against the revolution, even if a crime had already
been tried by a normal court. This established a precedent that showed that the country’s new
constitution was whatever the RCC decreed.
In 1954 when Naguib tried to apply democracy and allow people to choose their president
through a free election, he was arrested by the RCC, and Gamal Abd-Elnasser took power.
Nasser was the first one who rigged the elections for himself in order to be the president until
he died; 52 Nasser prevented the formation of any political parties and suspended all the existing
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ones. He formed one political entity called The Socialism Union and every Egyptian had to be a
member of this union in order to participate in politics or to be qualified to hold a government
position. Nasser severed democratic action by suspending the State Council, which was an
independent court that specialized in administrative cases against the Executive. By manipulating
the political sphere and controlling the Judiciary, Nasser started his dictatorship in modern Egypt.
Nasser adapted Arabian Nationalism as his own agenda to make Egypt a great country, and he
supported all the liberalization movements in all of the Arab countries and in Africa. In order to
achieve his dream to unite all Arab countries, he had to be in charge, so he justified to himself
that it was in the country’s best interest to have him as president, and he continued his policy to
forge the people’s will. His justification to the public was that Egypt was in the middle of a war
and that it would be stable under his leadership.
When Sadat came to power, he followed almost the same dictatorship claims, that Egypt was
in the middle of a war and that it needed to be united and stable under one leader. After Sadat’s
victory in the 1973 war, and his great step to achieve permanent peace with Israel, he justified
all his acts against democracy, claiming that it was a moral task, to achieve and maintain peace
with Israel.
Egypt post Nasser era
In 1981 Mubarak came to power with the perfect set-up to justify anti-democratic actions;
former President Sadat had been assassinated by a radical Islamic group, as part of a plan to take
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over power in Egypt. The Parliament announced an emergency law for a temporary period in
order to help stabilize the country. This temporary period lasted for 30 years.
It was Mubarak’s choice to keep the emergency law as his best tool against his opponents. He
claimed that the emergency law would be used for nothing else but fighting terrorism and drug
cartels. In the name of fighting terrorism, Mubarak’s regime was successful in eliminating or at
least minimizing his opponents’ influence in the political arena.
The most effective group in Egyptian politics was the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) group, which
was made illegitimate by a court ruling in 1965 after an assassination attempt committed by the
group. Even though they were a very organized entity, and fought hard to form their political
party, they ultimately failed. They were exposed to severe actions from the Mubarak regime,
especially during the last 10 years, when the State Security Investigation Service (SSIS), one of
the Egyptian intelligence agencies, discovered a top secret MB document that contained a plan
for, as they called it, the “Invasion of Egypt”.53
The “Invasion of Egypt” contained their plan to take control of the whole country from the
bottom to the top, and to change the regime to form their own Islamic country. The MB
repeatedly failed to have a controlling stake in the Parliament, mainly because of the SSIS’s
manipulation of the elections. Since the MB failed to form their political party for decades,
instead, the MB decided to become members of all the social, professional and political entities
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in the country and run for the elections in all of these entities in order to control them all. This
would help them to achieve two main goals. First, control over the majority of these entities
would give them more power against the government, and give them the opportunity to recruit
more members. Second, by showing people by example how good they are at running and
administrating public and social entities, they were in effect advocating for themselves to be
given the bigger responsibility of governing.
This leads to an important point, as a result of what was mentioned above, that Egyptians
never trusted any elections since they were always expecting them to be manipulated in some
way. For example, this might happen before the election by eliminating some MB members from
the election, during the election by forging the votes, or after the voting by announcing false
results.
Rigging elections had become part of the Egyptian political culture; almost everyone in all
branches of the government and most of the candidates had participated in one way or another
in manipulating elections. The SSIS was manipulating the election by coordinating with the key
players: judges, election officers, the candidates themselves, and even the opponents. Many
deals had been made between the SSIS as a representative of the government and the MB to
allow top important candidates from the National Democratic Party (NDP) to win, 54 and in return
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allow candidates from the MB to run for the elections in other geographic areas, and sometimes
allow them to rig their own election to guarantee a seat.
This political culture and the absence of the rule of law has had a huge impact on Egyptian’s
lives and it will take time to change. Even with this long history of rigging and manipulating all
kinds of elections, none of the officials who participated in these crimes were ever charged.
Moreover, no one has ever sued officials, individuals or an organization for rigging or forging
elections. Forgery is a felony under Egyptian law but no cases have ever reached the court. Many
legal cases were filed to challenge election results, on the basis of forgery, but the officials who
were involved in it were never convicted. 55
Egyptians do not have issues with the actual laws themselves. As a civil law country, Egyptian
laws were based on the French codes and they were well written except for a few laws that have
recently been adapted or changed to achieve certain benefits to certain people or to certain
groups of people. However, Egyptians do have an issue with the rule of law in practice. No one
respects the law in Egypt, even the government itself; everyone tries to manipulate the law as
much as possible, in order to win. Even within the legal profession, the good lawyers in Egypt are
those who have a reputation of manipulating the law in order to win their cases. Police officers
are well known for disregarding the law, and other officials manipulate the law in one way or
another. This practice has become expected, acceptable, and widely encouraged.
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The Absence of the Rule of Law in Egypt
Throughout the history of Egypt subsequent to the military coup of 1952, there were always
reasons not to enforce the laws by the Executive, or to even sometimes design a new law to serve
the Executive’s goals. The application of the law had always been interrupted by the Executive
for the reason of so-called “National Security”.
Until March 26, 1979, when the Egyptian President, Anwar El Sadat, and the Israeli Prime
Minister, Menachem Begin, signed the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel in Washington,
D.C., the war was the justification. Egyptians almost never complained about the breakdown of
laws for the sake of the war.
Because the Executive was manipulating the law in order to achieve the president’s will and
goals, it became normal for Egyptians not to respect the law. Laws did not mean anything and
were seen as just a piece of paper that the Executive was using to take advantage of the citizens
and control relationships between them.
The public accepted the state of emergency, and the arguments that, “No voice is louder than
the war’s”,56 and “the Parliament is the master of itself”, 57 so the Parliament’s refusal to
implement any judgment related to the Parliament’s membership became the trend in politics.
These arguments, which were taken for granted over time, had a large impact on the formation
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of political culture and the way people reacted to the Executive, and accepted the political
misbehavior of the Executive/President. The Parliament refused to accept any judgments
regarding the validity of the membership of the parliamentary members. Therefore, if a
candidate proved that another candidate won the seat by a rigged/forged election, and obtained
a judgment against the candidate, the Parliament would refuse to implement this judgment. The
Parliament’s argument was based on the immunity of its members, which was unconstitutional
according to the Article 93 of the constitution, which gave the State council the jurisdiction over
this matter.
The Parliament in Egypt was considered the most important branch of the government.
According to the text of the 1971 Constitution 58, the People's Assembly shall assume legislative
authority, approve the general policy of the state, the general plan for economic and social
development and the general budget. The People's Assembly oversaw the Executive. The
Constitution gave immunity to members of parliament who were performing their duties in the
Assembly or on its committees.
The Parliament had five main roles that interacted with the other branches of the government,
while still observing the separation of power principle.
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First, as a legislator, because the laws in Egypt as well as all the civil law countries are created
by parliament or by the president or by both, it depends on which political system the country
adapts. Judges just apply the laws, they do not create them.
The president and every member of the People's Assembly had the right to propose laws, and
the Assembly would then discuss the draft of the law. The People’s Assembly had jurisdiction
over the president’s law decrees. The decrees had to be presented to the Assembly during fifteen
days if the Assembly is in session or at the first meeting of the Assembly in the event of dissolution
or if it were not in session.
The Constitution also stipulated the need for parliamentary approval of peace treaties,
alliances, trade and maritime treaties, and all treaties involving modifications in the territory of
the state or that contained state treasury expenditures not included in the budget.
Second, the role of parliamentary oversight, which was based on the principle of the balance
of powers, meant that the People's Assembly oversaw the work of the Executive. The ministers
were individually and collectively responsible to parliament, in line with the Constitution.
It is worth noting that the main reason it was important for the president to have the upper
hand over the Parliament was that the Assembly had the authority to press criminal charges
against the president if this was proposed by at least a third of its members, and could issue an
indictment with the consent of two-thirds of council members. That is why throughout history
the president never gave the chance for the opposition to have excessive representation in the
Parliament. The most members the opposition had in the history of the republic was in the 2005
57

Parliament when the Muslim Brotherhood won 81 seats out of 450. This election was under full
judicial supervision, and it was one of the fairest elections in the history of the republic.
Third, the approval of the state’s general plan and budget, as well as the military budget, even
if it was part of the Executive’s role, was never discussed in Parliament. Although it might have
been against the Constitution at that time, it was widely accepted and no questions were raised
about it.
Fourth, for the role of amending the Constitution, the president and the Parliament had the
right to demand modification of one or more articles of the Constitution. Two-thirds of the
Assembly had to approve the request in order for it to be sent to a referendum.
In December 2006 Mubarak used this power and proposed the amendment of the
Constitution, which he alleged was necessary for democracy and giving citizens equal citizenship
rights, with no discrimination. Under Mubarak’s influence the People’s Assembly rapidly
approved the amendments, regardless of the opposition members who were boycotting the
discussion in Parliament.59
Last, in their role of being able to make a declaration of war or declare an emergency state,
the renewal of the emergency state was done underhandedly under the influence of the
president and the Executive.
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The People's Assembly was dissolved three times before the 2011 uprising, either by a
presidential decree or by a court order under the influence of the president.
The first time was in 1979 by a decision of the president 60. President Sadat issued a decree to
dissolve the People's Assembly, so that parliamentary members could not interfere with the
Camp David Accords,61 which led to the Peace Treaty with Israel.
The Supreme Constitutional Court ruled to dissolve the People's Assembly for the second time
in 1987, and invited citizens to elect a new Assembly. In its opinion, the court stated that this
Assembly, which had been elected in 1984, had not allowed independents to run in the election,
which violated the principle of equality of citizens which was enshrined in the Egyptian
Constitution.
The third time occurred on May 19, 1990 when the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that
the combination of regular party lists and individual election lists in the Parliament was
unconstitutional, and ruled that the Assembly election was therefore void. The reasoning was
that the People's Assembly law No. 38 of 1972, and its amendment Law No. 188 of 1986, which
stated that each Constituency is entitled to one member elected individually, and the rest of the
members have to be a member of a party and the party as a whole gets a quota - is
unconstitutional. In September 1990, Mubarak issued a decree to suspend the Assembly’s
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meetings, and called for a referendum to dissolve the People's Council in October 1990; however,
the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled to suspend the implementation of the decree and then
dissolved the People’s Assembly and redid the elections based on the individual system.
The difference between the three cases was mainly the degree of international community
support and the amount of public support.
In 1979, Sadat had international support for his decision to make peace with Israel, and he
took advantage of that by dissolving the Assembly to eliminate the opposition. Sadat capitalized
on the public support he gained after his victory in the war on October 6, 1973, and instead of
using a constitutional way to ratify the Accord, he dissolved the People’s Assembly.
In the other cases where Mubarak did not have such international community support nor any
public support, his regime needed to show the world that Egypt was a democratic country that
upheld the rule of law. It was widely known that the court decisions were political ones, rather
than legal ones. The regime set up the election system knowing that it was unconstitutional, as
a backup plan in order to be able to void the Parliament in case the opposition won seats that
could make them effective in the Parliament.
The rule of law implies that all citizens, including the lawmakers and the Executive, are subject
to the law. By bypassing the laws and giving political judgments, the Parliament and the
Executive were role models for not respecting the law, and for destroying the rule of law in the
country.
60

There were many cases that could be seen where one of the government branches did not
respect the law, and then it started to be the traditional way of dealing with the Judiciary, and
the cultural norm to bypass the law by any means. This culture went all the way from the top from government officials, to the bottom - to everyday people in the streets.
The danger of this phenomenon was that it became the cultural norm, no one complained
about it anymore, no one fought to achieve justice, all of the people fought for their own benefits
regardless of the methods they had to use.
The Executive used this culture to suppress the opposition, so that no one would complain
about justice, everyone would expect that the elections would be rigged/forged, and that the
only goal was how to win an election, instead of developing a democratic way of guaranteeing a
fair and non-manipulated election.
While the unique point about Egyptian laws is that they exist to be breached, the majority of
laws in Egypt are well written laws; Egypt has the oldest legal system in the world, starting
thousands of years ago. Egyptians scholars have written almost all of the laws and the
constitutions of the Arab countries. It would be hard to find a lawyer who had studied civil law in
an Arab country and who had not also studied at least one book written by one of the Egyptian
scholars (e.g. Abd El-Razzak El-Sanhuri, 62 Sufi Abu Taleb, 63 etc.).

62

“Abd El-Razzak El-Sanhuri.” Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Accessed December 26, 2014.
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Abd_El-Razzak_El-Sanhuri&oldid=568265056.
63
“Sufi Abu Taleb.” Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Accessed January 10, 2014.
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sufi_Abu_Taleb&oldid=639321801.

61

We can differentiate between three eras for Egyptian laws. First, before 1952, there was a
democracy in Egypt and an independent legal system. This allowed legal scholars to create laws
that reflected Egyptian needs and expectations for equality, justice, and freedom.
Second, came the era of the military coup, when wars greatly impacted everything, even laws.
It was the start of referring civilians to military courts, where there was no appeal from the courts’
decisions, and the court procedures were questionable.
The last era could be called the Mubarak era, when for the first time, you could find laws
written for a certain group of people’s best interest. For example, only in Egypt would you find
income tax laws that charge the same percentage of tax on people who earn 20,000 USD, as
people who earn billions (with a big B) of dollars.
During the Mubarak era the last and the most severe manipulation done by his regime to the
Constitution was when the president proposed an amendment for the Constitution which added
three articles on the requirements for presidential candidates, which basically made it impossible
for anyone to meet the requirements except Mubarak and his son Gamal. 64 Under the same
amendment, an article was also added to outlaw the formation of political parties on a religious
basis. The Mubarak regime used the Constitution as a tool against the MB in order to ban them
from participating in the political arena.
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The main point is that even with good laws, when it becomes the culture/practice to
manipulate the law in order to win, this leads to distrust between the people and the government
and between individuals. Then when the government passes a new law, everyone inspired by the
conspiracy theory will try to analyze why this law and why now, and for whose sake; no one
would believe that the government could pass a law just for the good of the country or the
people.
In some cases the situation is the opposite, sometimes the government would pass an
objectionable law or a law that would not be in the country’s best interest just to make people
happy, regardless of the impact of the law on the country economically or politically. Therefore
even when the government is trying to make people happy they manipulate the laws, which leads
in the end to the same situation of injustice and inequality involving both procedures and
substance. 65

2011 Mass Uprising, the Reasons
A revolution or a similar unrest situation was predictable and foreseeable for scholars,
politicians and even the regime itself. There were many official reports about an upcoming
revolution or mass uprising; even Egyptian movies predicted a revolution.
Many factors clearly pointed toward this situation:
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● corruption: 66 a nation-wide survey conducted in mid-2009 by the Cairo-based AlAhram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies found that 47 percent of small and
medium businesses in Egypt were forced to offer government clerks cash bribes in
order to obtain business licenses and then had to continually bribe them in order to
avoid fines
● economic problems and poverty
● police force misconduct
● the emergency law
● unemployment levels
● the manipulation of elections
● The preparation for the presidential election, and the understanding that Mubarak’s
son would become president. 67
What had not been predicted was the type of people who were rising up against Mubarak. It
was expected that there would be a revolution by the hungry lower classes, not a massive middle
class uprising. This class of people, which is the backbone of any society, was almost eradicated
by the Mubarak regime.
Middle and upper class youths started everything on a Facebook page. They created a group
months prior to the revolution called “We are all Khalid Said” and the aim of the group was to
highlight the police force’s misconduct against Egyptians. According to this group, Khalid Said 68
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was a victim who died while being tortured by police officers in the street. This case was widely
reported in the media, and became one of the most controversial cases of police brutality and
the practice of the regime as a whole. Almost everyone blamed the Ministry of the Interior for
the murder as part of the systematic misconduct and the police officers’ practice of torturing
people. The group aimed to encourage Egyptians to challenge the regime’s disregard of human
rights. What happened here was similar to the foundation of the Podemos party69 in Spain,
except these youth never form a political party and never reached the power. I believe the
difference in each situation outcome was based on the political and legal culture in both
countries: Egypt and Spain.

In the beginning, the members of the group encouraged all Egyptians to join them in Tahrir
Square 70 in downtown Cairo, in their peaceful protest against the government’s practice of
restricting the political freedom of Egyptians.
All the political parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, 71 one of the biggest political
movements in Egypt and which was illegal at the time and also considered a radical Islamic group,
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refused to participate and their opinion was widely announced.72 Their reaction was common
and justifiable, as all the political entities used to coordinate with the former regime before
acting.
The Salafi movement 73 took a position that was even more drastic. They announced that all
the demonstrations against the legitimate ruler were against the Islamic rules, and that they
would not participate in such demonstrations. They stated that the participants were committing
a sin by doing so. 74
The initiators of this revolution were youths who did not belong to any political party and had
never participated in political activities before. They started with no unified leadership and with
few demands, but with silence from the government side as to their demands, these demands
went higher and higher.
Three days later, when it became clear that something different would actually happen this
time, all the political groups started to appear in the square, all of them claiming that they were
there from the beginning, and some groups like the Muslim Brotherhood went further and
claimed that they were the initiators of the uprising.
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While the uprising was initiated on Facebook by non-organized youths reacting against the
corrupt practices of the Mubarak regime, leadership shifted into the Muslim Brotherhood’s
hands after only three days. During this time, trained members of the MB organized everything
for the unorganized youths who started the uprising. 75 They provided logistics, established field
hospitals, and also coordinated with the media. This last aspect was the most important because
the Muslim Brotherhood had a good relationship at the time with Aljazeera, and they used this
relationship in order to do two important tasks during the revolution:

● to act as if they were the creators of the revolution, and the coordinators of it
● to advocate for the revolution itself to guarantee more numbers of people would
come, and build up their support so that they would not lose everything. They took
advantage of people by getting the media to show that all of these normal people are
followers
Later, in the streets, the MB led the mob 76 to destroy the buildings of the State Security
Investigation Service (SSIS), one of the Egyptian intelligence agencies, which was responsible for
fighting them and other radical Islamist groups. This agency had the worst reputation in the
country, because during Mubarak’s rule it switched from its moral task of protecting the country
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against terrorism and anything related to national security, to that of an agency that would do
anything to protect the Mubarak regime.
SSIS officers have immunity from any consequences for their actions in torturing people and
manipulating the elections. Although they do not have legal immunity by law, it exists in practice.
During the last few months before the uprising, three major incidents happened with the SSIS.
These incidents illustrated how powerful and outside the law the SSIS was.

● In one of the SSIS offices in Rosita (“Rashid” in Arabic) in Egypt’s Delta, the SSIS
arbitrarily detained dozens of citizens who were part of an illegal human trafficking
ring from Egypt to Italy through the Mediterranean Sea. An SSIS officer, Major Ali
Rezek, kept them in detention even after the general prosecutor decided that they
should be released, so the lawyers of these people reported their illegal detention to
the general prosecutor. When the general prosecutor tried to approach the police
station where these people were detained, the SSIS officer threatened him and
ordered the soldiers to open fire on him and his assistants if they tried to approach.
There were no consequences for this incident at the time. The incident appeared on
the news once, and then the SSIS prevented all the media from mentioning it again.77
After Mubarak was ousted, the case was tried and the officer was sentenced. 78
● On New Year’s Eve 2011, there was a suicide bombing in front of al-Qiddissin (Saints)
Church, 79 one of the most crowded churches in Alexandria, the second biggest city in
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Cairo. Dozens of people died because of the attack. All terrorist attacks used to be
investigated by the SSIS, however, with out-of-date methods of investigation, the SSIS
arrested hundreds of Islamists to investigate them, which meant that they would be
tortured. During their investigation, a 30-year-old father, Said Belal, died while he
was being tortured, 80 and the SSIS officers just sent him to a hospital.
What happened next was really provocative for everyone. First, they forced the
hospital to announce to the public that they had found Belal alive in front of the
hospital and that he then died of a heart attack. Second, they forced his family to take
his dead body and bury it secretly at night, and prevented them from taking any legal
steps immediately. 81
Third, when human rights organizations filed a case at the office of the prosecutor
against the SSIS to prove that Belal died by torture, the SSIS intervened and made the
general prosecutor announce that there was no suspicion of any criminal acts in his
death. The general prosecutor’s speech itself was very provocative because it was not
professional and conflicted many times with legal rules and logic. 82
Finally, they forced the leaders of Islamist groups in Alexandria, especially the
leaders of the Salafist, to announce that Belal’s death was a mistake and to give a
long speech about how Muslims are supposed to be patient, and encouraged their
followers not to react to their friend’s murder.83
● The third incident was the parliamentary elections which happened in December
2010, where the SSIS rigged the majority of the elections and controlled them for the
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National Democratic Party (NDP), the ruling party in Egypt for more than 50 years.
They even intervened in the social and professional associations’ elections.
As can be seen, the law was never applied equally, but was instead applied politically. For
example, in the above-mentioned cases, the SSIS was strong enough to protect their officers from
the law. The regime needed the SSIS’s power to pass the inheritance of the presidency, so it was
acceptable not to charge the SSIS for their violation of the law.
After the uprising and the overthrow of Mubarak, for political reasons it was important to the
Military Council to terminate the SSIS as a key player because it held important secrets against
the regime in general and the military in particular.
Cases that had already been tried, were re-opened and the SSIS officers were charged
regardless of the Double Jeopardy Principle in the Egyptian Penal Code. In other cases the SSIS
officers were tried and sentenced for acts that were not criminalized by the Egyptian Penal Code,
in violation of the Egyptian Constitution. Article 77 of the 1971 Constitution stated, “No crime
nor punishment except by law.” The famous case of the destruction of the SSIS documents84 does
not have any legal basis in Egyptian law.
Religious Orientation and Political Culture in Egypt
The majority of Egyptians are religious people and adhere to their religion. Unfortunately, this
has had a negative impact on political practice in Egypt. People vote for candidates from the same
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religion as a result of the political culture. It has rarely happened that people vote for a political
party based on its agenda instead of their religious beliefs.
The most effective and organized political movement in Egypt is the Muslim Brotherhood,
which was established by Hassan Elbana 85 in 1928 to fight against English colonization in Egypt,
corruption in politics, and to reestablish the Islamic Caliphate. The name of this movement is
clearly based on religion. The most successful way to advocate for the movement was that they
are the true believers of Islam and their agenda is to apply Islamic law/rules on society.
The MB used their Islamic agenda to achieve their political goals and to attract as many
followers as they could. They used all of these followers to put pressure on the Mubarak regime,
which allowed them to make good political deals with this regime. They have always coordinated
with governing regimes in order to make deals that would allow them to grow more and more.
They never announced to the public that they coordinated with the government on any
political issues, because one of the most important points that gave them credit with people is
that they always appeared to be against the Mubarak regime, therefore any mention of
coordination with this regime would make them lose credibility.
The other big Islamic group was the Salafy group; the name refers to the ancestors of the
Prophet Muhammad, and means predecessors. This group had more followers than the MB, but
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they were not as organized as the MB and in the past they never participated in politics. The
majority of them referred to democracy as infidel practice.
The Salafy group always had their own radical interpretation to Islamic rules, and they were
reluctant to enter politics because their view was that it was better and more effective to reform
societies from the bottom up. Their strategy therefore was to reform individuals, which would
lead to reform of families, neighborhoods, cities, and then the entire society. They never
participated in any elections and they did not even participate in the last uprising as they
considered that it was not permissible to oppose the ruler of the state, whether it was a president
or king.
In his article, Do Islamic Orientations Influence Attitudes Toward Democracy in the Arab
World? Evidence from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria, M. Tessler (2002) analyzed the
phenomenon.
Although the majority of countries end up as a democracy, the situation in the Arab countries
is different. According to Freedom House, not a single Arab country qualifies as an electoral
democracy (Karatnycky 2000; Sivan 2000:70). Some Arab countries launched programs of
political liberalization but it was only part of a strategy designed to increase the legitimacy of the
rulers of those countries. There were some partial exceptions in countries like Jordon, Morocco,
Lebanon, Kuwait, Qatar, and in the Palestinian Authority.
Arab leaders refused to share their power to make sure that they would be able to protect
their personal interests, and the citizens of these countries do not have democratic values and
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attitudes. Institutional changes are not enough; the most important thing is that people
transition toward democratic attitudes.
The author Clearfield has stated that there is nothing in Islam that conflicts with democracy
and that Islam as a way of life advocates for democracy. He mentioned that there are many
Muslim scholars who have emphasized that Islam advocates and urges rule by democracy,
although there are many other scholars who take the opposite view.
Clearfield conducted surveys through questionnaires about democracy in four Arab countries
(Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Jordan) and analyzed the statistics that came out of these
questionnaires. He used the results to prove that there is nothing in Islam that conflicts with
democracy, and that the Islamic orientation of the majority of Muslims has little impact on their
perspectives of democracy. The author mentioned that he used these four countries since they
comprise two-thirds of the Arab population, which would give good statistics and better results.
Although I agree with the author that there is nothing in Islam that conflicts with democracy
and that Islamic rules advocate for democracy, I disagree with him that all Muslims’ approach to
democracy is the same, and that Muslims see democracy as a good way of governing in the same
way as all other nations.
The Muslims attitude toward democracy is mainly because of a misunderstanding of the
religion, and because of some, close-minded Islamists that pay attention to the formality instead
of the essence of their religion.
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I oppose the credibility of the questionnaires themselves since they did not take into account
the different cultures in the Arab countries, and even if the samples are from countries which
contain two-thirds of the Arab population, this does not give data about Arab Muslims on the
Arabian Peninsula. The questionnaires did not take into account the culture of the target
population and that they would like to appear more democratic even if they do not believe in
democracy, or that some of them understand that democracy is freedom of speech for
himself/herself only and would never tolerate opposition to his/her opinions.
The 2011 referendum on amendments to the Egyptian Constitution is a good illustration of
this phenomenon. The referendum turned out to be a fight between Muslims who were part of
any Islamist groups “which were considered radical” on one side and Christians and liberal
politicians who advocated for a secular country on the other side. Instead of focusing on the
political and legal aspects of the referendum, which was the main direction that the liberals
followed, the Islamists turned it to a fight against Islam.
The Islamists claimed that if you said no to the amendments that would open the door to
change the second article in the Constitution, which proclaimed Islamic rules as the main source
of legislation. It was very clear that their attitude was part of the deal between them and the
Military Council, to accelerate the procedures to the parliamentary elections, and to guarantee
that the majority of the seats would go to the MB.
The other side saw the amendments as a waste of time and as having no meaning. The
Christians saw it as a threat from Islamists to their freedom in the country and they advocated
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and made every church member vote “no”. The battle became a religious battle instead of
political battle.
My view is that the Military Council and the MB manipulated the referendum in three different
ways:
● First, this referendum should not have occurred as it was supposed to amend the
1971 Constitution, which had already died as a result of the uprising and the
overthrow of the Mubarak regime. All of the independent scholars, the ones who
were not members of the MB, were against the idea for many reasons. Some of these
reasons were that: it was not legally acceptable to amend a void constitution, it was
not publicly acceptable to keep the same constitution that was part of the former
regime that people struggled to end, and it was a waste of time and money at a time
when the country was already suffering from severe financial issues. The security
situation was also not good enough to run a countrywide project like the referendum,
and there was not enough administrative nor logistical support to prepare for it.
● Second, it was clear that the deal between the MB and the Military Council was to
legitimize the MB and allow them to form their own political party, and freely
advocate for themselves publicly. There was a clear nexus between the MB and the
Military Council; the MB wanted the parliamentary elections to happen as soon as
possible, which would give them the opportunity to win a majority in Parliament.
Therefore they advocated for voting “yes” to the amendment by telling people that
it was God’s word to say yes. With 40 percent of the population in Egypt being
uneducated, this was very popular. Many politicians considered it manipulation from
the source, and I call it “falsifying awareness”.
● Third, with the rush to do the referendum, there was not enough preparation, which
lead to manipulation by unintentional mistakes in the polls. Moreover, the results
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themselves were suspicious, since it did not make any sense that although all the
political entities, and all the political figures, and even some religious figures and all
of their followers said no to the amendment publicly in advance and encouraged
people to vote NO, the results showed that only 30 percent refused the amendment.
Although the Egyptian uprising was an extreme change for Egyptians, it could not be called a
revolution.
Decades of political culture were filled with just fears of changes, fears of dictators and a desire
for political stability and development. Some Islamic scholars participated in the interpretation
of some of the Islamic rules as meaning that people could not disagree with a ruler. Some
sociologists went further and analyzed Egyptian characteristics as inherited, therefore the way
ancient Egyptians saw the Pharaohs as Gods, and modern-day Egyptians by nature see their
leaders as Gods.
For decades, Egyptians never said no, and never complained, and for good reason since there
were significant law cases regarding people who opposed Mubarak (which will be examined in
detail later). One of the most significant ones was the Ibn Khaldun Center case.
The case was against one of the Egyptian-American sociologists, Dr. Saad-Eldeen Ibrahim. Dr.
Ibrahim founded the Ibn Khaldun Center in 1988 with seed money from an academic prize he
had been awarded for his pioneering work in sociology. The focus of the center ranged from the
promotion of democracy to training for non-governmental organizations on public policy issues.
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All center reports reflected the reality of Egyptian life, and Ibrahim was always expressing his
opinion about Mubarak and his regime and his opposition for Mubarak and saying that Mubarak
should step down. Ibrahim was the first person who outspokenly and directly opposed any of the
Egyptian presidents and criticized him and his strategy for running the country.
Mubarak’s reaction was to jail Ibrahim on June 30, 2000 for no real reason. The charges against
him included accepting foreign funds without authorization, disseminating false information
harmful to Egypt's interest, and embezzlement.
Usually political opponents may be jailed in Egypt without a court order, based on the
emergency law that had applied since 1981, which gave the president the right to put a person
in prison for three months in order to maintain order and fight terrorism and organized crime.
There are two critical issues about this right: first, it can be renewed forever, and second, the
president can delegate this right to the Minister of the Interior.
The Ibrahim case was different because he was American as well as Egyptian. He was a
professor at the American University in Cairo, and his reputation and his fame would not allow
the regime to just put him in jail.
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Chapter 2: The State of Exception86
In chapter one we talked about the state of exception and how it came into play, the purpose
of this chapter now is to talk about it in more details and to show its impact on rule of law and
how government officials could manipulate it.
As we have seen in chapter one, the Egyptian republic was born in 1952 in a state of exception,
and it continued in that manner until the uprising of January 2011. This chapter will explain this
proposition and rely on the analysis of Agamben in The State of Exception. 87
The state of exception was used as a political survival strategy. There were always
justifications for the exceptions, which never ended. The state of exception was the critical
imbalance between public law and the realpolitik. The Executive still used the same ancient
maxim that “necessity has no law”. 88 Necessity was never precisely defined, and wide powers
were given to the Executive, with no judicial review.
The state of exception was supposedly a temporary state brought on by an emergency
situation; either an external situation, such as a war, or an internal problem like a civil war or a
revolution.
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Historically, there are examples where a state of exception lasted for a longer time, and was
used to control citizen’s lives. One of the most obvious examples in modern history is Hitler’s
Germany. In the early 1930s, the Great Depression made living conditions in the country very
hard. Millions of Germans were unemployed. The majority of German citizens did not trust the
weak Weimer government. All of these circumstances made it ideal for a new leader like Hitler
and his party, the National Socialist German Workers' Party, to rise and promise Germans a new
future.
In order to achieve this prospective future, shortly after Hitler came to power on February 28,
1933, he announced the suspension of the Article of the Weimer Constitution that concerned
personal liberty.
As we will see, similar circumstances, promises, and justifications were given in Egypt
throughout history. It started with the new republic in 1952, and the justification was to protect
the “revolution”.89 Nasser, as a charismatic leader, over-promised the citizens of Egypt a
developed, modern, prosperous country and asked them for their cooperation, and the state of
exception was presumed to be necessary due to the war with Israel.
Sadat’s era had similar promises and threats. After the war at the beginning of his rule and
then his victory in the October 1973 war, he was looking to build a new country and establish
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capitalism in Egypt. After the signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 1979, he added a new
justification, which was to protect the peace.
We will see how Mubarak was creative in mixing both the reality of the state of exception and
the factitious one in order to stay in power for three decades. After Mubarak, the instability of
the country was due to the so-called revolution. This was a new model of the state of exception
for Egypt.
Agamben explained the root of the state of exception in Western democracies, and how that
may have led to the state of exception becoming the common state of the country. The citizens
of any country under a threat of war or imminent danger will accept a state of exception. The
Executive expands its power over the legislative branch; by issuing decrees it has the power of
making laws.
After a while, the state of exception becomes unnoticeable to the public. They would think it
was normal, a phenomenon which is called the normalized state of exception.90 The passage of
time alone can normalize what should otherwise be a short term of governance.
World War I and World War II were excellent justifications for the state of exception. Agamben
listed how the phenomenon repeatedly happened, in the history of Western countries, in almost
the same circumstances. Agamben explained how World War I matched with a permanent state
of exception in the majority of the involved countries, and even continued after the war.
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Because the Egyptian judicial system was derived mainly from its French counterpart, it is
important to list more precedents. For instance, early in 1924, for economic reasons and in
response to the exchange crisis that struck France, the Parliament abandoned its own
constitutional powers for four months, and granted the Poincare government full power over
financial matters.91
Similarly, hundreds of decrees that had the force of law were issued by the Laval
government in 1935, and it was noted that many of them did not have a clear relationship to
the act that was voted for by the Parliament. 92
The exceptional practice of legislating by executive decrees became more acceptable by all
political sides, even after the war. It took time to return to a normal democracy, but it did happen
in the end.
The same situation occurred around the time of World War II; Daladier’s government from
1938-on acquired the power to issue decree laws, used this power excessively, and also used the
defense of the nation as justification. 93 Although the Parliament remained in session, all
legislative actions were undertaken by the Executive.
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In the present French Constitution, Article 16 is devoted to the state of exception. The Article
states that, “The president of the Republic may take all necessary measures, when the
institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of its territory, or the
execution of its international commitments are seriously and immediately threatened and the
regular functioning of the constitutional public powers is interrupted." De Gaulle invoked Article
16 only once, in April 1961, in response to the Algerian Crisis. The president issued 16 decrees
which gave the police and the courts broader powers. Based on how this Article had been used,
it was not expected that the Parliament would issue ordinary legislation during the state of
emergency. 94
The normalization of the state of exception in all of the Western democracies became the
governing rule of the new governments. It was always easy to find a justification for the state of
exception. In order for the public to take it for granted and not even think about it, invoking
national interest has always been the way to justify, unjustifiable actions.
It is clear that France and the other countries that Egypt derived its legal system and
Constitution from, 95 eventually snapped back to normal democracy. In Egypt, although the
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Constitution provided for such normality, it never occurred. What became normal, was the state
of exception.

The United States and the State of Exception
There was a remarkable difference in the response of the United States' Judiciary and the
Executive regarding the state of exception and the expansion of the Executive’s powers between
1952 and 2001.

The Steel Seizure Case 96
The limited states that expanded with World War II tells even more about the compelling story
of a democracy resisting the demands of wartime. In April 1952, during the Korean War,
President Truman issued an executive order commanding the Secretary of Commerce to seize
and operate the nation's steel mills, in response to the strike by the United Steelworkers of
America.
It is important to recite the Supreme Court ruling and the reasoning behind it.
In Youngstown, the court dealt with a nation-wide strike of steel workers in April 1952, which
many believed would jeopardize national defense. President Truman issued an executive order
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ordering the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate most of the steel mills. The order was
not based upon any specific statutory authority, but was based generally upon all powers vested
in the president by the Constitution and laws of the United States and in his position as president
of the United States and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The Secretary issued an order
seizing the steel mills and directing their presidents to operate them as operating managers for
the United States in accordance with his regulations and directions.
The president promptly reported these events to Congress, but Congress took no action. It
had provided other methods of dealing with such situations and had refused to authorize
governmental seizures of property to settle labor disputes. The steel companies sued the
Secretary in Federal District Court, pleading for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The
District Court and the Court of Appeals held:

1. Although this case has proceeded no further than the preliminary injunction stage, it is ripe for
determination of the constitutional validity of the Executive Order on the record presented (pp.
584-585).
(a) Under prior decisions of this Court, there is doubt as to the right to recover in the Court
of Claims on account of properties unlawfully taken by government officials for public use
(p. 585).
(b) Seizure and governmental operation of these going businesses were bound to result
in many present and future damages of such nature as to be difficult, if not incapable, of
measurement (p. 585). [343 U.S. 579, 580]
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2. The Executive Order was not authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and
it cannot stand (pp. 585-589).
(a) There is no statute which expressly or impliedly authorizes the President to take
possession of this property as he did here (pp. 585-586).
(b) In its consideration of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, Congress refused to authorize
governmental seizures of property as a method of preventing work stoppages and settling
labor disputes (p. 586).
(c) Authority of the President to issue such an order in the circumstances of this case
cannot be implied from the aggregate of his powers under Article II of the Constitution
(pp. 587-589).
(d) The Order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President's military
power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (p. 587).
(e) Nor can the Order be sustained because of the several provisions of Article II which
grant executive power to the President (pp. 587-589).
(f) The power here sought to be exercised is the lawmaking power, which the Constitution
vests in the Congress alone, in both good and bad times (pp. 587-589).
(g) Even if it be true that other Presidents have taken possession of private business
enterprises without congressional authority in order to settle labor disputes, Congress
has not thereby lost its exclusive constitutional authority to make the laws necessary and
proper to carry out all powers vested by the Constitution “in the Government of the
United States, or any Department or Officer thereof” (pp. 588-589).
Justice Black, who delivered the opinion of the Court, stated that:
The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress
or from the Constitution itself. There is no statute that expressly authorizes the President
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to take possession of property as he did here. Nor is there any act of Congress to which
our attention has been directed from which such a power can fairly be implied. Indeed,
we do not understand the Government to rely on statutory authorization for this seizure.
There are two statutes which do authorize the President to take both personal and real
property under certain conditions. However, the Government admits that these
conditions were not met and that the President's order was not rooted in either of the
statutes. The Government refers to the seizure provisions of one of these statutes (201
(b) of the Defense Production Act) as “much too cumbersome, involved, and timeconsuming for the crisis which was at hand”.
Remarkably, in almost all cases, the state of exception was between the executive and the
legislative branches. It happened because of political consideration between the two powers.
The courts were always indecisive, and never involved in political issues. Therefore in the steel
case, Justice Black considered nothing but the American Constitution and emphasized the
importance of not making future precedents by agreeing with the president’s actions. The
emphasis was on Congress’s powers, and taking into consideration the national interest, not the
president’s decision.

The Bush Administration and the State of Exception
Shortly after the 9/11 attack, Bush issued an executive order to expand law enforcement
powers to investigate and detain foreign nationals in connection with terrorist activities.
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Bush’s military order authorized “indefinite detention” and trial by military commissions.
Unlike the long history of the rule of law in the United States, Bush’s order removed any legal
status of the detainee, which meant that individual rights according to the American criminal law
and criminal procedures, and as protected by the American Constitution, did not apply in these
cases. 97 The detentions were not subject to any judicial oversight; Agamben compared the
detainees’ status to the status of Jews in Nazi camps.
There was strong opinion that this order was more dangerous to the United States than the
terrorist attacks themselves, because of the danger of turning the country into a dictatorship.98
It was outstanding that in American legal history, habeas corpus rights were always protected.
The American federal Constitution of 1787 provided for the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act
in Article 1, section 9, clause 2.99 The suspension was limited to cases of invasion or rebellion.
There were cases when the president on his own, or with Congress’s approval, had suspended
the right: inside the United States in South Carolina in 1871 for the trial of the Ku Klux Klan; 100
and in United States' territories: once by the territorial governor of the Philippines in 1905 (in
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connection with the local revolt); and by the territorial governor of Hawaii during World War II
after the attack on Pearl Harbor. 101
In Rasul v. Bush case 102 the Supreme Court upheld habeas corpus, the court ruled that there is
no lawless zone in Guantanamo, it is US territory and because the United States exercised
"complete jurisdiction and control" over the base, the right of habeas corpus can be exercised.

We will see later how the Egyptians under the emergency law were subject to a similar status
during the whole republic period. It varied between de facto detentions with no de jure status,
and detention based on an executive order with no judicial oversight.
The situation in Egypt was different. The president had full control over the legislative branch
and the Judiciary, which had a large impact on freedom and the rule of law.

Permanent State of Exception in Egypt
The situation in Egypt ranged between a “real state of exception” and a “fictitious state of
exception”.
When a state declares a state of exception and martial law, the regime knows very well that
it runs the risk of destroying public freedom and human rights in the country. The risk of the state
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of exception is that it may backfire on the regime itself. The more pressure you put on the people
in the country, the more the people will have a tendency to explode. 103
The Egyptian regime under Mubarak understood this idea and tried to calm angry people by
adapting strategies that would make the regime appear more democratic. The regime allowed
democratic parliamentary elections under full judicial supervision in 2000 and 2005, which was
part of this practice to make the regime look better. 104 The justifications of the supreme national
interest, and the safety and stability of the country never ended. A kind of balancing act took
place, where the security needs of the state always won out.
By examining the real politic in Egypt, we can conclude that the head of state’s interest in
staying in power for as long as possible was the reason behind the state of exception in Egypt.
Between 1954 and 2011, the Egyptian presidents stayed in power until they were deceased,
or were forced to step down. Gamal Abdel Nasser 105 was in power from 1954 until he died in
1970, Anwar Sadat 106 was in power from 1970 until he was assassinated in 1981, and Mubarak 107
was in power from 1981 until he was forced to step down by the military in 2011.
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In comparison with the United States, we will see that between 1954 and 2011, only three
Egyptian presidents were changed, while 11 American presidents were changed; six of them
during Mubarak’s rule of Egypt.108
The Egyptian Parliament had routinely renewed the emergency law109 for three decades, and
the process for renewing the law appeared to be a democratic process. The president sent the
law to the Parliament and the Parliament renewed it. The reality is different however, since the
National Democratic Party (NDP), the president’s party, controlled the Parliament the entire
time. 110
The members of the NDP were not tied together by any ideology but through more of a
bargain between the elite, the stakeholders, and the Executive.
The emergency law and the anti-terrorism law, which partly amended Egypt’s Criminal
Procedures Code, gave the police the right to detain and interrogate suspects without arrest
warrants. Under these laws, the president or his delegates had the authority to issue detention
orders. The president delegated the issuing of detention orders to the Minister of the Interior,
and by such administrative orders, the police could detain a person for up to six months. By law
the detainee had the right to appeal the executive order before a court. What used to happen
was that the court would rule in favor of the detainee, and order his release. The practice was to
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release the detainee only on paper and then reissue a new order to detain him, and the circle
would go on for years.
The Constitution, the criminal procedures law, and the international treaties111 that Egypt
signed and ratified guaranteed the citizens’ civil rights. Regardless, international and local reports
indicated violations of the Constitution and the international treaties. One of these important
reports was the United Nations’ Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism (2009). 112 In
this report, the Special Rapporteur examined the emergency law, the provisions of the Criminal
Code relating to terrorist offenses, and the amendment of Article 179 of the Constitution, which
provided the legal framework for the ongoing fight against terrorism in Egypt. The report
expressed concern about the possibility of relying on exceptional powers to arrest suspected
terrorists and detain them, and then try them under the normal anti-terrorism law. It also
expressed concerns about the continuation of administrative detention, the renewal of detention
orders without a trial, and the failure to comply with court orders to release detainees - in
violation of international standards. The report observed the use of special courts to try
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suspected terrorists, including the use of State Security Courts and military courts, and called for
measures to ensure compliance with fair trials.

The Legal Framework for the Emergency Law
According to Article 154 of the 1971 Constitution, which was repeated in the Constitutions of
2012 and 2014, the president may declare a state of emergency, “according to the method
regulated by law”. Through the endorsement of a declaration of a state of emergency, the
Parliament extends the Executive’s powers, suspends individual rights, and puts restrictions on
basic freedoms.
Historically, there was a series of laws governing the declaration of a state of exception in
Egypt. The first Egyptian law in this regard was Law No. 15 of 1923, which was often used in the
customary way developed by the British occupation authorities, which was to serve their own
interest. Article I of the Law read, “Martial Law may be declared whenever there is a threat to
security or public order in the land of Egypt, whether due to enemy armed forces attack, internal
disturbances; to secure the armed forces and to ensure food supply and the protection of
transportation, in the Egyptian Kingdom”.
Martial Law No. 533 for the year 1954 113 was the first emergency law in the republic but was
exactly the same as the previous law. Although there was no declaration of a state of emergency
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during the period when it was in force, it was there and ready to be used to justify the regime’s
exceptional power.
The Law authorized the Executive to declare martial law whenever security or public order in
the Egyptian territories were at risk, whether because of an incursion by enemy forces from
abroad or disturbances at home.
Once martial law was declared, the Law granted the Executive broad powers, which were
often used against individual freedom and human rights, and to oppress opponents.
This Law was later replaced by Law No. 162 of 1958, 114 which is still in force even today. The
only change was that the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) ruled as to the unconstitutionality
of item 1 of Article III of the Law, which authorized the president to order warrants for arrests
and detentions, and searches of places and persons without compliance with the provisions of
the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Law 162 of 1958 115 regulates the state of emergency. The Law allows the president to declare
a state of emergency in the case of war or any situation of unrest, with no specific definition of
the term “unrest”. The state of emergency grants the president wide powers, including the power
to arrest and detain people irrespective of the due process of law, and the power to confiscate
private property. Specifically, the president shall appoint military officers as judges for special
courts that will judge civilians, and these court rulings are final and the defendant cannot appeal
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except with the president’s permission. We will see in the last part of this chapter how the police
force was used excessively by the president to stabilize the state of emergency.
Article II of the Law provides that the president shall decide on the declaration of a state of
emergency as well as its termination. When the president issues a decree, it must include a
statement explaining the emergency, specify the area covered and the date of entry into force,
and must also refer the state of emergency to the People's Assembly within fifteen days following
the decision. Moreover, if the Parliament were dissolved, the decree must be referred to the new
Assembly at its first meeting. If the resolution is not presented to the Parliament on the date
referred to, or not approved by the Council, the state of emergency is considered expired.
The state of emergency may not extend beyond the period specified in the decree declaring a
state of emergency without the consent of the Parliament. The state of emergency expires on its
own if it is not approved before the end of the period.
The Law itself was issued by a presidential decree, and many guarantees were included in the
law, however, in practice it was easy to bypass. The Executive always had the upper hand on the
Parliament and it was easy to pass any decree that the president desired to issue.
Article III provides that once the state of emergency is declared, the president enjoys wide
powers including: putting restrictions on the freedom to hold public meetings and on people’s
movements, the ability to arrest and detain suspects or dangerous persons, and the power to
conduct inspections of persons and places without complying with the provisions of the Criminal
Procedure Code. This Article also gives the Executive the right to monitor communications and
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press releases, publications, and inspect all means of expression and advertising prior to
publication and to disable, confiscate and close printing places.
The Law gives the Executive the right to order any person to perform any work, seize any
property, withdraw licenses of arms and ammunition and order the evacuation of some areas
and organize means of transport. The president may expand these rights set forth in the Article
and he shall refer his resolution to the Parliament at its first meeting.
The Law was issued as a decree law by the president, who did not have the right to issue such
laws in the first place. The Law had some formalities as guarantees against the misuse of the
Executive’s powers, however in practice all the powers were under the president’s control, as
can be seen in the previous chapter.
The Law gave the Executive wide powers to the extent that everyone become a suspect until
proven otherwise. The Executive could arrest citizens with no due process of the law, and with
no respect to the Criminal Procedures Code, or to the Penal Code. The Law made it seem as if the
normal status for people was to be behind bars, and that it was their duty to prove that they
should be free. In practice, even if a detainee’s appeal against his arrest was granted by a court,
the Executive would issue a new decree and keep the detainee in an endless circle.
A state of exception has existed in Egypt since 1952, the state of exception was formally
recognized by law since 1958, and sometimes even without the need to issue emergency
legislation, which is a big issue when you cannot prove a de facto state of emergency.
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The Egyptian government, and Mubarak himself on several occasions, stated that the renewal
of the emergency law was to face a set of "destabilizing factors" that it considered was a source
of risk to the national security of the country.
In many cases, all the procedures complied with the law, so you could not tell whether it was
the state of exception or a state of emergency. It was common practice that government officials
claimed that the regime respected the human rights and complied with its entire international
obligations. One of these cases was the Egyptian government’s response to the Committee
against Torture, 116 which stated in part: “There is nothing in the [Emergencies] Act that could
serve to nullify the provisions of the Penal Code relating to the offences of torture, wrongful
imprisonment or the use of cruelty…. Hence, the crime of torture and other crimes continue to
obtain, even when a public emergency has been declared in the country.”
It is a normal law, a normal court, but with the corrupted application of the law. Mubarak’s
regime succeeded in this way in normalizing the state of exception.

Independence of the Judiciary and Normalization of the State of Exception 117
The most effective method that Mubarak used to normalize the state of exception was to
control the Judiciary in order to ensure that every act his regime took would be legally covered.
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Political opponents like Saad Eldeen Ibrahim, 118 Ayman Nour, 119 and Ibrahim Essa, 120 were brought
before a normal court, not military one. All procedures were correctly followed in front of regular
judge. Even when Nour had immunity by law as a parliamentary member, 121 all procedures were
taken to remove this immunity as described by law. Nevertheless, the manipulation of the
legislature as well as the Judiciary was very clear. Procedures that usually took at least a month
to be done (if they were done at all), took only a few hours before the judgment was ready to
be announced to the public.
During the last 10 years of Mubarak’s presidency there was a battle between Mubarak and
the Judiciary over the independence of the Judiciary; Mubarak won this battle.122
Carl Schmitt, in his book Dictatorship, 123 had a set of ideas that could be significant in the
context of Egypt’s situation. One of the main ideas outlined the importance of the existence of
the state of exception in protecting the normal state. In a sense, a dictatorship is required to
protect stability, and disabling the constitution is necessary to protect the constitution itself later.
Schmidt differentiated between what he called a “constitutional dictatorship”, which is a
situation that is not outside the law and the constitution completely, and occurs when an election
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is the basis of the dictatorship, and what he called a “dictatorship based on sovereignty”. In the
second case the laws and the constitution are disabled, so that another constitution can be
created.
Mubarak’s dictatorship was based on a combination of both cases, he was the elected
president, the presidential elections were legal, but the legitimacy of his presidency was
questionable.
Egyptian elections have always met the legal requirements, but actual participation rates were
always low, which in a way reflected the public’s feelings about the whole process - that it was
settled, no matter what, and that voting under the prevailing conditions would not make any
difference to electoral outcomes. There were a lot of factors that prevented free and fair
electoral participation; Egypt remained under an emergency law, which gave the police force the
ability to ban or break up marches, demonstrations, and public meetings related to the elections,
as well as the right to detain individuals without pressing charges. Over the course of 2010,
especially in the weeks prior to the presidential election, the regime used these powers to
disperse gatherings and prevent individuals from exercising their rights of freedom of association
and assembly and freedom of expression - all essential freedoms for free and fair elections. 124
The judiciary’s role in any country is to resolve social conflicts and maintain individual rights.
States rely on the existence of margins of reasonable independence of its judiciary to create more
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stable environments. In Egypt the main reasons for giving the Judiciary some independence were
to attract direct foreign investment and to prevent a revolution. Mubarak’s regime made some
sacrifices by putting some corrupt officials and members of the ruling party on trial from time to
time. The preservation of the ultimate goal, the stability of the regime, was the most important
goal behind these minor sacrifices.
Mubarak's regime was in a crisis of survival during the last 10 years of his rule. The crisis came
because Mubarak tried to comply with some laws and the Constitution in order to give his rule
more legitimacy and to show the world the democratic basis of his regime. His goal was to
improve the image of the regime in order to gain time to peacefully transfer the power to his
son. On the other hand, he wanted to comply with certain laws - not all the laws - that had no
impact on his rule or on the transfer of power to his son.
For Mubarak’s regime, the ultimate goal, to maintain the state and stability, became less
important than the goal of maintaining the regime itself in power.
The performance of the government and the ruling party reflected the confusion that faced
the regime. Since 2000 Mubarak’s regime applied full judicial supervision on elections. The
regime requested, in an indirect way, that the judges not only ignore the rigging of the elections,
but that they also stay silent. The Executive requested the judges to be silent on practices125 such
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as: attacks on voters, the prevention of voters from voting, 126 and even attacks on the judges
themselves. In a scene that had not happened in the history of Egypt except only once or twice,
the 1954 attack against the judges of the State Council, “Judge Al-Sanhoori”, showed that 127
Mubarak’s regime was no longer tolerating the independence of the Judiciary.
After the parliamentary election in 2005, which was supervised by judges, the Judges’ Club
announced that only 10 cases had been investigated out of more than 165 cases of assault on
judges during the parliamentary elections. That was the beginning of the clash between Mubarak
and the judges who called themselves the Independent Judges Movement, 128 in defiance of the
dependency of the Judiciary in general.
It might appear that the Supreme Constitutional Court could supervise and control the power
of the president, in order to ensure that a democratic regime emerged which was dedicated to
the separation of powers. This was an illusion, the reality is that the regime allowed that in just a
few cases, but when it came to more important issues, that would have no effect on the
president’s powers.
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On May 4, 1985, the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court ruled on Case No. 28: principles
of governance regulating the authority of the president of the republic to issue legislation.
The court ruled that Law No. 44 of 1979, which amended some provisions of the laws of
personal status, was unconstitutional.
One of the reasons the court provided was that the Constitution gave the president of the
republic jurisdiction over issuing decrees that have the force of law in the absence of Parliament.
The Constitution put two strict conditions on allowing the special legislation permit to the
president. The absence of the Parliament, and the presence of exceptional conditions justified
the need of immediate measures as a response to the exceptional conditions. Measures could
not be delayed until a session of the People's Assembly. Taking into consideration that the
Constitution requires two conditions for the exercise of the exceptional legislative power, the
Supreme Constitutional Court extended its rule to verify the existence of these two conditions.
Article 74 of the 1971 Constitution, which governed the Mubarak era, gave the president the
ability to exercise his authority if any unusual circumstances arose which needed immediate
legislative intervention from the Executive. Article 74 provided that, “In case of danger that
threatens the national unity or the safety of the nation, or hinders the institutions of the State
for the performance of its constitutional role. The President is to take quick measures to address
this threat, to issue a statement to the people, and invite them to vote on a referendum on the
taken measures within sixty days of its adoption.”
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This Article quoted inaccurately from the text of Article 16 of the French Constitution of
1958; 129 however, Article 74 of the Egyptian Constitution expanded the president’s authority and
gave him endless power.
In comparison to the source of this article, in the French Constitution, it is noted that the
French text considered that the reasons justifying the president's extraordinary powers are those
that result in the interruption of the orderly functioning of the branches of the government.
However, in contrast, the Egyptian constitutional legislator considered that any disability and not
just a disabled state institution in the performance of its role, allowed the president use of these
extraordinary powers.
The French text of the above had commented that the president, as a precondition, should
take the opinion of the Prime Minister and President of the National Assembly, the President of
the Senate, and President of the Constitutional Council, into account before engaging in any
special powers. Nevertheless, we find that Article 74 of the Egyptian Constitution may only
require that the president direct a statement to the people, and hold a referendum on these
measures within sixty days of their adoption, which in practice means that the Executive could
manage to have the desired results anyway.
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It was known in advance what the results of the referendum would be. In fact, most of the
people did not vote in the referendum and the results did not reflect the opinion of the people.
Moreover, the text of Article 74 exaggerates the authorities that the president can enjoy.
Articles 108 and 147 of the Constitution delegate to the president, whether in the presence of
the People's Assembly, or in their absence, the authority to issue decrees that have the force of
law to meet any exceptional circumstances.
Even if Article 74 was used only once, in September 1981, 130 when President Sadat issued an
executive order for the arrest of 1,500 political and religious leaders, student union members and
the closure of all non-governmental newspapers, it was there all the time to dictate the state of
exception.
The text of this Article was very broad and there were no definitions of any of the terms that
were used in the Article. The Executive could use any event and describe it to be a threat to the
unity of the nation.
For example, in Sadat’s speech to the nation regarding his arrest decisions, he described the
arrestees as a sect that tried to create a sectarian division in the country. He added that the
regime tried to warn them more than once, and that their recent acts threatened the unity of the
nation, that they were using violence and threatening innocent people, and trying to escalate the
situation, which then required the use of Article 74 of the Egyptian Constitution.
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There was no judicial review of these decisions nor a legal description of the acts these people
committed, nor a statement about whether these acts were criminalized by the Egyptian Penal
Code.
The arrests were made for a higher political goal, which was the completion of the Peace
Treaty between Egypt and Israel. The Treaty was indeed an important political goal for Egypt and
the whole region, but the Executive used illegal methods to achieve this goal.
Sadat justified the detentions so as not to give Israel a pretext to evade the implementation
of its commitments to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula. The Israeli prime minister asked Sadat
about guarantees to ensure the continuation of Egypt in the commitment to peace with Israel,
since there was strong opposition to him. President Sadat intended to release the detainees after
the implementation of Israel’s promise to withdraw.

Legislation Dedicated to the State of Exception in Egypt
Law No. 162 of 1958 on the state of emergency, 131 which was issued by Nasser, was always
the basis for the declaration of martial law and the state of emergency. The regimes of Nasser,
Sadat, Mubarak and Morsi all used the same law as a basis to declare a state of emergency. The
MB’s regime used the same law as a basis for the decision of the president, Presidential Decree
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No. 45 of 2013, regarding the declaration of a state of emergency and curfew in the governorates
of Port Said, Ismailia and Suez on January 27, 2013. 132
The SCC ruled on the constitutionality of item 1 of Article III in this Law: "The authorization of
the president to issue arrest and detention orders, searches, places and persons orders without
compliance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure" was ruled unconstitutional on
June 2, 2013. The court stated that the law governing the state of emergency had to be bound
by the legislative framework, and most importantly not violate any other provisions of the
Constitution. The issuance of an emergency law based on the Constitution did not grant a license
to violate the rest of the Constitution’s provisions.
This ruling came after a long time. The case was filed on April 20, 1993, and the Executive
decided not to rule on it for 20 years. The ruling was one of the benefits of the removal of the
Mubarak regime.
Cases like that showed the struggle of the Judiciary to have more independency, the Judiciary
was willing to intervene to defend the rule of law.
One of the most unique laws that allowed the state of exception in the country was Law No.
105 of 1980 on the establishment of the State Security Courts.133 The Parliament agreed on the
Law under the influence of the Executive, and the Law established exceptional courts as named
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above. It was the first time that the exceptional courts were institutionalized in Egypt. These
courts were considered as another attack on justice and the rule of law in Egypt for many reasons:

● The law allowed the inclusion of two military officers as judges, and the president could
appointment them directly.
● The rulings of the State Security Courts were final and could be challenged only by appeal
to the Cassation Court, which deprived the defendant of the right of appeal to the Court
of Appeal. An appeal before the Cassation Court was an expensive and lengthy process,
plus the court only accepted appeals in cases where there were errors in the application
of the law.
● The president or his delegates could retry any of the cases before them, ratify them, and
refer them to the regular court. The Article allowed extreme intervention in the Judiciary
by the Executive; it allowed the president to retry any case for any reason if he did not
like the ruling of the State Security Court.
Law No. 95 of 2003 annulled the State Security Courts Law and transferred all of its cases to
the courts provided for by the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Formal declarations of a state of emergency:
● The first time that martial law was declared after independence was early in September
1939 after the outbreak of World War II, under Law No. 15 of 1923. Martial law was
terminated in October 1945.
● In May 1943 after the Egyptian armed forces were involved in a war in Palestine, which
was then lifted in April 1950, except for the provinces of Sinai and the Red Sea.
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● On January 26, 1952 after the Cairo Fire.134 The Law lasted for four years, and the July
1952 coup happened during this period.
● In November 1956 after the Suez Crisis, 135 also known as the Tripartite Aggression against
Egypt. This lasted for eight years.
● After the June 1967 war, the Six Days War. 136 The emergency lasted thirteen years this
time, and was ended on May 15, 1980 by President Sadat a few months before his
assassination.
● Following the assassination of President Sadat on October 6, 1981, the state of emergency
was renewed annually until April 1988. After 1988 the renewal occurred every three
years.
It is noticeable when reviewing the reasons for declaring a state of emergency before and
after the republic that the Egyptian Kingdom always declared a state of emergency due to war
except in the case of the Cairo Fire in 1952. The state of emergency was limited in time as well
during the Kingdom, when there were political powers and a real separation of powers. However,
it was declared under the republic for reasons attributable to internal security unrest, and for an
unlimited time.
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Egypt was ruled under the emergency law since it was declared in 1939. A fair assessment of
the state of emergency in modern Egyptian history proves that the Executive predominates over
the constitutional protection of individual rights and civil liberties. The Executive’s supremacy
over the legislative branch and the Judiciary and its excessive use of the emergency powers,
which threatened the separation of powers, did not succeed in achieving the claimed purpose of
ensuring the security and stability of the country.
Most importantly, the way each regime used the emergency law was the same - the same
approach, the same breaches of human rights and individuals’ freedoms, and the same
justifications.
Under emergency laws, there have been many major political assassinations. In the time of
the British occupation of Egypt, the guerrilla war broke out against the occupation forces under
martial law, and the Free Officers Movement toppled the entire regime in July 1952. In the era
of the republic, it was the same. The state of emergency did not prevent attempts to assassinate
Nasser (the “Mansheya” incident 137 was the most famous one), or Sadat, or prevent Hosni
Mubarak and Mohamed Morsi from being overthrown.
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Chapter 3: Rule of Law and the Police Role138
Egyptian police played a considerable role in kindling the Egyptian sentiment of resentment
against consecutive governments since the 1952 coup, 139 and such feelings of hostility towards
the police were exacerbated over the last ten years of Mubarak’s rule, culminating in January
2011. Perhaps choosing the Police Day for the uprising against Mubarak’s regime is the most
prominent proof of this point. 140
The police authority is the state tool for the preservation of security and order, and for the
enforcement of laws enacted by the legislature. It is also a tool that is used for the interest of the
community in a way that reflects positively on the interest of the individual. For the police
authority to carry out the duties assigned to it, it is required to overcome several security
challenges. Additionally, police work necessitates the imposition of restrictions and
commitments that the public should respect, and which can, in one way or another, limit the
freedom of the individual. Such limitation is unwelcome by citizens, and contributes to the tense
relations between them and the police. This is a natural consequence in most communities. The
138
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more developed the community is, the more its individuals accept adherence to the laws and
understand the nature of police work, recognizing that it is in their personal interest. Yet this is
dependent on the observation of equality in law enforcement, and on maintaining the rule of law
as the basis and the criterion for ruling relations among individuals, and between the individuals
and the state.
The situation in Egypt is different however, since law enforcement is dependent on many
elements. This dependency led to a public feeling of selective justice, which in turn intensified
the public sentiment of injustice, and provoked enmity against the police, since they were the
Executive enforcing the law. Interestingly, individuals are used to venting their wrath on the
police authority, no matter whose mistake it is. For instance, enforcement officers are blamed
for corruption in the courts, even though what happens is that mistaken judgements are passed
against certain citizens due to mistakes in the litigation process, resulting from either deliberation
or negligence. Corruption has penetrated all the Egyptian state institutions, including the
Judiciary. In this example, the result is personal enmity between the “wronged” citizen and the
police, not between the citizen and the Judiciary. Perhaps this is all due to the state of public
resentment against the police. Yet it is the common people’s sense that justice is selectively
administered which undermines the relations between the people and the police, in light of the
absence of the rule of law. The law is not enforced against many sectors in the community, and
selective law enforcement ranges from giving traffic tickets, to the enforcement of judicial
110

decisions in criminal cases. A feeling of oppression is therefore experienced by a taxi driver, who
primarily lives on driving, when he is suspended for a violation while in the meantime he sees a
judge, a police or army officer, a parliamentary member, a famous actor or soccer player escape
a penalty for the same violation. Such a feeling of oppression escalates enmity towards police
authority.141
It should also be noted that the extent of the state’s dependence on the police negatively
reflects on the extent of the regime’s legitimacy. The more the regime loses part of its legitimacy
due to erroneous political practices, the more it depends on the police authority in recompense,
lending the latter broader power.
Furthermore, the regime drew on a security-based solution in face of numerous phenomena
that cannot be fully worked out through security-based solutions alone. Terrorism probably
comes at the top of such phenomena, having expanded in the 1980s and 1990s in Egypt. The
Egyptian regime, however, drew on police authority alone to combat it. As is the case in many
undemocratic - or even some democratic - countries, the war on terrorism as a threat to national
security was a pretext for many erroneous practices that led to the naturalization of the state of
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emergency in Egypt. Ultimately, the ruling regime employed the police as a formidable shield
against potential overthrow by the people.142
In order to understand the reasons behind the feelings of hostility between the police
authority and the Egyptians, an internal image of the police during the pre-January 2011 period
should be outlined.
According to the Police Corps Act, 143 the police is a disciplinary authority that is composed of
the following:
1. Police officers
2. Lieutenant-chief warrant officers
3. Police agents
4. Privates and warrant officers
5. Staff officers and policemen
6. Disciplinary patrolmen
According to practical reality, however, those working in the police are classified into two
categories. The first category is the officers, who are at higher educational, financial, and social
levels, and hold higher educational degrees, such as a Bachelor of Law and Policing. Also, a
specific social and educational level is required for admission to the Police Academy, to which
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twenty thousand-odd students apply annually, with only a thousand candidates admitted.
Moreover, the acquisition of a Bachelor of Law entitles a graduate of the Police Academy to enrol
in all judicial bodies and diplomatic corps, meaning that no small number of police officers, “a
few hundred”, are admitted into judicial bodies.
The second category includes police warrant officers, agents, privates and patrolmen, as well
as staff officers and policemen. It is the biggest category in the Ministry of Interior (MoI), and the
hardest to control. Because it is difficult to dispense with them, they are notorious for being the
most corrupt category in the ministry. However, they are in fact among the community’s low and
middle class victims of consecutive Egyptian governments. Their corruption is manifested in the
Khaled Said case.144 He is known as the icon of the Egyptian Revolution, and was beaten to death
by two warrant officers, Mahmoud Salah and Awad Suleiman. This incident shall be analysed
later.
This second category is also charged with persistent accusations of corruption, and it is the
most disreputable category in the ministry, which is itself already notorious.
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Here, the most prominent reasons behind the tension between the police and the citizens are
the following:
● The corruption of policemen and their violations of the law;
● The media’s impact on the relationship between the police and the citizens; and
● The inflation of the MoI organizational structure and the excess in police practices
beyond their normal role in preserving law and order.

The Corruption of Policemen and their Violations of the Law
Article 47 of the Police Corps Act stipulates that “Any officer who violates the duties stipulated
in this law or in decisions issued by the Minister of Interior, or transgresses proprieties in a job or
behaves or appears in a manner that dishonours the job is disciplinarily punished”. It is notable
that the Article is so flexible that it allows the MoI to punish its officers for whatever reason. The
Egyptian Penal Code is also applicable to a police officer in his role as a citizen, a public official,
or a law enforcement officer.
Legal and behavioural irregularities are among the most influential elements on the relations
between the people and the police. Police deviations cannot be considered apart from political
reality, especially for police leaderships; to protect the state regime, many appointment criteria
for senior police positions were developed, including transfers, rewards and penalties, but not
efficiency or honesty.
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We notice that the most important criterion for the selection of ministry leaders is loyalty, and
the consequence is blind obedience to orders regardless of whether or not they conform to the
laws, morals, or customs. Therefore, the ministry spends lavishly on officials who fill top
positions, especially the general managers, be they security managers, department heads or
chiefs of administration. These managers usually earn salaries that are five times the salaries of
their peers of the same rank who do not assume leading positions, not to mention material
privileges that often include assigned cars, drivers, and recruits. Perhaps such huge privileges for
leaders constitute the sole justification for the excesses perpetrated by the MoI leaders.
The desire of such leaders to maintain their positions out of their keenness to retain the
privileges linked to the posts has negatively affected the performance of the ministry at large.

1. MoI criteria is based on longevity in office alone, to the disregard of any other criteria.
Middle leaders (belonging to the two ranks of lieutenant colonel and colonel)
suffered a state of frustration and insecurity due to the nonexistence of objective
criteria for promotion to leading positions, knowing that middle leaders constitute
the mainstay in the MoI, considering the experience they gain over an average period
of twenty years of work in the ministry. Moreover, their average age makes most of
their counterparts more capable of doing their job, especially field leaders in the
various police fields. However, the place of work is far more important than rank. For
instance, a well‑placed officer may get privileges that greatly exceed the privileges
acquired by his seniors. This shall be illustrated later in more detail.
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2. These leaders create general policy and work plans for the units they manage. Yet
due to their covetousness to persist in their positions, when carrying out their duties
they keep their eyes set on the preservation of their positions by any means - to the
disregard of the work itself, its smooth flow, the provision of better services to the
citizens, or the improvement of living conditions for those working in the institution.

These things led to a state of frustration and a feeling of disloyalty to the institution among
the officers, which in turn drove some of them to keep up only the minimum level of their work,
which is known within the ministry as “working only to the extent of warding off blame”, which
negatively affected ministry performance. Given the considerable services the police could offer
to the community, and in light of the shortage of material and human resources compared to the
magnitude of work to be done, attention should be paid to the human factor and improve their
loyalty to the organization so as to ensure the maximum possible benefit from its employees.
This point has been missed by all the ministry administrations with the exception of the State
Security Investigations Service (SSIS).
Reasons for corruption
David Carter summarized the factors leading to the phenomenon of corruption in the police
as follows: 145
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• greed
• personal motivations, such as ego, sex, or the lust for power;
• cultural intolerance
• socialisation from peers and/or the organisation
• poor selection of officers
• inadequate supervision and monitoring of behaviour
• lack of clear accountability of the police officers’ behaviour
• no real threat of discipline or sanctions
Positions or work locations that offer material privileges are distributed on the basis of
cronyism or favouritism. Moreover, corruption in the MoI, like other police organizations,
includes both internal and external corruption.
Internal corruption is that which occurs within the ministry itself and links in the first instance
to those working in it. This type of corruption has a direct impact on the performance of the
organization and those working in it. Internal police corruption contributes to the prevalence of
a state of frustration and indifference among officers, which is negatively reflected even within
a police station, since justice is lacking in the assignment of police services and shifts.
External corruption links directly to the police dealing with the public, and in this regard, the
citizen is the ultimate recipient of corruption. Newspapers tell us daily of crimes committed by
policemen on duty. The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights issued a report that showed the
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violations committed by policemen in Egypt 146. The prevalent feeling among citizens is that no
transaction with the police can be finalized except through bribery or cronyism, which is a reality
that many people have experienced over the years.
Here, the police’s misbehaviour is manifested in two fields: corruption and the excessive use
of force (violence). In this regard, corruption means that a police officer engages in illegal
activities to acquire material gains, taking advantage of the authority granted to him, or refrains
from doing a job he is supposed to do in return for material compensation.
As for police violence, it is embodied in the abuse of lethal force and the abuse of authority,
by engaging in torturing suspects to forcibly extract confessions from them, or by avenging
themselves on individual citizens for various reasons.
Thus, police corruption can be manifested in many actions, yet observers and researchers in
the field of police behaviour agree that it is represented in nine specific areas, namely: meals and
services, commissions, accidental theft, pre-planned theft, blackmail, the offer to cover-up for
criminal activities, the manipulation of evidence in investigations in the interest of the suspect,
the provision of private security services, and cronyism. Under the powers granted to police
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officers according to law, they have numerous temptations and opportunities to engage in
corruption, unlike the case in any other professions.
In this regard, three main theories attempt to explain the persistence of police corruption: the
society at large theory, the structural- affiliation theory, and the rotten apple theory. 147 As for
the society at large theory, it proposes that corruption occurs among officers within the larger
framework of their relation with the citizens, especially in relationships involving the acceptance
of gifts or overlooking minor offenses like traffic violations, in return for payment. According to
this theory, the whole community is to blame for the corruption of the police, since police
corruption is the result of community corruption. The structural- affiliation theory, however, is
an extension of the general community theory. According to this theory, corruption starts when
an officer believes that criminal behaviour is not limited to criminals, but can also be committed
by citizens who appear to be honest or by officers in their own departments. Finally, the rotten
apple theory affirms that corruption starts among a few number of deviant officers inside the
station, and these officers have the ability to spread the infection (criminal activity) among the
rest of the officers. In some ways aspects of all three theories are applicable to the Egyptian
police.
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It would be fair to indicate that corruption has prevailed in all state authorities, not just the
police. People do not expect to finalize a transaction in any state facility without offering a bribe
or drawing on their connections. Excessive media highlighting of police corruption only increases
their corruption, and the prevalence of the idea among all clients dealing with such an authority
that it is necessary to pay so as to get any service done. Despite this inaccurate generalization
about all police officers, the lack of transparency and the free flow of information has cemented
it in people’s minds.
The destructive consequences on the community due to the police corruption
Indeed, police corruption in Egypt has had destructive consequences on the community,
which are as follows:
Mistrust in the rule of law
Any democratic regime depends on imposing order in the community, through legal
institutions that guarantee the rule of law. The Egyptian Constitution of 1971 and legal
enactments stipulated several principles that established the rule of law. 148
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Article 64: “The rule of law shall be the basis of the exercise of public power in the State.”
Article 65: “The State shall be subject to the law. The independence and immunity of the judiciary are two basic
guarantees to safeguard rights and liberties.”
Article 66: “Penalties shall be personal. There shall be no crime or penalty except by virtue of the law. No penalty
shall be inflicted except by judicial sentence. Penalty shall be inflicted only for acts committed subsequent to the
promulgation of the law prescribing them.”
Article 67: “Any defendant is innocent until he is proved guilty before a legal court, before which he is granted the
right to defend himself. Every person accused of a crime must be provided with counsel for his defence.”
Article 68: “Access to the courts is an inalienable right, and every citizen is entitled to submit his case to the
competent judge. The State shall guarantee free access to the courts for the parties to a controversy and a speedy
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Perhaps this is the most influential factor on the community, since people have totally
lacked trust in the rule of law due to their mistrust in the police as the primary representatives
of the law. It should also be noted here that internal corruption in the police played a
considerable role in mistrust in the law by policemen themselves. Even the basic needs
guaranteed for them by the Police Corps Act, like having their weekly one day off, or working
for a certain number of hours a day, were lacking. Therefore, the law – for the policemen
themselves – has become merely ink on paper with no real value. And by corollary, when
citizens noted that law enforcement is limited to a specific category to the exclusion of
another, or that he cannot get his due rights by way of the law alone, the Egyptian community
has turned instead to the law of the jungle, where it is survival of the fittest.
There are several examples of the non-implementation of the law, or of deviations in
implementing it.
Implementation of judicial rulings
Formally, Egyptian legislatures initiated the rule of law institutions, namely the legislative
branch that enacts laws in the name of the people and through elected representatives of the
determination of their claims. Any provision in the law stipulating the immunity of any act or administrative
decision from judicial control is prohibited.”
Article 69: “The right of defence either in person or by counsel is guaranteed. The law shall grant needy citizens the
means to resort to justice and defend their rights.”
Article 70: “No criminal charges shall be brought except by indictment of a judicial authority in the cases defined by
the law.”
Article 71: “Any person arrested or detained should be informed promptly of the reasons for his arrest or
detention. He has the right to communicate, inform, and ask the help of anyone as prescribed in the law. He must
be confronted, as soon as possible, with the charges brought against him. Any person may lodge a complaint to the
courts against any measure taken to restrict his individual freedom. The law regulates the right of complaint in a
manner which ensures that a decision is issued within a fixed delay, or else release is imperative.”
Article 72: “Sentences shall be passed and executed in the name of the people. The non-execution of sentences or
the obstruction of their execution by the competent civil servants is considered a crime punishable by law. In this
case those who have a vested interest in the execution of the sentence may bring criminal charges before the
competent court.”
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people, the judicial authority that settles disputes and guarantees the rule of law, and the
Executive that implements judicial rulings.
Here, it should be noted that the predominance of the Executive over the Judiciary in many
Egyptian legislatures significantly contributed to the erosion of the rule of law principle that is
enshrined constitutionally. Additionally, the lack of effective enforcement of judicial control
over the legislative branch and the Executive led to the success of the Mubarak regime in
normalizing the exception. The emergency law that has remained applicable in Egypt since
1981 contradicts a citizen’s right to appear before normal courts, which is incompatible with
the rule of law principle.
15,896,594 cases were handled in Egyptian courts during 2004.149 Although the Ministry of
Justice had taken some steps over recent years to maintain prompt justice, including the
establishment of new courts in the different governorates, increasing the number of
appointees in the Judiciary, and the allocation of additional hearings for judges, still the courts
are overloaded beyond their capacity as a natural result of the significant increase in the
number of cases. Hence, it is impossible to administer justice promptly and properly,
especially with some courts considering around 500 cases in one hearing.
In addition to the slow process of litigation in Egypt, even after getting a final ruling, the
enforcement of such ruling, which lies on the shoulders of the police, is quite difficult. There are
several obstacles that citizens encounter to get the rulings enforced, at the top of which are the
following:
● They can only draw on the General Law Enforcement Administration and law
enforcement units in a police station for enforcement of decisions, which is impossible
149
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because of the numbers of these decisions and the allowed prescribed time period,
especially in the case of default judgments. 150
● The lack of tools available to the police to enforce a judgment. So far there are no remote
data terminals in police vehicles to identify the convicted persons, which would help in
enforcing thousands of judgments.
● Prevalent corruption among judicial officers, for example, arresting the convicted person
and then releasing them without taking any legal procedures against them, in return for
a payment or some sort of favouritism.
In these instances, citizens find themselves incapable of getting their due rights ensured by law
because of corruption in the Egyptian legal system, which may lead to a feeling of despair among
individuals. Such feelings may drive individuals to commit crimes in an attempt to retrieve their
lost rights, which leads to increasing crime rates; and the wheel endlessly rolls on.
In addition, the prevalence of corruption in the police force makes policemen lose their
credibility before the Judiciary, which in turn leads many criminals in Egypt to escape punishment
due to the judges’ lack of trust in the testimony of the officer handling the case.
On the other hand, default judgments intensify the state of enmity towards the police. The
reason for this is that in many cases, people, to their surprise, have arrest decisions issued against
them without them knowing anything about the case at all. Such convicted persons may in fact
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be innocent, yet the police officer has no means to find out about it, and the result of the arrests
in these cases is hostility towards the police.
The real problem lies in the justification and legalization of corruption, on the grounds that
police misconduct is justified in the name of good ends (Porter and Warrender, 2009; Caldero
and Crank, 2004; Harrison, 1999). 151
Considerations of national security and the higher interests of the country are considered
good ends, and were the justifications for the security campaigns led by the Mubarak regime
against the Islamist trend in politics. Hence, rigging elections against the Islamists and fabricating
cases against them was justified by the protection of national security, and the danger that the
Islamist trend would threaten the unity of the community. Some people agreed with the danger
that the Islamist trend posed, which was proven true during the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule of
Egypt, yet security confrontation and fabrication of false charges were denounced. Additionally,
rigging elections is not a mere crime in the Egyptian Penal Code, 152 but it is the main crime that
demolished the Egyptian people’s sense of belonging.
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Rigging Elections and Corrupting Society153
Despite a multiplicity in the forms of police corruption, and the brutality of some of it - like
torture crimes - the difference here is that rigging elections is a crime against the society at large,
and it is the primary reason behind corruption in Egypt. The citizens voluntarily cede to the
government a portion of their freedom by dint of the social contract, in return for the
government regulating the community according to law. A citizen also retains his right to
peacefully change the government through presidential elections in presidential system
countries or in semi-presidential countries, like Egypt. The citizen also monitors the works of the

Article 212 of the said code reads, “Any person, other than public office functionaries, who commits a forgery as
those prescribed in the previous Article shall be punished with temporary hard labor or imprisonment for a period
of at most ten years.”
Besides, Article 214 reads, “A punishment of hard labor or imprisonment for a period of three to ten years shall be
inflicted on whoever uses the forged papers mentioned in the three previous Articles while knowing of their forgery.”
Also, Article 145 stipulates that “Whoever comes to learn of an occurred felony or misdemeanor, or has what to
make him believe it has occurred, and assists the felon in any way whatsoever to escape from the judiciary, either
by harboring the said felon, or by hiding the evidences to the crime, or by submitting information related to the
crime while he knows they are incorrect or he has what to make him believe they are not correct, shall be punished
according to the following provisions:
If the crime that occurs is penalized with execution, the penalty shall be detention for a period not exceeding two
years. If the crime that occurs is penalized with hard labor or imprisonment, the penalty shall be detention for a
period not exceeding one year.”
As for Article 44 of the Exercise of Political Rights Law, it reads, “Any person who uses any means of terrifying or
intimidating, with the intention of influencing the proper functioning procedures of the election or referendum
without realizing his intention, shall be penalized with no less than two-year imprisonment. Should he realize his
intention, the penalty shall be imprisonment for no less than two years and no more than 5 years,” while article 46
reads, "Any person who steals, conceals or damages any election or referendum roster or ballot paper, or any other
paper related to the election or referendum process; with the intention of changing facts in such result, or with the
intention of causing election or referendum to be repeated or disrupted shall be penalized with imprisonment for a
period of no less than 2 years.”
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government through their elected parliamentary representatives. So a citizen - for the
government - is an electoral vote, and the more the value of that vote increases, the more the
citizen’s value for the government increases. Such a concept explains all the crimes committed
against the Egyptian citizen, from human rights violations, through daily dishonoring, to the
deaths of thousands as a result of negligence. These crimes happen daily without the government
offering any radical solution because the citizen is of no value to the government. Moreover, the
rule of law also vanished because the citizen is of no value. Perhaps this explains the people’s
revolution against the government following the flagrant rigging of the 2010 parliamentary
elections, as by then things had become intolerable. It also explains the citizens’ turnout to vote
after January 2011, when they sensed their capacity to introduce a change, and after their
electoral vote had a value that allowed them to effect change.
It is worth noting that Egypt has joined thirteen international agreements, and three regional
human rights protection agreements, and that human rights principles are enshrined in the
Egyptian Constitution and Egyptian legislature.154 Yet in reality, the Egyptian government is used
to violating human rights, due to the lack of the population’s legal control through the ballot box.
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The Impact of Film and Media on the Relationship between the Police and Community
The media in general has always displayed the image of a policeman negatively, knowing that
the ruling regime’s control over the cinema industry had a far reaching impact on the negative
image of the police and the deep enmity between the police and the people. We therefore notice
that each of Abdel Nasser’s, Sadat’s and then Mubarak’s regimes supported and encouraged
filmmakers to address the disadvantages of the former regime and highlight its violations, even
in an exaggerated manner at times. In addition, filmmakers would always exaggerate when
highlighting police violations.
Moreover, there are several cinematic works that have tarnished the image of security bodies
during the 20th century. These films would criticize security practices under the former regime
in order to expose its disadvantages, and then would usually end with the dawning of a new
regime. The most important and most famous of these films, which are very influential in the
Egyptian community, is Al-Karnak, 155 which depicts the state of political dictatorship embraced
by Abdel Nasser’s regime. It displays the enormous violations committed in a systematic manner
by the security forces, from the raping of girls to the purposeful killing of opponents after
torturing them. According to the film, brutal torture and rape were employed to force citizens to
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confess crimes they did not commit, and to recruit them to work as sources for the security
forces.
With the beginning of the third millennium, the Mubarak regime adopted a new policy to
uphold the regime, allowing freedom of expression in an unprecedented manner in Egypt. It also
allowed writers, journalists and opposition parties to extensively criticize the government and
expose its disadvantages, as an outlet within the state of political tension, on the condition that
they considered the president and his family as an untouchable red line. Therefore, writers
exploited such a climate and produced movies that blatantly criticized the police, such as Hena
Maysarah [Till Things Get Better], 156 `Imarat Ya`qubian [The Yacoubian Building] 157 and Hiyya
Fawda [Is It Chaos!].158 It is also noticeable that the last film revolved entirely around the
corruption of a policeman, displaying all forms of corruption inside the police as well as their
interactions with the community as a whole, and even the Egyptian people’s acknowledgement
of such corruption.
Undoubtedly, the cinema industry sheds light on an already existing phenomena in the
community. Therefore, it reveals a state and does not create it. Yet with the repeated treatment
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of police corruption alone, to the neglect of corruption in other government bodies, and without
highlighting any real advantages or discussing the difficulties and risks that policemen face in light
of their weak potential, all of this worked towards giving the impression that corruption is a
prevalent phenomenon in the police force as a whole and not an individual behavior. This
engendered a state of permanent mistrust against the police in light of a prevalent impression engendered through the mass media - that policemen are criminals and corrupt.
Such an impression is entrenched due to the feeble media reaction by the MoI towards
criminal acts committed by policemen. The ministry at times totally ignored responding to such
occurrences in a way that opened the door for exaggerations by some newspapers, knowing that
the citizens would tend to believe such exaggerations. At other times, however, the ministry
hastened to issue statements on certain crimes. Though such statements were sometimes
entirely correct, the multiplicity of details and the quick issuance of the statements called their
credibility into question and opened the door for the mass media to raise doubts about it. “This
approach took place through an incident in Alexandria, in April 2006, when the so-called
Mahmoud Salahuddin Abdel Razeq attacked three churches, an attack that led to the killing of
two persons and the injury of some others.” 159
On the other hand, the ministry has consistently defended itself in order to avert
responsibility, and exaggerated incidents that have nothing to do with its general policy, instead
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of admitting its mistakes and working towards treatment of it, and then including such treatment
in its training plan.
After January 2011, the mass media - out of its excessive partiality towards protesters persisted in negatively displaying the police through focusing on the mistakes of some police
officers, and showing the policeman as the real criminal, who uses ignoble and illegal means in
his work, in a manner that threatens public freedom. Also, the mass media participated in issuing
pre-judgments against police officers and against the MoI, accusing it of negligence in not calling
such officers into account. Even the Judiciary were sometimes charged with corruption, when
judicial decisions in some cases were not in line with the public’s conception that a policeman is
always mistaken and that judicial decisions should be based on public opinion and not on facts
and legal principles!
During the events of January 25, 2011 the mass media consistently highlighted policemen’s
violations against peaceful protesters, without distinguishing between peaceful protesters in
public squares and criminals who broke into various police stations and public offices, either for
theft or assault on those working therein. They also displayed the police as the criminals, even
though the policemen who shot at those attempting to break into police stations were practicing
their legal right of self-defense, as ensured by Articles 245 to 251 of the Egyptian Penal Code.
Moreover, Article 102 of the Police Corps Act allows them to use force in whatever measure
necessary for them to perform their duties, in case it is the only means available to perform such
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duties. There were several cases where this applied, where police stations were broken into, and
are as follows:
●

The arrest of every suspect charged with a felony or caught red-handed in a
misdemeanor, or a suspect regarding whom an arrest warrant is issued in case he
showed resistance or attempted to escape. In this case, the attackers of police stations
were caught red-handed in the felony of vandalizing government facilities, under
Article 90 of the Penal Code.

● When guarding the prisoners in the cases and conditions stipulated in the Prison Code,
knowing that several police stations include temporary public prisons where prisoners
are detained pending their deportation to public prisons. Those [temporary] prisons
are liable to all the rules applicable to public prisons.
● The dispersal of gatherings or demonstrations formed by at least five persons when it
exposes public security. After warning the crowd to disperse, an order to use weapons
would be issued by a chief whose orders must be obeyed. This was manifest during the
course of events.

Enlargement of MoI Organizational Structure and Expansion of Police Powers
The enlargement of the MoI organizational structure 160 reveals ramification of the tasks
incumbent upon them, which led to absorption of policemen in subtasks that distanced them
from their primary mission of preserving security and order. The Egyptian police were and are
still existent in every state institution, and perhaps this is the reason behind calling the police
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“the government” by men on the street. In Egyptian colloquial Arabic, “government” means “the
police”. So the police undertake all administrative works in cities: occupancies are handled by the
Utility Police; supply wastage and pricing by the Supply Investigation Police; removal and storage
of wrongly parked vehicles by the Traffic Department; issuance of birth and death certificates
and national identifications by the Civil Status Department; issuance of passports and nationality
affairs by the Administration of Passports, Emigration and Nationality; fighting tax evasion by the
Public Administration to Combat Tax Evasion (PACTE); fire-fighting by the Civil Protection Agency;
organization of presidential, parliamentary, and municipal elections by the General
Administration of Elections in cooperation with all the other police authorities; and even the
organization of the state Hajj [pilgrimage] delegation by the General Administration for Financial
and Administrative Affairs.
The reason behind assigning all these tasks to a single authority, “MoI”, is usually because of
trust in it. Yet the question is what type of trust is it; is it trust in the efficiency of that authority,
or trust that its individuals would blindly obey orders, which would allow executive authority to
tighten its grip on all state organizations and control the individuals’ daily lives?
“It is noticeable that the proportion of reliance on the police authority has multiplied several
times, and in fields where the police are not supposed to have any role. Yet, the absorption of
policemen, who are entitled to preserve security and order, in tasks relating to protection of the
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regime and the safety of the president has negatively affected the security state in Egypt,
especially in the last ten years of the Mubarak rule.”
Highly centralized decision-making and fear of making decisions, produced a generation of
police officers incapable of making any decisions without referring back to their superiors. Also,
centrality in decision-making in all situations, no matter how insignificant, led to conformance of
such decisions to reality in many cases, which necessitated that decision-making was left to field
leadership, and not officer leadership. Moreover, many middle leaders, and even senior leaders,
refrained from taking any decision for fear of disciplinary accountability, which was stipulated in
the Police Corps Act in such a loose manner that allowed the ministry to inflict a penalty on any
officer without his commitment of a legally clear violation.
The organizational environment in the police authority: Though the Police Corps Act stipulates
that the police are “a civilian, disciplinary authority”, the predominance of military style police
work, and strictness in dealing with the public had a considerable impact on the relation between
the police and the citizens. Police officers did not receive sufficient training or psychological
training to differentiate between the citizen, who should be treated as a service recipient, and
the outlaw, who should be treated strictly within the framework of the law.
The Post-January 2011 Stage
The outcome of such tension was the citizens’ rejection of the police role, coupled with the
desire of outlaws to topple the police authority, and the symbolism of toppling the police for
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many political powers that viewed the collapse of the police as a collapse of the regime. This led
some police officers to refrain from performing their duties, especially when fear infiltrated into
their hearts from accountability for actions they had not committed. As a consequence, safety
and security were lost on the streets, and everyone accused the police of following a policy of
violence and disrespect for human rights. Rather, impartiality or any attempt to defend the police
authority was met with charges of treachery and accusations of loyalty to the Mubarak regime.
In addition, the death and injury of hundreds of protesters had the maximum impact on the
broad popular rejection of the police, which made policemen refrain from performing their role
of preserving security and order in the community. Citizens demanded the prosecution of police
officers on charges of treachery, given their abandonment of their duties.
It is noticeable here that the situation worsened under the interim government of the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), and then the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)
government. The most salient points of difference in police work can be summarized as follows:
1. Just as the police were used to fabricating charges (against innocent citizens) for
various reasons, the matter turned upside down, and the citizens imputed all the
mistakes of the former regime to the police, including mistakes the police did not
even commit. This was clearly manifested through many documents alleged to be
issued by the State Security Investigation (SSI) or the MoI, which held the ministry
responsible for some crimes. The most important of these documents was one that
stated that the bombing of Al-Qiddisayn Church, in Alexandria, in December 2011
134

was executed by a special unit in the MoI 161

And though the document is

incompatible - both in form and content - with the rules of work at the MoI, and also
with all the basics of logic, still it gained currency among the different political parties
out of their desire to hold the MoI responsible for all the mistakes of the past and to
restrain the police from exercising their power.
2. Honest police officers were stricken by disappointment when they saw themselves
charged with crimes they did not commit and when everyone else forsook them, in
turn they neglected their work.
3. Favoritism grew excessively in the ministry following the reign of Habib el-Adly - the
strong MoI man, who never allowed anyone to interfere in the affairs of his ministry
- and the police force was afflicted with a state of weakness that forced interior
ministers to respond to demands that were disregarded during the time of Habib elAdly. 162
4. The practice that had been going on during the reign of Hosni Mubarak, of
overlooking criminal behavior under certain circumstances and the non-enforcement
of court rulings against persons having ties to the regime, persisted under the MB
government, with a difference in terms of who was targeted. More than once,
information was available to the security services regarding the presence of terrorist
elements, but orders were issued by the presidency not to take any measures, and
this struck officers with despair. Besides, granting Egyptian nationality to and
releasing Jihadist prisoners, which was carried out upon presidential orders,
endangered Egyptian national security and entrenched the breeching of the rule of
law under the MB government. 163
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5. The officers learned the lesson quite well and refused to violently deal with
protesters, and perhaps this was the reason why the MB resorted to their members
to disperse the sit-in in front of Al-Ittihadiyya (Presidential) Palace. This resulted in
the death and injury of some of those protesting against the MB regime in objection
to Mohamed Morsi’s issuance of a constitutional declaration granting him absolute
powers, 164 and is the reason Mohamed Morsi and the MB leaders are being
prosecuted now. 165

Police Reform
Voices calling for police reform ascended, especially in light of the state of insecurity that
prevailed in the Egyptian community following the police breakdown on February 28, 2011. The
state of insecurity has negatively affected all spectrums of society, as well as the state’s economic
situation, especially with the paralysis of the tourism sector, which is one of Egypt’s most
important economic sectors. The security situation in Egypt is quite serious, given the
quantitative increase in the crime rate, as well as its qualitative increase with the emergence of
new crimes in Egyptian society.
Since numerous valuable police reform initiatives were introduced, the present study shall
focus on the practical steps for police corps reform, in light of the changes that occurred in the
community after January 2011.
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Development of the human element
In light of the limited resources of the Egyptian state, care for the human element becomes of
paramount importance in the coming phase, being a long-term investment, the fruit of which will
be reaped by the community as a whole.
The first step towards the development of the human element is to deploy police officers and
policemen in places commensurate with their individual preferences and personal potential. For
this to be achieved, equality should be observed among all the ministry bodies in terms of salaries
and financial privileges, while disclosing objective rules for staff advancement. One of the most
negative aspects in the MoI is inequality in terms of salaries and financial privileges between the
ministerial bodies, which induces policemen to seek work at the highest yield bodies, regardless
of the suitability of the place of work for their qualifications or even for their personal
preferences. For example, all are desirous of working in the SSI, the PACTE, the Electricity Police,
or the Transport and Communication Police, given the high material privileges granted to officers
working at such bodies. Former Interior Minister, Habib el-Adly, laid down fixed rules for staff
mobility among the three geographic areas after spending a specific work period at each area.
He also raised the salaries of the police and the general appearance of policeman.
Cancelling the four-year system at the Police Academy
Contrary to what is believed by some people, study in the Police Academy focuses in the first
instance on the study of law. After four years of study, the student graduates, obtaining a
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Bachelor of Law, just like any other college law student in Egypt. The teaching of police subjects
is limited to about six hours a week, while lectures of law subjects add up to no less than 35 hours
a week. As for field training, it does not exceed 10 hours a week. Clearly, the purpose of student
boarding throughout the four years is to train them in discipline and to think like a police officer,
and not like a civilian. At the top of the reasons for the cancellation of the four-year system are
the following:
● The Police Academy has become a place for offering favors to working and retired
officers having a Ph.D. at the expense of academic content.
● High boarding costs in the academy: The MoI budget is burdened with around
100,000 Egyptian pounds per student during the four-year study, which can be
reduced. Currently, the Police Academy admits nearly 1,200 students a year.
● Boarding entrenches the military notion, which is incompatible with the civil nature
of the police corps, and which develops within the students the idea of “we/they”,
and in this case the gap widens between the police and the citizens.
● The compulsory boarding for four years results in the graduation of a psychologically
disordered police officer; such compulsory boarding for long periods is incompatible
with sound human nature, even though it has justifications in military colleges so that
the student adapts to rough military life. Yet such justification is inapplicable in case
of the civil police corps. With the enforcement of the local police system, the current
Police Academy could be retained if two other new academies were established, one
in any Upper Egyptian governorate and the other in a Lower Egyptian governorate.
The duration of study in the academy should be six months, and it should admit
graduates from law colleges all over the republic, on the condition that admittance is
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based on the needs of each governorate. Additionally, a quota of graduating officers
should be determined for each governorate on the basis of its population, while
allowing the governorate to request an increase in its assigned quota, with the
governorate bearing the study costs for students beyond its quota. Students would
spend six months on physical training, and on the study of police subjects, focusing
on modern methods of crime prevention and physical training. Then the students
would end their study with a one-month training period in their assigned
governorates, followed by a graduation project through which each group would
present their vision regarding the challenges of security work in their governorate
and the way to solve them, coupled with practical implementation of such projects
on the ground.

Gradually cancelling the annexation of soldiers to the Central Security Forces, and replacing
them with volunteers:
Clause B of Article 2, of the National and Military Service Law, allows seconding armed forces
recruits to the MoI to perform military service. Accordingly, hundreds of thousands of conscripts
without educational qualifications, from among poor and illiterate classes, join the Central
Security Forces for a three-year period. They are trained and housed under extremely harsh living
conditions and are given very modest salaries. The Central Security system, thus, embodies the
concept of forced labor and not of serving the homeland. Upon finishing their basic training
period, the conscripts are deployed among geographical sectors of the Central Security and
security forces administrations in security directorates.
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The MoI heavily relies on these conscripts as cheap labor, since an individual’s monthly salary
does not exceed 70 Egyptian pounds, which is equivalent to 10 dollars US.166 The conscripts live
at the places of their forced labor and get a monthly one-week vacation. It is also worth noting
that the Central Security Forces is a quasi-military force, and the main purpose of establishing it
is to preserve internal order during internal disturbances, without the interference of the regular
armed forces. This sector generally incorporates Riot Police and Swift Intervention Forces (Special
Operations). In dispersing riots, the MoI drew only on large numbers of policemen, who did not
have any genuine training in the modern methods of riots dispersal. It was natural to dispatch
3,000 soldiers when the expected number of protesters was over 500. The MoI also drew on the
psychological status of protesters and their fear of encountering Central Security Forces. This
explains the breakdown of these forces on January 28, 2011, in face of a huge numbers of
protesters. Another major element behind the breakdown of these forces was fatigue. Given the
way the ministry operated, considering such soldiers as cheap labor with no rights, the ministry
leaders would dispatch riot dispersal formations 24 hours prior to an expected time of
occurrence, which would cause extreme exhaustion for the recruits.
Security forces are subordinate to security directorates, and tasks are assigned to them by the
directorate leadership, unlike Central Security soldiers, who receive orders only from the Central
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Security leadership. Moreover, security forces are entrusted with the dispersal of riots lower in
numbers, and with the tasks of securing facilities and guarding prisoners, especially in
directorates where there are no Central Security Forces.
Yet the major violation of human rights, regarding the nature of Central Security’s or security
forces’ work, is embodied in the so-called “batman”, where soldiers are deployed among the
different police services to work as drivers of police cars, and to work as domestic attendants, in
return for the meager salary which they earn per month, not to mention the inhuman treatment
of them, according to their on-site chief.
The most dangerous thing here is that most officers consider such conscripts as rightfully
theirs, feeling no qualms about employing them for their own personal interest. They view such
conscripts as part of the privileges prescribed for them, considering their charge-free work hours
do not require them to hire anyone to do such chores for them. Many newspapers have already
reported accidents related to the ill-treatment of conscripts or of using them for personal
purposes. The most prominent of these cases was that of the former Interior Minister, who
forced recruits to work on his own farm, at el-Wahat el-Bahariyya, in 6th of October City, for three
successive years. 167
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However, practical reality dictates setting a timetable for the abolition of conscription in
Central Security, and – if political will is available – Central Security could introduce a
comprehensive change in the Egyptian community. Thus, the three-year conscription period
could first be divided into 18 months training and then joining police operations. It could then be
followed by 6 months’ work fighting illiteracy and teaching one of the crafts or vocations needed
by the community. The last year would, however, involve work for a full and rewarding payment
on service projects set up by the ministry. Such projects would be utilized in reducing
unemployment and offering practical training for the conscripts and in offering services and
goods for citizens at prices lower than the local market prices, which would rebuild bridges
between citizens and the police. Finally, this would yield a marginal profit that would help in
improving the material status of those working in the police. However, strict control should be
imposed on such projects, since any corruption in its administration could lead to catastrophic
results. Moreover, the conscripts could be given the choice as to whether or not to keep joining
the Central Security, which would contribute to the existence of well-trained elements that
would have acquired expertise in police operations.
Establishing a union for police officers.
The demand to forming a union for officers is not a new one, as the Police Club was already
established with an elected board of directors, as a first step in defending officers’ rights. Yet it
has not met the officers’ needs so far. Thus, a totally independent union should be formed to
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advocate the social and economic interests of its members in the face of the ministry, and if any
of its members are subjected to injustice, to offer support for police officers in cases filed against
them due to their work.
Reforming the MoI organizational structure
People were demanding the so-called cleansing of the MoI, without offering any legal support
for such cleansing or presenting the criteria according to which it should be implemented.
Therefore, I deem it impossible to fulfill such a demand, given its illegality. On the other hand,
the MoI suffers a considerable shortage in the numbers of officers and forces; a shortage that is
impossible to cover in light of the deficit in the state budget, and the tasks assigned to the
ministry. However, the MoI organizational structure could be cleansed of tasks that have nothing
to do with police work, in a way that reduces police intervention in the daily life of individuals,
covers the shortage in human resources, in police work, and help in offering more effective
training courses to promote the level of police work in general.

1. Cancel the subordination of sectors and authorities non-commissioned to perform police
work to the MoI
- In the economic security sector, the following general administrations:
o Transport and Communication Police, Electricity Police, Tax and Fees Evasion
Police, Artistic Products and Intellectual Property Protection Police, Supply and
Internal Trade Police, Supply Police inside security directorates. It is worth
noting that civil employees working in these administrations have judicial
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arrest power in relation to their scope of work and that they are the most
informed on technical issues relating to the exercise of their work. Thus, there
is no need to involve the police in the work that lies within the jurisdiction of
other ministries.
- General Directorate of Port Security:
o Administration of Passports, Emigration and Nationality: The very description
stated above applies to workers in the present administration.
- General Administration of Labor Permits for foreign authorities:
o The entire administration should be cancelled, given its uselessness, since
Egypt is a population-repellent country. Remittances by Egyptians working
abroad are among the primary sources of national income. It is also worth
noting that el-Ganzouri’s first government once canceled labor permits for
foreign authorities inside Egypt, knowing that the said administration was
among the state means of bearing down on its citizens with no genuine reason.
So the purpose behind the establishment of such administration was to ensure
the monitoring of (Egyptian) laborers in hostile countries or of authorities
suspected of hostile activities in collecting information. This act is contrary to
the law, and yet it has become a routine task, considering the numbers of
those applying for permits. According to the Central Agency for Public
Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), the number of labor permits issued for
Egyptians to work abroad during the year 2012 increased to 1,000,176,000.168
- Civil Defense Authority/Civil Protection:
o It is a customary practice for the Egyptian people that firefighters are taken
from among the police, which is acknowledged by many people, without any
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clear reason. Analyzing the nature of civil defense, we find that it falls
completely beyond the scope of police work, and therefore it should be
assigned to an independent local administration subordinate to each
governorate separately, according to the needs of each, and under the
supervision of the governor. Also, a central institution for training new
affiliates to work in civil defense could be kept, and periodic training courses
could be held for them.
- Prison Service Sector:
o The task of the ministry should be limited to securing the prisons from the
outside, and the prisons should be an independent authority, per se. The
building of new prisons in desert areas should be expanded, and those prisons
should be transformed into productive communities, based on a legislative
amendment that allows paid voluntary work on the part of prisoners.
- Administrative Affairs Sector:
o The General Directorate for Administrative Affairs is entrusted with the
organization of Hajj trips. Here, there is no need to involve the police authority
in purely administrative work.
- General Administration of Elections:
o This is the most disreputable aspect of the administration, due to flagrant
cases of rigging elections. Although the administration’s work was only
logistical support, it was exploited by the SSI to manipulate elections.
- Legal Affairs Sector:
o This sector should represent policemen in the courts, in cases relating to the
exercise of their work, and should also present bills that keep up with
developments in daily police work.
- General Directorate of Military Justice:
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o It should be cancelled as an affirmation of the civil nature of the police corps.
- The Civil Status Department (CSD):
o What is mentioned above applies to this department in the sense that its field
falls beyond the scope of police jurisdiction.
- General Administration for Presidency Police:
o There is no justification for the existence of such an administration, since
guarding the president of the republic is carried out by the Republican Guard
forces, which are subordinate to the Armed Forces, and the Presidential
Security Service.
- The General Administration for the People’s Assembly’s and Shura Council’s Police:
o There is no justification for the existence of such an administration, and
guarding the two buildings should be assigned to the geographically
competent police station only.
- Utility Police Force:
o This work falls within the jurisdiction of the municipalities, and the police
authority has nothing to do with it as long as it does not involve a criminal act.
- Traffic Departments:
o Issuing licenses for vehicles and detecting their validity is a purely technical
work, which should be carried out by specialists in this field. Besides, the
issuance of driving licenses is administrative work that falls within the
jurisdiction of municipal administrations.

Adopting a local police system
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Egyptian law169 stipulates that governors, each within his own jurisdiction and within the
state’s public policy and general plan, assume all executive powers prescribed for ministers
in laws and regulations, as principal - not mandated - powers. The governor is thus the first
official in charge of security in his governorates. Yet, practically, the security manager is
the official responsible for security, and he is considered as the representative of the
Interior Minister in his governorate. In addition, the police central administration has
contributed to an increase in the corps internal corruption, as officers seek to work in
specific geographic areas, and resort to the MoI leaders’ mediation for this purpose. This
also produces a general feeling of injustice, along with the consequent sentiment of not
belonging to such organization.
Hence, the local police system has several benefits, at the top of which are the
following:
1. Realizing the interests of the local community, which differ from the general national
interests, and this reduces the central government’s complete control over the police
and exploitation of it as a tool for repression.
2. Deepening the sense of participation and increasing police efficiency. The local
policeman protects his own community, and not a community where he is an
intruder, being driven to it by the MoI Officers’ Affairs Administration. It also
contributes to greater participation by the citizens with the police in solving their
local security problems, being the prime target.
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3. The local police would be more responsive to the citizens and more informed on
security problems in the society, as well as the most effective means of solving them.
4. It brings about transparency as the most important means of fighting corruption. In
the local community - especially in small and medium-sized cities - information would
be available to a greater extent through informal contacts. This, in turn, would
represent a pressure on local police to fight internal corruption, especially with the
increasing role of the community in monitoring and making decisions, and even in
choosing the local police leaders.

For the local police system to bear fruit, then, penalties should be intensified against
selective enforcement of the law, so as to avoid the disadvantages of having officers’
relatives within their same work circle.
Legislative amendments for the organization of police work
● Granting policemen the right to vote:
In order to deepen their sense of belonging and affirm that a policeman is a citizen,
having the same rights and duties as all other citizens within the framework of the
law, it was necessary to approve the police officers’ right to vote. Therefore, the
Supreme Constitutional Court declared the Elections Law and Exercise of Political
Rights Law unconstitutional, in May 2013. According to the text of the verdict, a
citizenship right dictates equality among citizens in terms of public rights and duties,
and it should not be restricted or abridged except by an objective justification. Hence,
depriving police and army officers and personnel from exercising their political rights
throughout the duration of their service, due to their performance of such functions,
and despite their eligibility to exercise it, involves the diminution of popular
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sovereignty and erosion of the principle of citizenship, not to mention its
contravention of the articles of the Constitution. The court’s verdict stirred a
controversy, as some viewed that it would open the door to executive authority’s
intervention by influencing its members to vote for a specific candidate. Yet, such an
argument is refuted by the point that no citizen is to be deprived of any of their
constitutional rights as long as they do not commit a breach of the law. Besides, this
step shall be the first step towards building a police corps that appreciates democracy
and the value of their electoral vote.
● Intensifying penalties for assault on police officers on active duty:
Given the state of lawlessness that prevailed in the society, the quantitative and
qualitative proliferation of firearms (following the downfall of the Libyan regime), and
the inability of the police and the army to control the scene on the Egyptian borders,
the phenomenon of violence spread in the society, especially against policemen.
During the period of August 14-19, 2013, 26 officers, 28 policemen, 47 recruits and
employees fell as martyrs, while 212 officers, 182 policemen and 2 police employees
were injured during the same period.170
Intensifying punishments of people who assault police officers is acknowledged in
many countries. Considering current circumstances, this issue has become inevitable
for policemen to be able to continue their work. Besides, citizens should be
enlightened on the objective of the law and on the danger policemen face daily.
Moreover, the MoI should educate citizens on how to deal with policemen on the
street in a way that conforms to law. This would also guide them on how not to expose
themselves to danger. Hence, it is necessary to refer to the behaviors that are
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considered by the police as representing risks to their lives, in order to allow them to
defend themselves, against actions such as attempts to penetrate fixed security posts.
● Redrafting the Criminal Procedure Act:
So as to lay down more a precise basis for the detention of individuals, to state
probable causes of detention, and to compel the police officer to immediately disclose
the cause of detention to the detained person.171 It should also involve stressing the
inadmissibility of arresting a person for mere suspicion, which has been applicable in
accordance with Article 5 of the Vagrants and Suspect Persons Law no. 98 of 1945,172
or with the Emergency Law. Here, arrest for mere suspicion opens the door for
policemen to misuse power, and it is considered a violation of human rights, not to
mention that it induced a state of enmity towards the police corps.
● Establishing the small claims courts:
This is an applicable system in many countries, as retired judges are assigned to
consider civil disputes that do not exceed a specific value, which spares the Judiciary
thousands of proceedings and cases that consume work hours without leading to any
results.
● Approval of a Freedom of Information Act:
Approval of a Freedom of Information Act is considered as the cornerstone in
establishing the state of law, and in anticipating corruption. This is affirmed by the UN
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General Assembly, “Freedom of Information is a fundamental human right, and the
touchstone of all freedoms to which the UN is consecrated.” 173
In addition, free exchange of information expands the scope of objective and
regular oversight and accountability over government authorities, and it is now badly
needed for the MoI to combat corruption and to build bridges of trust with the
Egyptian people.
● Reorganization of police work:
The MoI should pay considerable attention to the reorganization of police work in
order to maintain security without violating human rights, and to ensure that officers
do not misuse their power in the name of maintaining security or self-defense. The
following steps can thus be taken:
o Establishing a MoI unified information network that contains all personal data of
individuals in the ministry, including criminal cases, provided that each police
station and police patrol are equipped with remote data terminals for quick
detection of detainees.
o Equipping all police units and patrols with surveillance cameras to be reviewed in
order to ensure that power is not misused and to be provided as positive or
negative evidence during trials, in cases like self-defense and justified detention.
o Coordinating with the Ministry of Justice so that the police station, prosecution
headquarters, court and preventive detention are all in one place, which ensures
for the public prosecution an easy check of any abuses by police officers in police
stations, or any legally punishable violation by the individuals dealing with the
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police. It also saves a huge number of work hours spent by policemen in securing
the summoning of suspects before the prosecutor or the court and then
committing them to the preventive detention headquarters.
o Involving civil society organizations and youth in police work through the daily
presence of civil society volunteer representatives inside police stations.
o Several routine services provided by the police for the citizen should be
automated to reduce the number of people frequenting police stations. Hence,
reporting lost and stolen objects, for instance, could be done via the Internet, with
no need to frequent the police station.
o Restoring security and control in the Egyptian streets after the prevalence of
violence crime.
In order to control the prevalent state of lawlessness, we recommend the adoption of
a security plan that targets political areas and seats held by criminals through enlarged
campaigns, provided that a public prosecution member, being the owner of the
inherent right to exercise judicial arrest, and a civil society representative should
participate in it. Besides, these campaigns should be filmed in order to answer to any
allegations of legal violations. These campaigns should target criminal seats only, and
should not be exploited in achieving any political goals of the central government, so
that the campaigns can get necessary support from society and can thus bear fruit as
early as possible.
No reform is possible unless the police embrace it, they are the frontline of society,
and nothing will change until the police change. Legal and political culture can evolve
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only when the police change their practice, and the next chapter will look at the role
the courts might play in bringing about the change.
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Chapter 4: Judiciary and the Rule of Law
Egyptian constitutions texturally affirmed the independence of the Judiciary as an important
principle to ensure the individual’s rights, especially against the Executive. All constitutions174
purported to make the Judiciary an independent authority from the legislative and the executive
branches, made the non-removability of judges as another guarantee, and prohibited any
authority from intervening in any law cases or in the affairs of justice. The legislative laws were
confirmed on the same principles.
This chapter will examine the independence of the Judiciary and its role in political life, and
the rule of law in Egypt.
Part one of this chapter will focus on the independence of the Judiciary prior to the overthrow
of Mubarak and part two will be on the period after Mubarak until the end of the MB’s rule.
Part One: independence of the Judiciary prior to the overthrow of Mubarak
Interference in the work of the judiciary and judges was a common phenomenon in totalitarian
regimes and authoritarian dictatorships that prevailed after independence from western
colonialism in the Middle East and Africa. It is common knowledge that these regimes used the
judiciary as a tool against their opponents, because these authoritarian regimes did not know the
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meaning of a state of law and the independence of the judiciary. The head of the executive in
these regimes, whether a president or a king, and his inner circle, are the center of the political
regime. His will is the law and no one can stand against him.
The situation in Egypt was different, and this part will examine the supremacy of the Executive
over the Judiciary, and the limits and the reasons behind giving the Judiciary some independence.
It will also show how the Executive manipulated the Judiciary in a way to balance between the
regime’s image and its best interests in staying in power.
The Egyptian Constitution, issued in 1971 175 and amended by a decision of the People’s
Assembly, which was issued on April 1980, which was in place when the uprising happened
defined the main characteristics and features of the ruling system in Egypt.
This Constitution included ten chapters under the following headings:
1. The Head of State
2. The Legislature (the Peoples' Assembly)
3. The Executive, which includes four sections:
a) The President of the Republic
b) The Government

175

Government of Egypt. Text of 1971 Constitution.
http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=208#.VLTMQSujMW8.

155

c) Local Administration
d) The Specialized National Councils
4. The Judiciary
5. The Supreme Constitutional Court
6. The Socialist Public Prosecutor 176
7. The Armed Forces and the National Defense Council
8. The Police
9. The Consultation Assembly
10. The Press
In this Constitution, the Head of State enjoyed exceptional powers, when compared with other
branches of the government, and especially compared to the Judiciary:
● The President is the head of the state, who shall retain the separation of powers,
safeguard the national security. 177
● The President shall appoint not more than 10 members in the People’s Assembly and shall
appoint one third of the members of the Consultation Assembly or “Al shura”. 178
● The President shall call the People’s Assembly in its ordinary annual sessions. He may also
call for an extraordinary meeting and, when necessary, has the right to dismiss both
rooms of the Parliament, the People’s Assembly and the Consultation Assembly. 179
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● The President shall issue decree law or object to the laws issued by the Parliament,
whether under normal or under exceptional circumstances. 180
● The President declares the State of Emergency, 181 once the State of Emergency is
declared, the citizen can be referred to exceptional courts, with less restricted due
process and civil rights protection.
● The President appoints the Prime Minister, his deputies, the ministers “including the
Minister of Justice”, their deputies, and has the right to relieve them of their posts. 182
● The President is the head of the Supreme Council of Judicial Institutions (SCJI), 183 which
shall supervise the affairs of the Judiciary (which is the most severe intervention on the
Judiciary’s affairs).
● The President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. 184
● He has the authority to declare war and conclude treaties. He is also the head of the
National Defense Council and as such is responsible for the safety and security of the
country. 185
● The President is the Commander in Chief of the Police 186 (as can be seen this role played
a significant part in the political life in general).

The president enjoyed wide powers against the Judiciary, he was the retainer of the separation
of powers, as stated in the text of the constitution and this job in a democratic country is reserved
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for the highest court. For example, in the United States the Supreme Court plays this role that
was vested by the principle of judicial review. 187
The most severe intervention was for the president to be the head of the SCJI and that allowed
him to intervene with the judges’ affairs since the SCJI appointed the highest judges in the
Judiciary.
The president played a role in the Parliament by appointing some of its members both in the
People’s Assembly and in the Consultation Assembly. 188
The most powerful tools the president had in general, by political practice, was being the head
of the police and the military forces. As a non-democratic country, the armed forces was still a
very important tool to control the whole country. Even with a well-established Constitution, the
idea of having the force of the military and the police under the president’s control was a very
important tool to rule the country. The defeat of the police forces and the military’s refusal to
intervene during the 2011 uprising, was the main reason of that Mubarak had to step down. It is
important to notice that the main reason behind the refusal of the military to intervene was that
they did not accept the idea of having Gamal Mubarak as a civilian president after Mubarak the
father.
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By all the powers vested in the Constitution to the president and by controlling the military
and the police, the president had absolute decisive power. Adding to that the control of the NDP,
the ruling party, the president had control over all the three powers, the Executive, the Judiciary
and the legislative branch.
Egypt as member of the United Nations is obligated to follow its instruments, and the UN basic
principles on the independence of the judiciary stated, “Independence of the judiciary shall be
guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country”.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the African Charter on Human Rights,
and the Arab Charter on Human Rights, are all considered part of the 1971 Constitution, 189 as
Egypt ratified all of them. These treaties provided for the right of a fair trial, and the independent
of the judiciary is the most important guarantee for a fair trial.
In order for the judges to play their role in the regime, they must be independent, especially
from the Executive’s intervention. The independency requires regulations to guarantee their
impartiality, merit based appointments and promotions, immunity and tenure, and disciplining
by a judicial body that is independent from the Executive.
In practice and under the 1971 Constitution the Executive enjoyed higher powers over the
Judiciary, as evidenced by the powers enjoyed by the president, the Minister of Justice, and the
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Minister of the Interior in their dealings with the Judiciary. The use of these powers were clearly
shown by the president and by the Minister of Justice in appointing judges and taking disciplinary
measures against them.190
Outstandingly, the president, with his powers, holds no political accountability, whether
before the Parliament or before a court of law, except in the case of the commission of high
treason or other serious crimes. The Constitution limits impeachment to the approval of twothirds of the members of the People’s Assembly. 191 As seen with the president’s control over the
Parliament, impeachment of the president was unmanageable. In addition, there was no law
issued to allow a trial of the president.
The dominance of the Executive over other authorities limited the independence of the
Judiciary and reduced the balance of powers.
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The legal framework for the independence of the Egyptian Judiciary
Chapter four 192 of the Constitution covered the Judiciary. This chapter provided for the
guarantees of the independence of the Judiciary in general. Chapter five 193 of the Constitution
provided for the guarantees of the independence of the Supreme Constitutional Court.

192

Chapter 4
The Judicial Authority
Article 165: The Judiciary Authority shall be independent. It shall be exercised by courts of justice of different kinds
and competences. They shall issue their judgments in accordance with the law.
Article 166: Judges shall be independent, subject to no other authority but the law. No authority may intervene in
judiciary cases or in the affairs of justice.
Article 167: The law shall determine the judiciary organizations and their competences, organize the way of their
formation and prescribe the conditions and measures for the appointment and transfer of their members.
Article 168: The status of judges shall be irrevocable. The law shall regulate the disciplinary actions with regard to
them.
Article 169: The sessions of courts shall be public, unless a court decides to hold them in camera review for
considerations of public order or morality. In all cases, judgments shall be pronounced in public sessions.
Article 170: The people shall contribute to maintaining justice in accordance with the manner and within the limits
prescribed by law.
Article 171: The law shall regulate the organization of the State Security Courts and shall prescribe their jurisdiction
and the conditions to be fulfilled by those who occupy the office of judge in those courts.
Article 172: The State Council shall be an independent judiciary organization competent to take decisions in
administrative disputes and disciplinary cases. The law shall determine its other competences.
Article 173: A Supreme Council, presided over by the President of the Republic shall supervise the affairs of the
judiciary organizations. The law shall prescribe its formation, its competences and its rules of action. It shall be
consulted with regard to the draft laws organizing the affairs of the judiciary organizations.
193
Chapter 5
The Supreme Constitutional Court
Article 174: The Supreme Constitutional Court shall be an independent judiciary body in the Arab Republic of Egypt,
and have its seat in Cairo.
Article 175: The Supreme Constitutional Court alone shall undertake the judicial control in respect of the
Constitutionality of the laws and regulations and shall undertake the interpretation of the legislative texts in the
manner prescribed by law. The law shall prescribe the other ability of the court, and regulate the procedures to be
followed before it.
Article 176: The law shall organize the way of formation of the Supreme Constitutional Court, and prescribe the
conditions to be fulfilled by its members, their rights and immunities.
Article 177: The status of the members of the Supreme Constitutional Court shall be irrevocable. The Court shall call
to account its members, in the manner prescribed by law.
Article 178: The judgments issued by the Supreme Constitutional Court in constitutional cases, and its decisions
concerning the interpretation of legislative texts shall be published in the Official Gazette.
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Law no. 46 of the year 1972 194, known as the Law of the Judicial Authority, was issued in order
to regulate the general jurisdiction courts, while Law no. 47 of year 1972 195, known as the State
Council Law, regulates and organizes the administrative courts. Law no. 48 of year 1979 196,
known as the Law of Supreme Constitutional Court regulated the Supreme Constitutional Court.
The Judiciary in the 1971 Constitution
Article 165 endorsed the independence of the Judiciary; Article 166 affirmed the
independence of judges, stating that no authority may intervene in trials or in the affairs of
justice. However, this independence was not absolute. As seen, the Executive had power over
the legislative branch, which allowed the president to issue laws related to the affairs of justice,
including laws that regulated the Judiciary and decreased its independence. Since Egypt is a civil
law country, judges only apply the laws that the legislative branch creates.
The Executive could deprive all the protection and guarantees for the independence of the
Judiciary stated in the Constitution, especially because the ruling party (whose president is the
president of the republic as well) appointed the cabinet and had the majority in the Parliament.
The Constitution stated, “A Supreme Judicial Council, headed by the President shall supervise
the affairs of the judiciary organizations. The law shall prescribe its formation, its abilities and its

The law shall organize the effects subsequent to a decision concerning the unconstitutionality of a legislative text
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rules of action. It shall be consulted with regard to the draft of laws organizing the affairs of the
judicial organizations”.197
The Constitution stated that the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) shall be consulted about the
draft of laws that organize the affairs of the judicial organizations. The Executive had direct power
over member judges of the SJC. 198 They all had connections to the Executive and received
benefits directly or indirectly from the Executive.
The State Security Courts and the military courts were another way the Executive intervened
in the Judiciary. 199 They were exceptional courts, and they were regulated generally by laws that
were made by the Parliament, not the Constitution.
These exceptional courts were a way for the Executive to avoid the normal courts in political
cases and cases related to the opposition.
The emergency courts and military courts specialized in hearing crimes against state security.
The president could appoint civilian judges in the emergency courts upon the recommendation
of the Minister of Justice, or appoint military judges on the recommendation of the Minister of
Defense. The president had to approve the sanctions before they were considered final and could
be imposed. Once the judgment was final, there was no right to appeal. The president could alter
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or cancel any decision issued by an emergency court, including the decision to release a
defendant. All of authorities vested in the president were against the constitutional principles.
The Executive has confirmed that the referral of cases to emergency courts were usually
limited to terrorism and national security issues as well as major issues related to drug trafficking.
However, in reality the Executive has used emergency courts in some cases to prosecute some
cases outside of the fight against terrorism and serious threats to national security, such as
homosexuals and religious extremists or political opposition in general.

The intervention in the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC)
The SCC is the highest Egyptian court, it reviews the constitutionality of the laws and
regulations and shall undertake the interpretation of the legislative texts in the manner
prescribed by law.
The Executive intervenes in the court through the president, who appoints the head of the
court, and the court judges.
The role the president played in appointing the head of the SCC minimized the independency
of the court. There were no rules for the appointment, even if it was customary that the president
appoint the most senior deputy for the successor to the head of the SCC. The president broke
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this norm in September 2001, when the president appointed Fathi Nageeb, 200 the Head of the
Legislation Directorate in the Ministry of Justice, to be the head of the court, disregarding the
most senior deputy of the head of Supreme Constitutional Court.
The appointment of Nageeb endangered the independence of the SCC, not only because he
was from outside the court, but also because of his former position as the Head of the Legislation
Directorate in the Ministry of Justice, where he was responsible for legislating draft laws that
were then challenged as unconstitutional before the court. In this situation, he was reviewing the
constitutionality of laws he drafted himself.
On August 26, 2003 the president appointed Mamdouh Mar'i, the former head of the Cairo
Court of Appeals as the head of the SCC, completely disregarding the rules of selecting the most
senior and experienced among the deputies of the Head of the Supreme Constitutional Court.
Later, Mar’i was appointed as the Ministry of Justice (in August 2006).
The Executive had used the SCC to legitimize decrees issued by the Executive, to settle political
disputes, to define the role of the president in comparison with the Parliament and to legitimize
the law decrees that the president issued.
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The SCC issued a judgment in 1982 granting the State Security Courts’ jurisdiction over the
appeal of the detention decrees issued by the Executive.
The State Security Courts are exceptional courts formed under the emergency law, which have
less procedural guarantees, and the Executive had full control over its judges.
This judgment conflicted with the State Council jurisdiction stated in the Constitution.201
On May 16, 1987 the SCC affirmed the unconstitutionality of Law no. 38 of 1972 of the election
of the Peoples' Assembly, which required the membership of a political party to run for a seat.
In addition, the SCC, on May 19, 1990, affirmed the unconstitutionality of Law no. 188 of 1986
which gave an advantage to the parties’ members over the independents in running for
Parliament.
As a result, the Peoples’ Assemblies that were elected in 1984 202 and 1987 203 were dissolved
because they were elected according to unconstitutional laws. However, while the Supreme
Constitutional Court affirmed the dissolving of the above mentioned two assemblies, it did not
abolish the laws that were made by them.
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These judgments declared the People’s Assembly void, which abolished and made void all the
laws that were made by the Assembly, since these judgments were declaratory in nature. 204
The political role that the SCC played was clear in these two cases, the MB members won more
than 10 percent of the seats in the People’s Assembly 205 and they started to oppose the Executive
in many aspects, and it was very important to the Executive to remove them from the Parliament
by any means.
Excluding the MB members from the People’s Assembly was the real reason that the president
put pressure on the court to issue these judgments.
In 1993, the court issued a judgment that granted the president the authority to use the
emergency law to submit any crime, including accusations against civilians to a military court.
Resonated with the state of exception analysis in chapter two, by providing a rationale that stated
no more than “for national security reasons”. The tainted judgment clearly illustrated the
influence of the Executive/the president over the highest court in Egypt, and explained why it
was important for the president to appoint cooperative judges to this court.
Military verdicts were subject to review by other military judges, and approval by the
president. In practice the president delegated a top ranking military officer to review and approve

204

El Shereef, Adel Omar. The Judiciary of the Constitutional. Al Shaab Printing House, Cairo, 1988.
The People’s Assembly of 1987 included 60 members of the MB, and that was 13% of the total number of the
members of the Peoples' Assembly.

205

167

the military judgments. It was reported that the lawyers for the defense did not have enough
time to prepare their defense, and that military judges tended to rush cases involving a large
number of defendants.
The judicial supervision of the election case
One of the significant cases that was reviewed by the court, and illustrated the dependency
and the independency of the court consecutively, was the judicial supervision of the elections.
The case was filed on November 27, 1990, but it was only reviewed ten years later when the
regime needed more legitimacy and Mubarak and his regime needed to appear as a more
democratic regime.
This case was filed to challenge the parliamentary elections of 1990 and 1995 but it was not
reviewed. The above mentioned elections were reported to be the worst regarding the
manipulation of them, and in using new methods in doing so. Using thugs on a wide scale to
manipulate the elections was a new phenomenon that added to the political culture.
Coinciding with the start of the hearing of the case by the SCC, the president issued law decree
No. 167 of 2000 which amended the Law of the Political Rights, and established the complete
judicial supervision of elections.206
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The Judges’ Association criticized the dependency of the court and its connection with the
Executive. During its first conference of justice, in 1986, the association recommended giving the
Cassation Court jurisdiction over reviewing the constitutionality of the laws and regulations, as
stated in Article 4 of the Law of the Judiciary Authority. It also recommended abolishing Chapter
5 of the Constitution as well as the Law of the Supreme Constitutional Court No. 48 of 1979 as
there was no reason for establishing the SCC. 207
The independence of the courts rather than the SCC in the Judiciary
The independency requires regulations to guarantee impartiality, merit based appointments
and promotions, immunity and tenure, disciplining by a judicial body that is independent from
the Executive, and the independence of judges in managing their financial and administrative
affairs.
These guarantees give clear indicators for the independence of the judiciary of any country.
When the process of selecting judges is specific and has clear criteria, when they are not under
any other authority or supervision, and not subject to disciplinary measures, and when they are
enjoying self-management under a stable and suitable financial system, then the judiciary is
considered an independent one.
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The Egyptian Judiciary is an applied judiciary. The judges apply the laws issued by the
legislature, they cannot create new laws or change existing ones, and the precedents do not have
weight in the judgments. The judges cannot review the constitutionality of the laws, they have
to refer them to the SCC.
The Role of the Executive in the Appointment of Judges in Egypt and the Independence of the
Judiciary
The appointment of judges starts with law graduates joining the Public Prosecution, and once
a candidate reaches the age of thirty, he is eligible to become a judge. 208
The whole process of appointing and promoting the judges is under the control of the
Executive, headed by the president; the judges are appointed by presidential decree. 209
The Supreme Council of Judiciary Institutions appoints the judges in the lowest court, once
they reach the age of thirty, as well as the judges in the Court of Cassation, as the highest Egyptian
court with general jurisdiction. The Council was presided over by the president, and as mentioned
before, this Council was not independent from the president and the Executive.
The president appoints the Public Prosecutor and his assistants, 210 after consulting the
Supreme Council of Judiciary. The Council opinion here is not mandatory to the president.
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Law no. 35 of year 1984 expanded the tenure of the judges to all the general prosecutors,
after their first year in the office. 211
There were many reports about corruption or the necessity of having connections in order to
be able to join the prosecution office. 212 The most significant reports were about the corrupt
practice of appointing the sons of the judges regardless of their qualifications compared to
others. 213 The judges themselves confirmed reports of this kind of corruption in the judiciary.214
Article 48 of the Judiciary Law opened the door for manipulation in appointing the general
prosecutors. The Article stated in part that the candidate must have no criminal record and a
good reputation. This good reputation was not defined, nor its requirements clearly stated,
therefore this article was the basis for eliminating any candidate that did not have connections
to join the Judiciary.
While carrying out their duties in office, all the members of the public prosecution are under
the direct power of the Minister of Justice.215
The Executive has similar power over the State Council, the administrative court in Egypt; the
appointment or promotion of the State Council judges were made by presidential decrees. The
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president appoints the head of the Council. The General Assembly of the Council can recommend
names to the president, but it is not obligatory for him to follow these recommendations. 216
The State Council Law stated that:
The appointment of the head of the State Council is carried out by a decree from the
President among the vice Presidents of the Council after taking the opinion of the
Supreme Council of the Judiciary Institutions. Also, the vice Presidents of the council and
its deputies are appointed by a decree from the President after a recommendation from
the General Assembly of the Council and after taking the opinion of the Supreme Council
of the Judiciary Institutions. 217
The State Council plays a pivotal role in forming the relations between the state and the
individuals; the Council is the main court that reviews the disputes between individuals and the
Executive. This role should be carried out by an impartial and independent court. Therefore, the
State Council itself should make the appointments of the head of the State Council and his
deputies.
More importantly, the head of the State Council played a significant role in political life, the
head of the State Council is the president of the first chamber of the Supreme Administrative
Court, and this chamber is responsible for reviewing all the appeals of the decrees of the
committee of political parties. Controlling the head of the State Council gave the Mubarak regime

216
217

State Council Law no. 47 of 1972 amended by Law no.136 of 1984.
Article 83.

172

the chance to control which political party would be approved, and gave him full control over the
political arena, by eliminating any strong opposition and preventing people from forming their
political party. The most obvious examples were the MB and the Elwassat party. 218 The MB
party’s request was rejected more than once. The Mubarak regime changed the Constitution to
make it illegal to form a party based on religion, to prevent the MB from forming their party.219
The Elwassat party was different. It was formed by former MB members who rejected some
of the MB’s ideology since 1990, and the requests to form the party were rejected, even with
Christians and secular public figures as members of the party. The requests were rejected in 1990,
1996, 1998, 2004, and 2009.
In their First Conference of Justice, 220 judges rejected the method of the appointment of all
judges, and especially the heads of the judicial institutions. The conference recommended that
Supreme Judiciary Council approve all the appointments of judges and the public prosecutors.
The delegation and movement of judges
The Judiciary Law gives the Minister of the Justice wide power over the movement and
endorsement of the judges. He can assign judges to specific courts for one year and create a
yearly movement for judges. The law states that this requires the approval of the Supreme
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Judicial Council and the president, 221 but in practice, it is in the hands of the Minister of Justice
and the rest is just rottenly done with no further examination. The Minister of Justice used this
power to move judges to favorable geographic areas as a reward to the more loyal ones, or to
move judges to make them judge “expected cases” in certain areas, especially the political ones.
The heads of first instant courts are appointed by the Minister of Justice, they have authority
over the rest of the judges in the court, and this authority includes the issuance of warnings. 222
The Supreme Judicial Council must approve the Minister of Justice’s decision, but again, in
practice, the Council always approves the decision. The judges seek to gain the Minister of
Justice’s trust and satisfy him, in order to stay or move to preferable court.
The Minister of Justice has the authority to delegate judges temporarily to non-judicial
positions, 223 and it is important to mention that the delegation here is a reward for the most
cooperative and loyal judges. The delegation can take place to one of the Ministries or one of the
Public Institutions. A judge can be delegated to work in one of the Executive entities and under
direct and full supervision of one of the Executive members, receive his salary, which is usually
multiples of the judge’s original salary. One of the biggest rewards that the Executive can offer
judges and which is used to encourage them, is the appointment of the judges as governors,
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either subsequent or prior to their retirement. Similarly, as a greater reward, the president had
the authority to delegate judges to work as ambassadors or representatives to foreign countries
or international organizations. Article 62 limited the president’s authority by requiring the
approval of the Supreme Judicial Council. In practice, the Council approved any nomination from
the president or from the Minister of Justice; the council did not really have any authority over
the issue.
More importantly, the Minister of Justice had the power to refer judges to the disciplinary
department. Although the law stated that the Supreme Judicial Council had to approve the
referral to the disciplinary department, 224 in practice the Council always approved the Minister
of Justice’s decision.

Limitation of firing judges (both with and without disciplinary measures) - and its effect on
the independence of the judiciary
In modern history, there were two major incidents against the independence of the Judiciary.
Both happened during the Nasser presidency, and both were dedicated to the idea of the
legitimacy of the revolution as the supreme legitimacy, and the supremacy of the state’s best
interest over any other organization, even the Judiciary. As can be seen, the best interest of the
state was always defined by the Executive and the president.
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On April 15, 1954, Nasser issued a decree to dismiss Dr. Abdel Razek ElSanhori, the head of
the State Council, after being bitten in his office. 225
The decree was issued, regardless of Article 26 of the Law of the State Council 112 of 1946
which stated that “the Head of the State Council, his deputies and the judges are immune from
dismissal”.
Nasser used his power, as stated in the previous chapter, to impose the de facto state.
Following that, Law no. 165 of 1955 was issued to restructure of the State Council, and as a
result 20 judges were removed from the State Council, either through retirement or being
transferred to other non-judicial positions. The termination of these judges happened mainly
because of their view of the law was that its objective application is the highest value and more
important than the revolutionary state of the country at the time. The restructuring of the State
Council was a step to make the Judiciary subject to the control of the Executive. However, the
judges believed that the State Council was the guarantee for the individuals, protecting them
against the aggression of the Executive. 226
A more severe incident occurred when Nasser issued decree Law no. 83 of 1969 which stated
that the structure of the Judiciary shall be restructured. The president must issue, within 15 days,
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the necessary decrees in order to re-appoint the members of the judicial institutions in their
positions, and that those who were not included in the new appointment decrees were
considered by law to be retired.
This decree law was a reaction from the Executive/the president to the Judges’ Club’s General
Assembly statement, on March 28, 1968 that rejected Nasser’s request to join the Arab Socialist
Union, as the only political organization in the country. The statement emphasized the
independence of the Judiciary as a guarantee for justice and protecting individual rights, and that
joining any political organization would contradict with this independence.
It is important to note that Nasser did not have the authority to issue the law decree, but it
was part of the series of de facto laws the president issued. The president granted himself all the
powers of the Judicial Institutions’ General Assembly and it was part of a blatant assault on the
independent of the Judiciary.
The law and the presidential decrees led to the termination of 189 judges from their positions;
the incident is known as the “Judiciary Massacre”. 227
Judiciary reform was the justification for the law and later that became the common
justification for any attack on the independency of the Judiciary. The explanatory note to the
decree of law justified these procedures by stating that “it was necessary to restructure the
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judiciary in order to guarantee the rights of the citizens and the best interest of the State during
the socialist transformation”. 228
As stated before, when Sadat came to power he understood the importance of having
independent courts to attract direct investment, in light of the open markets policy he
encouraged. Thus, in order to demonstrate the independent of the Judiciary, Article 127 of the
1971 Constitution stated that “The judges shall not be dismissed or moved except by the law”,
and Article 168 stated that “The judges shall be tenure in the office and the law shall regulate the
disciplinary measures taken against them”.
It is worth noting that the 1971 Constitution restricted dismissal for non-disciplinary measures
as a guarantee for the independent of the Judiciary.
Then the Judiciary Law 229 contradicted this constitutional course by giving the Minister of
Justice the right to refer any judge to the Disciplinary Council to approve the dismissal or the
transfer of the judge to a non-judicial position. This Article gave the Minister of Justice broad
power to refer any judge that became ineligible to continue in his judiciary position for reasons
other than a health condition. The law did not identify the reasons that made a judge ineligible
to carry out his responsibility as a judge. The reasons of being eligible could be related to the
judge’s behavior, personal life, and his relations with others.
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It is clear that the Minister of Justice can use this Article to refer any judge to the Disciplinary
Council, and ask for his dismissal. Thus, the tenure of a judge was questionable under this Article,
especially in light of the control of the Minister of Justice over the Judicial Disciplinary
Department. This department had wide authority over the judges in general, and giving control
to the Minister of Justice over this department, was giving the Executive more power and control
over the judges.
The Judicial Disciplinary Department and the intervention from the Minister of Justice
According to Article 78 of the Judiciary Law, the Judicial Disciplinary Department is part of the
Ministry of Justice; the department shall oversee the judge’s duties, evaluate them for certain
positions, and investigate any complaints against the judges. This department is the main tool for
the Judiciary to fight corruption from within.
The department then submit its reports to the Minister of Justice. For the sake of their
independence, the Judiciary as a body should be self-disciplined by the judges themselves. The
main goal of establishing the JDD, and forming it from judges only to oversee other judges’ work
was to give the Judiciary the opportunity of cleansing themselves independently. The reality of
the workflow was different, the Minister of Justice had full control over this department, and he
appointed the judges who worked in it. The department was used by the Executive to punish the
non-cooperative judges and reward the cooperative ones.
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The JDD had a personal file for each judge that included his personal information, the positions
the judge held, recommendations for or against appointing him to certain judicial positions, all
complaints filed against him or by him, and any warnings he received. It was widely known that
these files were used to choose between judges, for nomination for a higher position in the
Executive, such as governors, 230 and draft the judges’ movement between different courts.
The work of this department must be reviewed and it should be under the supervision of the
Supreme Judiciary Council rather than the Minister of Justice, and the work of the department
should be more transparent. The head of the Supreme Judicial Council alone should have the
right to refer for retirement a judge who cannot carry out his judicial duties for any reason.
The situation seems better in the administrative judicial branch, as according to Article 99 of
the State Council Law no. 47 of 1972, the inspection directorate is an independent directorate,
which is under the control of the State Council. The head of the State Council is the one who
appoints judges to it, and there is no direct intervention by the Ministry of Justice. However, it
remains that the Executive appoints the Head of the State Council.
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Financial issues and the independent of the Judiciary
The salary of the judge, along with the financial department, which determines this salary, are
guarantees for the independence of the Judiciary. A judge should not worry about earning his
living, and his salary should be enough to live an outstanding life.
The judges are prohibited from conducting any kind of business or work that affect his
independence as a judge. 231
The Supreme Council of Judicial Institutions can issue an order to prevent the judge from being
involved in any activity that conflicts with his position, duties or may affect his performance as a
judge.
The Minister of Justice controls the salaries of the judges, which means this is under the
control of the Executive. The Supreme Judiciary Council shall be the official authority for setting
a judge's salary and amend it when needed to guarantee a certain standard of living to the judges
and their independency from the Executive.
It is evident that the judges of the Supreme Constitutional Court are paid almost three times
more than their counterparts in the Court of Cassation or the Courts of Appeals, despite the fact
that the work load in the latter is heavier than in the first.

231

According to Article 72 of the Judicial Authority Law, “The judge shall not practice any commercial activity, nor
shall he carry out any activity that is inconsistent with his independence and dignity”.

181

The way the Executive can distinguish between the judges, gives them more power over the
Judiciary. It can give some judges, such as members of the Supreme State Security Prosecution,
that investigate cases of a political nature, higher salaries and advantages to encourage them to
continue with their work while their colleagues in other prosecutions are treated poorly
financially. It was reported that these prosecutors had benefits that were given only to them,
such as cars with private chauffeurs and bodyguards.
The Executive had a fundamental role in the judge’s finances, as seen, which led to giving it
more power and more control over the Judiciary, by determining the salaries and granting
rewards and advantages to those who they believed were more cooperative.
The Ministry of Justice had control over the benefits given to the judges, which included
salaries, and other material benefits. With such control, the Ministry could create real pressure
on the judges to fulfill the Executive’s interests. 232
The relationship between the Executive and the Judiciary
Since the 1952 coup, the relationship between the Executive and the judges was a mix of
tension and attraction. The Executive was trying to show its powers and to have control over the
judges, and when some of them tried to oppose the power of the Executive, then the Executive
would try again to contain them.
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In developing countries like Egypt force plays a key role in the separation of power and the
balance between the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judiciary. The Executive, which controls
the military power and police forces always wins, especially in the absence of the rule of law.
When the Executive can give orders to the police to break the laws, not to enforce them, or
selectively enforce, the Executive always wins. Individuals do not believe in their ability to change
the regime, nor to challenge the illegal activity of the Executive. When the Judiciary is not strong
enough to oppose the Executive, the only other way is a revolution by the people or a military
coup by a group of elite shareholders.
While the Supreme Court in the US has no military, no police forces, it is still the most powerful
institution in the country, mainly because after decades of democracy, all the American people
and all the authorities understand the importance of the rule of law. They also understand how
important it is for all authorities to accept the judgments of the Judiciary, and consider it the fair
arbiter between them. The opposition of one Supreme Court ruling for US has the same impact
as a military coup in Africa.
There were milestones in the battle for the Judiciary’s independence during the last decade
of the Mubarak regime. I agree with Nathan Brown’s argument in his book Constitutions in a
Nonconstitutional World 233 that the Egyptian courts especially the SCC played a significant role
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to dedicate the rule of law compared to the Parliament, which was under full control of the
Executive, but at the end it did not work out and the Executive prevailed over the Judiciary in
most cases.
The Supervision of the Elections
The most important way the Judiciary confronted the powers of the Executive, was in the
battle to have complete supervision of the Judiciary over the parliamentary elections. This
controversy reached its peak in the Court of Cassation judgment regarding the district of Al
Zaytoun in the 2000 election.
The importance of this district was because Zakarya Azmi, the Chief of Staff of the president
and his right hand man, was the winning candidate in the election. The judgment voided the
election on the basis of the absence of judicial supervision in the district. 234
The Executive’s lawyer appealed the judgment, claiming that the State Litigation Authority
and the Administrative Prosecutor were both part of the judicial institutions and their members
supervised the elections.235
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The Court of Cassation refused this explanation stating that “it is the logic that the description
‘Judicial Institutions’ is granted for Judicial bodies that conduct the hearings and resolving
disputes and which provides to its members the guarantees of neutrality and independence
which are necessary for them to carry out their duties”.
The court concluded that the State Litigation Authority and the Administrative Prosecutor
were two institutions that were under the power of the Executive Authority.
Thus, including them in the judicial authority by the legislator as well as appointing members
of them to the Supreme Council of Judiciary Institutions was an aggression on the independence
of the Judiciary.
The members of the State Litigation Authority are Executive lawyers who defend the cases
that are filed against the Executive. The members of the administrative prosecution investigate
the violations of the Administrative Law by the Executive employees under the supervision and
monitoring of the Ministry of Justice.
It is important to mention that this issue arose before the elections and the judges explicitly
refused to include these two institutions in the term “Judicial Institutions” with regard to the
supervision of the elections.
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At that time the judges insisted that the appointment of the State Litigation Authority and the
Administrative Prosecutor members to supervise the elections, was void and so the elections
should be considered void.
It was clear that the Executive worried about authorizing full supervision of the elections to
the judges, even if the Egyptian Constitution at the time stated that the judicial institutions were
the normal courts, the State Council and the Supreme Constitutional Court.
The Executive added these two institutions to those supervising the elections according to a
judgment from the SCC.
The Court of Cassation judgment confused the Executive, because the supervision of the
elections in the majority of the electorates was by the members of the Administrative
Prosecutors and the State Litigation Institution.
This matter threatened the annulment of the Egyptian People’s Assembly. The Head of the
Egyptian Cassation Court and the Head of the Supreme Judicial Court immediately announced
that these two institutions were judicial institutions and thus their supervision over the election
was correct based on previous judgments of the Court of Cassation.
Ahmed Meky, the Head of the civil department in the Cassation Court and the court deputy at
the time, who was leading the advocacy for the independence of the Judiciary, published a study
in a newspaper that concluded that the Administrative Prosecution and the State Litigation
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Institution were not judicial institutions and thus the elections that were supervised by these two
institutions were void.
On May 29, 2003 the Board of Directors of the Judges' Association issued a statement which
emphasized that including the members of the Administrative Prosecution and the State
Litigation Institution in the structure of the judicial institutions was a threat to the independence
of the Judiciary. The statement determined that members of the Administrative Prosecution and
the State Litigation Institution were not judges but participated in establishing justice in a way
similar to police officers and lawyers and therefore must not intervene in the structure of the
Judiciary. 236
The Implementation of the Administrative Judgments
The Egyptian Constitution prohibited the non-execution of any judgments and stated in more
than one place that the rule of law is the base and the safeguard for the citizens in the state, and
made any law that gives immunity against the courts’ rulings. The Constitution even criminalized
the non-execution of the courts’ rulings and made it punishable by law. Interestingly these
articles existed in all of the Egyptian constitutions, but realistically the Executive knew that they
could control the outcomes, and passing such articles was harmless.
The Executive is the tangible executor of the rulings; the courts do not have the physical ability
to execute these rulings. Any legitimate regime shall execute the law equally between individuals
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and the individuals and the Executive, and this is how regimes gain their legitimacy. Under Sadat’s
and Mubarak’s rule, the Egyptian regime tried to establish a state of the rule of law in part. They
gave the Judiciary more independence than ever before with some exceptions, one of the major
exceptions was the execution of the judgments regarding the membership of the People’s
Assembly. The People’s Assembly was very important especially for the Mubarak regime; it was
the legal cover for a regime that had lost its legitimacy. As was seen, the People’s Assembly was
controlled by the NDP, the ruling party, which controlled the Executive as well. The Executive
used the People’s Assembly, “the Legislative”, to fight the battle, instead of having a direct clash
with the Judiciary.
The Egyptian Constitution creates the separation of powers, protecting the Legislative from
the Judiciary’s intervention, by giving the People’s Assembly exclusive authority to determine the
validity of its members. 237

The Court of Cassation conducts investigations regarding the

membership of any member and submit its ruling to the People’s Assembly to approve the ruling.
The majority of two-thirds of the votes is required to find a membership invalid. The Executive
asserts that according to Article 93 of the Constitution, only the People's Assembly has the
authority to decide the validity of its members.
As seen, the case was usually regarding manipulation of the election in one way or another by
the Executive, it was regarding acts done before a member became a member and should lay
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under the jurisdiction of the State Council. 238 In this scenario, the People’s Assembly was a judge
and a party at the same time and did not maintain the Separation of Powers.
The Supreme Administrative Court 239 heard 23 appeals on the invalidity of the election
procedures, and the conditions and requirements of some of the candidates of the 2000
Parliament before and after the election itself. One of the most noticeable judgments that was
issued by the Administrative Court and affirmed by the Supreme Administrative Court, was the
ineligibility of dual citizenship candidates to run for a seat in the Parliament.
The court based its judgment on Article 5 of Law No. 38 of 1972 of the Peoples' Assembly
which stated that a member of the People's' Assembly must have Egyptian nationality.
The court stated that an individual with dual nationality does not have the right to candidacy
in the People's Assembly. The court ruled that the dual citizen does not necessary have absolute
loyalty to Egypt.
In light of the number of the NDP members who were members of the Executive that had dual
citizenship, the Executive and the Peoples’ Assembly tried to challenge the decision.
The Executive and the People’s Assembly disregarded the judgments, which resulted in an
illegitimate People’s Assembly that was not the real representative of the people’s will. In order

238

According to Articles 93 and 172 of the 1971 Constitution, the State Council has the jurisdiction over all of
administrative disputes.
239
Part of the State Council.

189

to gain a massive majority in the People’s Assembly, the Executive normalized manipulating the
law in an illegal way. Part of the legal tricks the Executive used to achieve this goal was to
encourage the NDP members to appeal the judgments in any other court that lacked jurisdiction
over the issue. The appeals obstructed the execution of the judgments, and once the election
was done, the candidate became a member and the People’s Assembly would have absolute
jurisdiction over his membership according to the customary rules that were set over the years.
The Mubarak regime proudly announced that the elections were democratic and transparent,
because of the judicial supervision. This supervision is incomplete, however, if the Executive and
the Parliament are not willing to implement the court judgments, or try to manipulate them.
Continuing with an election that included a list of candidates who were excluded from
candidacy by a judgment, voids the electoral process, even if these candidates did not win. The
People’s Assembly announced that it has the one and the only jurisdiction over determining the
membership of its members. This announcement and the practice of accepting the membership
of candidates whose memberships were voided by the court, detracted from the legitimacy of
the People’s Assembly and the whole regime.
It was better for the Peoples' Assembly, as the head of the legislative authority, to get rid of
any candidate who used legal tricks (for example by using gaps in the law), or illegal methods to
become a member, for the sake of transparency, democracy, and the rule of law.
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The Executive ignored all these judgments, and carried on with the election, even if some of
these judgments were issued prior to the elections, the People’s Assembly insisted on ignoring
these judgments and did not void the membership of the ineligible members.
The head of the People’s Assembly, Fathy Soror, who is a distinguished law professor and
scholar in Egypt, announced more than once that the Assembly has absolute jurisdiction over the
membership of the members. 240 The lack of the rule of law in the country and disrespect of the
law by the Executive, which was referred to by all the citizens as the government, spread the
feeling of political disappointment. The citizens did not see that the courts could be the safeguard
for them against the Executive. The situation exploded after the severe rigging of the 2010
parliamentary election. Because there was no legal pathway, that was a factor behind the
explosion of the situation in the 2011 uprising. The uprising occurred because there was no rule
of law in the country but with no rule of law tradition the change sought was impossible.
The extension of the age of retirement for judges and the intervention of the Executive
In 2002, in the name of reforming the Judiciary, the Minister of Justice proposed increasing
the age of retirement for judges to 66 years, instead of 60 years. The amendment was approved.
In 2003 the president issued decree Law no. 159 that increased the retirement age to 68; the
People’s Assembly was not in session and the president took advantage of that to issue the
suspicious law. The decree’s explanatory note justified the increase to take advantage of the
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experienced judges and in order to finish the current heavy work load of the cases in front of the
courts in general. The decree violated the Constitution, which granted the president the authority
to issue laws only in the case of an emergency.
The president issued the law in violation of the Constitution, which stated in Article 174 of the
1971 Constitution that the president was granted the power to issue a decree law in case of
emergency. In all cases, the law must be introduced to the People’s Assembly within 15 days from
the date of its promulgation, or during its first meeting of session, otherwise the law is void
retroactively.
Mubarak issued the law, the People’s Assembly did not vote on it, and the law came into force,
despite its illegality, and unconstitutionality. 241
It was widely known that the reason for the increase of the retirement age was to keep certain
judges who led judicial institutions in their positions242, as a reward for their loyalty and
cooperation with the Executive, and to take advantage of this cooperation to pass the
constitutional amendments as planned.
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The judges themselves were against the decree and the Judges’ Association protested against
the law and the Executive’s intervention in the Judiciary’s affairs, especially because the law was
not discussed with the judges before being issued.
There were two main reasons that made the Executive more willing to contain the Judiciary.
First, the role that the Executive wanted the Judiciary to play in decorating the image of the
regime to appear more democratic, by appointing judges to supervise the election, to attract
more direct investment, and to vent the public anger, as explained before.
Second, the election of the new board of directors of the Judges’ Association, on June 21,
2002. The Association continued to be under a board which had pro-government tendencies for
about 10 years, until the 2002 election when all the seats were taken by judges who were known
for their defense of the independence of the Judiciary and wish to free the Judiciary from the
bonds of the Executive.
Although the judges receive less than what they deserve in order to establish real justice, the
way they are granted such advantages, which come directly from the Executive, seems to be
semi-attempts of corruption or containment.
The Executive will have the upper hand if the budget of the judges continues to be under the
control of the Ministry of Justice.
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Independence versus corruption in the Judiciary
The challenge for the independence of the Judiciary is to balance it with the corruption inside
the Judiciary. In order to have independent judges the law gives them some privileges. A judge
in Egypt is subject to the Criminal Penal Code, as a citizen and as a public employee. The law
states certain and more complicated procedures to take any legal action against a judge, in order
to protect his independence.
For instance, in cases of flagrante delicto involving a judge, the Public Prosecutor must raise
the matter of arresting the judge to the Supreme Council of the Judiciary within twenty-four
hours. The Council may decide on continued detention of the judge or release on bail or without
bail, and the judge may request a hearing in front of the Council as well. In non-flagrante delicto
cases, no judge shall be arrested or detained except after obtaining permission of the Supreme
Council of the Judiciary. 243
In a culture where favoritism prevails in all business transactions, both in the private sector
and all government entities, it is understandable that some judges may misuse the immunities
given to them by law.
The best way to balance that is to make judges and lawyers discipline themselves, by making
it mandatory to report any violations by judges, and form an independent investigation
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committee to investigate all the crimes reported against the judges. It is important for this to be
a very independent committee; otherwise, the Executive will control the judges by using this tool.
There is no census of judges who were accused with criminal charges for violations committed
in their course of business.
Part Two: independence of the Judiciary post Mubarak era
Judiciary in the new Constitution
The controversial political circumstances in Egypt after Mubarak stepped down, led to the
feature of Judiciary articles in the later constitution of new features that did not exist in any of
the past Egyptian Constitutions. The most severe one was, downsizing and the intervening with
the powers of the Supreme Constitutional Court by the Executive and the Legislative.
Interestingly, there was no major change in the way the Executive intervened in the Judiciary.
The MB was not concerned about the regime’s image, therefore they severely intervened in the Judiciary
in a way that had not happened since Nasser’s era.

Expanding the role of the Judiciary in public life
As seen, the expansion of the role of the Judiciary started with the 1971 Constitution, which
started the principle of judicial review of the constitutionality of laws, and the legality of
administrative decisions.
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Thus the Judiciary became an important tool in political reform, and this role had expanded
greatly during Mubarak’s regime, in such a way that the regime tried hard to contain this role by
many means.
The Egyptian elites desired to keep the same role of the Judiciary and even expand it in the
new Constitution, but that was against the MB president and the ruling party’s ambitions to
remain in power. The expansion and the increasing independence of the Judiciary would limit the
Executive’s powers, which was against their agenda.
There were some successes at passing some articles that reinforced the Judiciary’s powers.
On February 22, 2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) issued a decree to
form a committee of some Egyptian constitutional scholars. The committee was to consider
amending the Constitution after the success of the January uprising, and surprisingly to amend
only Articles 76, 77, 88, 93, 179, and 189, instead of writing a new Constitution after the collapse
of the old regime.
Amending the Constitution illustrated a hidden agenda of the SCAF and the MB. The formation
of the committee was questionable to civil society organizations and human rights organizations,
in many ways, at top of which were:
•

The formation of the committee was limited to Islamic oriented scholars and
ideologies.

•

There was no consultation with the Supreme Constitutional Court on the composition
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and terms of reference of this committee.
•

The committee lacked the presence of independent constitutional law scholars, who
were widely agreed upon as independent and who were not part of any political
movement.

•

The committee did not reflect the societal and political diversity of Egypt, and was
limited to representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood, and their current allies from
the former regime.

•

There was late disclosure on the articles to be modified in the constitutional
amendment, for no clear reason, which did not give other scholars and the society in
general the opportunity to review and comment on the amendments.

Therefore, the committee proposed to amend eight articles of the 1971 Constitution, and on
March 4, 2011, the SCAF issued a decree to call the voters to vote on a referendum on these
amendments on March 19.
On March 30, 2011, the SCAF issued a constitutional declaration 244 to amend 63 articles, which
would be valid until the parliamentary elections for the People’s Assembly and Shura Council 245 and the

presidential election.
The Declaration included the eight articles, which were approved in the referendum, and also
included additional articles related to public freedoms and articles which regulated the
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government system and the international treaties signed by Egypt along with some special
articles related to the Legislative and the election laws.
The temporary Declaration stated that Islam was the state religion and the principle of Islamic
law was the main source of legislation. The Declaration stressed the freedom of belief and
religious practice, journalism, and prohibited the censorship of newspapers.
Articles 46 to 52 described the guarantees on the independence of the Judiciary, as follows.
Article 46: The Judiciary is independent; the Judges sit on the courts of different jurisdictions
and degrees, which issue judgments in accordance with the law.
Article 47: Judges are independent, tenured, and the law regulates disciplinary actions against
them, there is no authority over them but the law, and it is prohibited for any authority to
intervene in any law cases or in the matters of justice.
Article 48: The State Council is an independent judicial body, which is responsible for
administrative disputes and in disciplinary proceedings, and the law defines its jurisdiction.
Article 49: the Supreme Constitutional Court is an independent judicial institution, and has
exclusive jurisdiction over the constitutionality of laws and regulations, the interpretation of the
legislation, and the law determines the other jurisdiction of the Court and regulates its
procedures.
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Article 50: The law determines the judicial institutions and their jurisdictions, their formation,
and the conditions and procedures for the appointment of their judges.
Article 51: The law regulates the military courts jurisdiction and determines its powers within
the limits of constitutional principles.
Article 52: The court hearings are public, unless the court decides to make them secret in the
interest of public order or morality, and in all cases the verdict has to be publicly announced.
The SCAF clearly stated the principle of the independence of the Judiciary, so they could gain
support of the political activists, but it was the same approach as the 1971 Constitution.
The constitutionalism of the military court, and keeping the Executive’s power over the
Judiciary were the main concerns about the Declaration.
All articles regarding the Judiciary in this Declaration were formalities only. For example, it
authorized the legislative branch to organize the courts and its jurisdiction, while there was no
legislative branch at all.

2012 Constitution
The formation of the Constituent Assembly that drafted the Constitution, the way the
Constitution was drafted, and the constitutional legislator’s attitudes toward the Judiciary and
its independence, are very critical to understand the Constitution and the reasons behind the
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way the Constitution was written. Especially, it is noted that most of the members of the
Constituent Assembly were members of the People's Assembly, who had been invalidated based
on the violation of the elections law.
Background on the draft of the Constitution
The parliamentary elections, the People's Assembly and the Consultation Council (Shura),
took place in between November 28, 2011 and March 11, 2012. This election was
particularly important considering that it was the first parliamentary election to be held
without the Executive’s influence, and reflected the genuine expression of the will of the
people, without intervention by the Executive.
The election was the first step to end the transitional period and the end of the Military
Council rule and to transfer the power to civilian elected institutions, to create a new
political system to face the economic crisis in the country after the 2011 uprising.
This Parliament was particularly important because it would nominate the members of
the new constitution committee, which would draft the new Constitution that would
define the relationship between the authorities, and the new political system of the state
as well as the secularity of the state.
The elections were held in accordance with the legal framework set by the
Constitutional Declaration, and the laws that has been issued by SCAF.
200

It is noted that the laws and new regulations governing the election process were very
conservative, and within the same philosophical and legal framework that was
inaugurated by the former political regime.
For instance, the Constitutional Declaration maintained the requirement for the
representation of laborers and farmers as 50 percent of the Parliament.246 This principle
was outdated and overtaken by the nature of the new political system to be established.
The requirement for the representation of laborers and farmers as 50 percent of the
Parliament and local councils was a phenomenon developed by Nasser to gain public
support, regardless of its legality. The 1964 Constitution provided for the system in the
context of the socialist system.
Nasser’s regime justified that as a guarantee for the representation of workers and
peasants in the formation of political organizations (the Socialist Union), the Parliament
(National Assembly), and local councils. The regime’s justification was that these two
groups represented the majority of the nation, and the representation of this ratio was to
protect the gains of socialism, and as a compensation for them from the denial of the
exercise of their political rights before the republic.
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Article 32 stated that, the law determine the number of People's Assembly members, nonetheless not less than
three hundred and fifty members, at least half of them are laborers and peasants, the members shall be elected by
direct public election. The law defines the laborer and the farmer, and determines the constituencies. The
President may appoint up to ten members of the parliament.
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After the reform of the political system to a multi-party system, as provided in the 1980
and the 2007 constitutional amendments, this requirement should have been abolished,
to be consistent with the change of the political system of the country.
It was no longer in reality nor politically justified to require the 50 percent
representation of workers and peasants. This requirement has become an anomaly and is
inconsistent with the Constitution in the context of these amendments and with the
current political orientation. The Executive kept this requirement to guarantee less
educated candidates, and candidates from the low class to run for the parliament seats,
which the Executive could control easily after they become members of the parliament.
This approach made it appear that the Executive would be taking the poor and the
uneducated people’s side in front of the citizens and that would give the Executive more
support.
The constitutional provisions on the proportion of the 50 percent extended to the
political party’s law, which also stipulated this ratio as a requirement for forming political
parties, which seemed inconsistent with the philosophy of the party system itself.
The other issue is that the Constitution did not define the status of the worker and the
farmer, and left their definition to the law. The law did not define these terms clearly; it
remained ambiguous and inaccurate, in a way that opened the door to manipulation and
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fraud. The qualifications required for nomination gave the candidate a bigger opportunity
to win based on the condition of at least 50 percent.247
Abdul Razzaq Sanhoury, 248 in his research titled “The legislative violation to the
Constitution and the deviation in the use of legislative authority”, 249 emphasized that the
law could be issued according to the provisions of the Constitution, but it is still deviated
from the higher, unwritten principles that apply to the law and the Constitution.
The reasons behind that are as follow.
First, the nature of the legislation itself, which is in essence an abstract rule. Even if the
legislation is abstract on its face, but lacks abstraction in its application, this legislation is
void. Sanhoury stated that the deviation standard is a purely objective standard which is
to say we do not need to detect hidden intentions coupled with this legislation. It is enough
to prove that the law applied only in individual cases and it was very clear to the Parliament
when it issued the law.
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In case of two candidates for the other category received the highest number of votes in one of the
constituencies, while the workers or peasant’s candidate won the third place, the third place farmer would win.
But that, in contrast, in the case of two candidates from the workers and peasants get the highest number of votes
they win based on “the at least 50%” text!
In fact, in all parliamentary elections since the introduction of the requirement ratio, those who occupied the
workers and peasants seats in parliament and local councils were not representatives of these groups most of the
time. This requirement opened the door to impersonate the requirements to guarantee the seat.
248
Ibid.
249
Published in the State Council Magazine, 1952.
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Second, when the legislator exceeds its power that was defined by the Constitution to
serve a particular purpose. For example, if the Constitution permitted the legislator to halt
a newspaper to protect social order, but the legislature elaborated on the concept of the
social protection, and expanded the halt of newspapers under this provision, that means
the legislator deviated in using its power.
Third, if the legislature did not safeguard public rights and freedoms, and tied them up
under the façade of regulation.
This is the most important criteria where the legislature violated the supreme
constitutional principles to safeguard individual rights. The legislative authority does not
have absolute authority in the legislation, but has to follow the constitutional rules and
standards. Hence, some Constitution provisions can be described as unconstitutional, if
the texts are stained by any defects, despite the paradox that the Constitution is
unconstitutional.
The SCAF kept the limited powers of the Shura Council, and rejected the political
demands to increase its powers or terminate it. Shura remains as the Advisory Board
rather a legislative council, which faced widespread criticism from political forces, because
the Shura Council elections have become a waste of time, as well as a waste of state
resources.
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Most of the political parties criticized the legal framework governing the parliamentary
elections, because it kept the Mubarak era’s political practice. However, most of these
parties agreed to enter into the elections under these rules, to assure of the speedy
transfer of power from the SCAF to a civilian elected government.
The first formation of the Constituent Assembly
After the parliamentary elections, on March 24, 2012 the Egyptian parliamentary chambers
issued a decision to form the Constituent Assembly to draft the new Constitution. The Assembly
was formed - according to the decision - of a hundred members, 50 percent of whom were
members of the parliamentary chambers, and 50 percent were from the trade unions,
professional associations and public figures.
The Freedom and Justice Party, the Muslim Brotherhood party, and the Al Nour-Salafi party
(one of the other Islamist parties) acquired 36 seats out of 50 seats allocated to members of
Parliament. As a result of the predomination of the Islamists on the Assembly, 35 members
withdrew from the Assembly, including representatives of Al-Azhar and Egyptian churches and
the Supreme Constitutional Court and civil parties, in protest at the formation.
This decree of the formation of the Assembly has been widely criticized by political and human
rights activists in Egypt for many reasons:
•

To allow the parliamentary majority control over the Constituent Assembly was
unacceptable. Drafting of the Constitution is the highest legislative act, which should
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not be governed by the parliamentary majority, and should represent all and every
sector in the Egyptian society.
•

This decision represents a severe risk to the future of the constitutional institutions.
This decision violates Article 60 of the Constitutional Declaration, which stipulates
that both houses of the Parliament elect members of the Constituent Assembly. The
legislature was entrusted to elect members of the Assembly only, so that the
Parliament could set rules and criteria for the selection of members of the Assembly,
and the parliamentary members are not to be elected to the Assembly.

•

This decision represented the acquisition of a parliamentary majority on the
Assembly, and the monopolization of the Constitution based on one ideology and
political orientation. This is inconsistent with the fact that the Constitution must be
written in accordance with societal consensus. The Assembly should have represented
all of the intellectual and political spectrum and accurately reflected all spectrums of
Egyptian society, taking into account geographical distribution and equality. It must
be taken into consideration that the party that may now represent the majority, will
not represent the majority in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

•

The monopoly of the parliamentary majority that formed the Assembly could threaten
the powers of the Executive and the Judiciary and intervene with these powers, and
that means a Parliament with a majority of one political orientation, will determine
the political system of the country, to the exclusion of all the other political and social
groups.

The decision - at the time - raised legal dilemmas, which could lead to the fall of the Constitution
after approval. Especially because there were many concerns regarding the validity of the
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membership of many of the members of Parliament, the Constitution’s legitimacy was
questionable.
Later, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled on the unconstitutionality of some articles of
the law of the People's Assembly, and dissolved the People’s Assembly.
As the Supreme Constitutional Court held, it was politically and constitutionally unacceptable
to allow for the formation of the Assembly with one political force that could hold the majority
and influence the Parliament. The Constituent Assembly is the highest ranked of the authorities,
which are regulated by the Constitution, and Parliament is one of those authorities that will be
regulated, and it is unacceptable to have the control of an upper body by a lower body.
The Administrative court ruling to dissolve the first Constituent Assembly
As a result of the defects in the formation of the Assembly, some lawyers challenged the
validity of the decision of forming the Assembly at the administrative court. On April 10, 2012 the
administrative court ruled to suspend the decision. In its ruling the court stated that: “the
Parliament appointing half of the members of the assembly from the two houses of the
Parliament is a defective administrative decision that include deviation in the use of power”,
which affirmed the principle of the superiority of the Constitution and the constitutional
assembly, over all the state authorities. The court based its judgment on the violation of the
Article 60 of the Constitutional Declaration issued on March 30, 2011.
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The formation of the second Constituent Assembly
On April 18, 2012 the Constitutional Affairs Committee, at the People’s Assembly, started to
prepare a draft of the standards to elect a new Constituent Assembly. Standards guaranteed the
representation of all political parties and all the sectors in society. The committee held public
hearings to allow contributions to such standards.
On June 7, 2012 the political parties agreed on the new formation of the Constituent
Assembly, which gave the parties represented in Parliament 39 percent of the total members of
the Constituent Assembly's one hundred members.
On June 13, 2012 the Assembly formation was approved by the People's Council and Shura
Council, and the representatives of the civil parties withdrew because of the dominance of the
Islamic orientation of the parties on the Constituent Assembly.
The Parliament Dissolution
On June 14, 2012 the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled to dissolve the People’s Council
based on the unconstitutionality of the People’s Council Law.
Following the Supreme Constitutional Court ruling, the SCAF issued decree No. 350 of the year
2012 to dissolve the Council.
Because of the confusion and the uncertainty about the Constituent Assembly, after dissolving
the People’s Council on June 17, 2012, the SCAF (as the ruler of the country at the time) issued a
Constitutional Declaration. The Declaration stated in part that: “if for any reason, the Constituent
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Assembly could not finish its work in drafting the constitution, SCAF shall form a new Constituent
Assembly, within a week that represents a spectrum of the community, and to draft the new
constitution within three months from the date of its formation. Held a referendum on the
constitution within 15 days''.
After the presidential elections, the new president, on July 8, 2012, issued decree No. 11 of
the year 2012, including the withdrawal of decree No. 350 to dissolve the People’s Council, and
allowed the Council to exercise its powers stated in Article 33 of the Constitutional Declaration.
The decree was issued to allow the People’s Council to hold for one day in fraudulent conduct in
order for the council to issue a law to fortify the Constituent Assembly.
It is noted that, on July 11, the president retreated from the former decree, after the Supreme
Constitutional Court ruled on July 10 to dissolve the People’s Assembly and the
unconstitutionality of its law.
The formation of the second Assembly has faced as many criticisms as the first one. The
inclusion of the Islamic oriented parties, and having the members of the People's Assembly and
the Shura Council as members, was a violation of the above-referenced rule of the Administrative
Court on the invalidity of the formation of the first Constituent Assembly.
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On October 10, 2012 the Constituent Assembly finished drafting the Constitution and posted
it to the voters, regardless of all the criticism on the draft, especially those related to the
president's powers, the independence of the Judiciary, freedoms and equality.
On October 16, 2012 the Administrative Court postponed the hearing, for the third time in a
month, to October 23. On October 23 the Court ruled to forward the case to the Supreme
Constitutional Court, and the Supreme Constitutional Court did not rule on the issue.
On December 15, 2012 the referendum results were 63.8 percent in favor of the Constitution,
and 36.2 percent against.
The new Constitution 250
The new Constitution did not include - as had been hoped – by human right activists, law
scholars and the society in general, the complete list of rights, civil liberties, political, economic,
and social rights as in the International Bill of Human Rights. In addition, the Constitution adopted
the philosophy and approach of the 1971 Constitution in terms of the following:
•

The new Constitution, in handling civil rights and public freedoms, has fully and
unconditional delegated the legislator to regulate the exercise of these rights in a
way that could threaten the public rights and freedoms, and allow the legislature
to impose several restrictions on the exercise of the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.

•
250

Appendix 16

Instead of restricting the legislator and affirming basic rights and freedoms, the
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Constitution allow the laws to restrict the Constitution, and thereby compromises
the Constitution’s superiority.
Although this kind of delegation is recognized in most constitutions, these constitutions
develop general abstract rules, and leave the legal details to the legislator to enforce the main
constitutional principles, or (in civil law countries) "delegate the legislative authority in issuing
laws complementary to the Constitution". However, in this case these fundamental principles
become very clear and certain in a way so as not to allow any changes from the legislator, and
set the rules that determine the extent, the conditions, requirements and the limits permissible
for the legislature to then impose restrictions on the values and concepts of the Constitution.
Thus, these formulations prevent the legislature from prejudicing the fundamental constitutional
concepts and values.
•

The Constitution broadly delegated the Executive to issue laws, which may result
in a lack of consideration for constitutional values, and may result in the
unconstitutionality of the laws.

•

The wording in the Constitution made its rules as only guidelines, and not binding
on the legislature. The Executive raised this argument, that some constitutional
rules are just pilot rules or just for guidance and therefore not mandatory, in front
of the Supreme Constitutional Court. In light of these precedents, the
Constitution should have been clear regarding its mandatory rules, which
parallels with the concept of the Constitution as the supreme law that applies and
regulates the state authorities.

•

Many of the articles of the Constitution bear more than one interpretation, and
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are not as definitive and significant as they should be.
•

The Constitution is not consistent with the state's legal obligations as part of the
international conventions related to human rights.

•

The Constitution unresolved the superiority of the international and regional
conventions, the way it should be superior to laws and inferior to the
Constitution.

Independence of the Judiciary in the Constitution of 2012
Chapter III of the Constitution entitled “the Judiciary”, delegated the legislator to set the rules
of the independence of the Judiciary and its powers, 251 as well as determine the conditions and
procedures for appointing the judges and the disciplinary rules against them, 252 and to set the
jurisdictions of the judiciary institutions. 253
Although such mandates are recognized in most constitutions, the constitution develops
abstract general rules, and lets the legislator set the detailed rules, to enforce these
constitutional principles, or "delegate the Legislative the authority to issue laws supplementary
to the Constitution". This requires using very clear and precise wording, in order not to allow any
breaches of the constitutional rules, and to restrict the legislature’s ability to prejudice the values
and concepts of the Constitution.
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Article 168.
Articles 170, 173, 176, and 179.
253
Articles 173, 174, 175, 179, and 180.
252
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The Constitution has included some guarantees for the independence of the Judiciary, such as
criminalization of interference in the affairs of justice, and the immunity given to the judges
against firing them. However, some of the articles carried a breach of the independence of the
Judiciary; foremost among these are outlined next.
Removal of certain judges by Constitution articles
Article 173 of the Constitution was an unusual Article. It did not set abstract
general rules with proactive direct effects as it should be, but it was a retroactive
Article to circumvent the lifetime position of the general prosecutor, at the time.
This Article contradicted Article 170 of the same Constitution in power, which set
the tenure of the judges.
Article 173 mainly aimed to remove the Attorney General from office. The Article
limited the duration that the Attorney General could be in the office to four years, or
the remaining period until he reached retirement age, whichever was earlier. Which
means that the Article resulted in removing the Attorney General from office. Aiming
to achieve a specific result is against the generality and the abstractness that should
be in the Constitution.
The Article was unprecedented in political and legal practice. It was used to
achieve an illegal political goal, by using legal means on its face. The ruling party knew
that they would face resistance from some independent judges who hold their seats
for life according to the Constitution. In order to remove them from their seats, and
to make sure they would have the upper hand over the Judiciary by removing these
judges, the ruling party made this Article to get rid of them.
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The same thing occurred with Article 176. The members of the Supreme
Constitutional Court, which constituted 18 members, was reduced to 11 members
which means the removal of 7 judges by the Constitution, without taking into account
the provisions of the Constitution that prevented the removal of the judges. In
addition to that, this Article left the formation of the court to the legislator, while it
should have left the conditions and the formation of the court to the General
Assembly of the Constitutional Court, as it used to be.
The ruling party targeted specific judges in the SCC who had strong opinions and
agendas regarding the independent of the Judiciary, and who explicitly announced
their opposition to the Executive, the ruling party and the president’s agenda in this
regard.
Reduce the jurisdiction of the SCC
Article 175 reduced the jurisdiction of the Supreme Constitutional Court, which
had never changed in the history of the Egyptian constitutions. The 1971
Constitution for example outlined the role of the SCC, to review the constitutionality
of laws and regulations, to interpret the laws, and rule on the conflict of jurisdictions
of the lower courts, in addition to other roles to be set by the legislator. Article 175
of the new Constitution trimmed these roles and precluded the court from
interpreting the laws, and from ruling on the conflict of jurisdictions, and limited its
role to reviewing the subsequent constitutionality of laws and regulations.
Deleting the subsequent review of the constitutionality of laws and
immunization of the laws against constitutional review
Article 177 of the Constitution deleted the judicial mechanism to protect the
Constitution itself, and minimized the court’s role in the protection of the
214

Constitution and review of the constitutionality of the laws. This Article prevented
any reviews of all the elections laws, as Article 76 of the 1971 Constitution did with
the presidential election.
Prejudice the fair trial guarantees
Article 35 of the Constitution trimmed the fair trial guarantees in terms of:
o Not requiring immediate informing of the arrestee of the reasons
for his arrest and enabling access to his lawyer.
o Retracting the guarantees for the arrestees and removed the
requirement for the arrestee to immediately appear in front of the
public prosecutor’s office, and enable him to contact any person he
wished. The lack of this guarantee will make it harder to reinforce
legal protection for detainees of forced disappearances and
torture. It also did not take the above-mentioned Article of
sufficient guarantees on the non-misuse of pre-trial detention, and
turn it into a penalty as it was before.
Constitutionally legitimize military courts
As seen, the military courts were always a part of the Egyptian legal system and a
tool used by the Executive to prosecute the political opposition. The military courts
were exceptional courts, and it was never constitutional before that civilians can be
taken before the military courts.
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Article 198 254 adopted for the first time in the constitutional history of Egypt the
prosecution of civilians before military courts. This prejudiced the independence of
the Judiciary and took away their jurisdiction to try civilians, and prejudiced, on the
other hand, guarantees for a fair trial.

Independence of the Judiciary in the law
As expected, the new regime kept all the ill reputed laws that were drafted in a way to allow
a powerful Executive over the Judiciary, allow many exceptions and strip away the courts’
jurisdictions. It was important for the new regime to keep these laws in order to have full control
over the country, at the top of these laws are the following:
1. Law No. 46 of 1972, that regulates the Judiciary, and its amendments continued to govern
under the 2012 Constitution. The law gave the Minister of Justice, a representative of the
Executive, the power to supervise and intervene in the affairs of the Judiciary. The Minister
of Justice, according to this law, is entitled to:
• Hold the courts’ sessions outside their jurisdiction circuits. 255
• Appoint the heads of the courts of first degree without approval of the Supreme
Judicial Council.256
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The judicial military is independent judicial body, which has exclusive jurisdiction over all the crimes related to
the armed forces, its officers and personnel. Civilians shall not be trial before military courts, but in case of the
crimes against the armed forces; and the law defines such crimes, and the jurisdiction of the military courts. The
military judges are independent, and tenure in their seats, and have all the guarantees and rights and duties
prescribed for members of the judicial bodies.
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Articles 6, 9, and 11.
Article 9.
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• Appoint the heads of courts and judges to work in different jurisdictions, and return
the judgments of the Courts of First Instance for retrial, 257 and appoint the appeal
courts judges to work in different jurisdictions. 258
• Temporarily appoint a judge from the Court of Appeal, to work in the Court of
Cassation. 259
• Appoint a judge from the appeal courts temporarily to work as a public prosecutor, for
a period not to exceed one year.260 Although all of these assignments required the
approval of the Supreme Judicial Council, as a guarantee for the independent of the
Judiciary, in practice the Minister of Justice had power over the council, and the
council always approved the Minister’s assignments, and orders.
And the Minister of Justice has the authority to intervene in all the administrative
matters related to the judges, in a way that makes the Executive have superiority
over the Judiciary:
• Create the Judicial Monitoring Regulations. 261
• Assign the cases to be heard by the courts of appeal and courts of first instance during
the judicial recess.262

257

Article 36.
Article 56.
259
Article 55.
260
Article 57.
261
Article 89.
262
Articles 87 and 88.
258
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• Decide on early retirement of a judge for health reasons, 263 propose disciplinary
actions against judges, 264 transfer judges to non-judicial jobs or propose early
retirement for non-health reasons. 265
• Appoint the members of the Public Prosecution Office, geographically transfer them266
and propose disciplinary action against any member of the Public Prosecution
Office. 267
2. Law no. 142 for the year 2006 on the Judiciary. This law was kept effective, regardless of
many observations on the law:
● The law did not regulate the selection and appointment of judges by setting objective
requirements, despite what was reported about the non-transparency of the
appointment of judges in practice. Many disputes about the appointment of the judges
were litigated before the State Council, such as the lack of criteria of exclusion for many
of the competencies, and denying many women their constitutional right to ensure
equality in the field of public office.
Given the political culture and employment in Egypt, it is good for the Judiciary Law
text to include specific criteria for candidates to become judges. There were many
reports about favoritism in hiring the new judges or in transferring judges, for hiring
judges; the Executive had the upper hand on this matter.
● The law did not grant a judge the right of freedom of association or form organizations
to represent their interests and promote their professional training and to protect their
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Article 91.
Article 99.
265
Articles 111 and 112.
266
Article 121.
267
Article 129.
264
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independence. 268
● The law lacked regulation of the public prosecutor’s office as an independent authority
from the Executive or endorse them to the Judiciary in a clearer way. The law should
set objective criteria in appointing the Attorney General.
● The law kept the assignments of judges to carry out non-judicial jobs, despite the
accumulation of cases and limited numbers of the judges compared to the number of
cases. The law even extended the maximum period of delegation for judges to 4 years.
Assignment or delegation of judges to the Executive prejudiced the independance of
the Judiciary, and conflicted with judicial principles which do not permit a person to be
both a party and a judge at the same time. The law lacked predetermined objective
rules to control the assignment of judges. These rules are important in order to avoid
the use of delegation as a way to reward or intimidate the judges, and prejudice the
independence of the Judiciary.
● The law denied the right of counsel for judges, in the disciplinary actions and cases.
The right is a constitutional right for all citizens, and endorsed by the international
conventions.269
3. Some laws gave the president the right to interfere in the Judiciary. These continued to be
effective, such as Article 83 of Law No. 47 of 1972 on the State Council which gave the
president the right to appoint the president of the State Council. Despite the fact that the
State Council is a judicial body of a special nature, its jurisdiction is disputes between the
Executive and individuals, and it should be completely independent from the Executive.
As seen, Law No. 48 of 1979 granted the president the power to appoint the Supreme
Constitutional Court members only after consulting the Supreme Judicial Council. Without
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These rights are endorsed by Article IX of the United Nations basic principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary.
269
Articles 85 and 106.
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requiring approval, however, the President can appoint the chief justice of the Supreme
Constitutional Court, without even consultation with the Supreme Judicial Council. 270 As
noted above, the new Constitution has broadened the power of the president to appoint
members of the Court and its head.
4. State Council Law No. 47 of 1972 as stated in Article 11 was considered an abuse of justice,
by taking away an important part of the council’s jurisdiction. The text stated that the State
Council had no jurisdiction over the acts of sovereignty. This text was very broad and
vague, there is no definition to these acts and it leaves the identification to the council. In
a civil law country, this Article represented an assault on the rights of citizens. The
Executive always argued that the dispute was related to acts of sovereignty, and excluded
many of these cases which related to the rights and freedoms of the citizens.
5. Law No. 25 of 1966, known as the Martial Law, in Article 6 allows the president, once the
state of emergency was declared, to refer any offense under the Penal Code to the military
courts. Also, Article 48 gave the military courts exclusive authority to determine their
jurisdiction.

The de-facto practice and the intervention in the independence of the Judiciary by the
Executive and the Legislature in the post-Mubarak era
The intervention of the Legislature (the Parliament) in the Judiciary
The intervention in the Judiciary took a new direction after Mubarak stepped down;
compared to Mubarak’s regime and the NDP, the intervention was severe in an
unprecedented way. The NDP in the Parliament and the Executive used to follow the
formalities, and tried to enhance the image of the regime. The Judiciary was independent
270

Articles 4 and 5.
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to some extent, and some rules were important to follow. While in the new era under the
SCAF or the Freedom and Justice Party, the new ruling party, its allies and the Executive
did not care about anything but full control over the country, in the light of the unstable
regime.
There were many issues on the intervention in the Judiciary, at the top of which were
the following.
In May 2012 the People's Assembly agreed on two draft laws (bills) submitted by
members of the Al- Nour Party, to reform the Supreme Constitutional Court, and to review
its jurisdiction.
The reform as usual was the means to be used to intervene and rupture the
independence of the Supreme Constitutional Court. It was important for the new Islamist
parties to have power and control over all of the state authorities, especially the Judiciary.
The SCC was the obstacle to having full control over the country.
One of the draft laws stated that the reform to the Supreme Constitutional Court would
be to include in its membership the oldest two vice-presidents of the Court of Cassation
that were not members of the Supreme Judicial Council, and the heads of the other appeal
and cassation courts.
The other draft law stated that the president of the Constitutional Court would be
elected from among its members by secret ballot, had to have the vote of two-thirds of
the members of the Court, and be a member of one of the judicial institutes.
Article VII of the draft stated that the Constitutional Court should express an opinion
on draft laws before they are issued, and this opinion would be a non-binding opinion in
this regard.
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If the People's Assembly had approved these drafts as laws, that would have prejudiced
the independence of the court, and created improper intervention by the Parliament in
the Judiciary, and disrupted the implementation of the judgments of the Supreme
Constitutional Court and ended the immediate effect and direction of these judgements .
These projects have raised many concerns especially regarding the timing of their
submission, in particular, there were lawsuits in front of the Supreme Constitutional Court
to determine the constitutionality of laws related to the elections of the Parliament.
The court ruled unconstitutional the law of the People’s Assembly election, which
resulted in the invalidity of these elections, and thus dissolved the Parliament. This proved
that the draft law was a proactive attempt to prevent the implementation of the ruling.
This may have seemed clear from the text of the draft law, in particular, which
stipulates, “in case of rule the unconstitutionality of a law that results in dissolving of the
elected councils, the dissolving does not go into effect until after the end of the session of
this council.” This text represented illegal practice and a breach to the rule of law,
regarding the subordination of all the state authorities to the law, including the legislature
itself.
These bills prejudiced the jurisdiction of the Supreme Constitutional Court in the
subsequent supervision over the laws, the cancellation of res-judicata and the retroactivity
of judgments of the Supreme Constitutional Court.
The intervention of the Executive in the Judiciary’s affairs
On December 29, 2011, the Egyptian police raided 17 of the civil society organizations, and
43 employees of these organizations were referred to a criminal trial. The investigating
judge issued an order to add 19 Americans to the no-fly list, and to ban them from traveling
abroad till the end of the case.
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At the trial, on February 26, 2012, the court’s decision stated that: after reviewing the
demands submitted by the defense that represents the absentee defendants, regarding
the abolition of the judge's decision to prevent the American defendants from traveling,
reviewing the Code of Criminal Procedure, and after the contact from Abdel Moez Ibrahim,
the head of the Court of Appeal, demanded to revoke the no-fly decision.
The court continued that: although there was a court session scheduled to be on
February 29 to issue a decision on the requests previously referred to, after deliberation,
the court decided to expedite the consideration of demands referred to a hearing on
February 28, 2012. The court decided to step down from the case as a whole, for
embarrassment, and send the case accompanied by requests above to the Cairo Court of
Appeal to be presented to the Court head to consider and refer them to another court.
The decision to step down raised serious concerns. Given the reasons that have been
announced, as well as the timing of this decision which came before the judges who
considered the complaint submitted by the 8 foreigners on the decision to prevent them
from traveling, this pointed out that there was improper intervention exerted towards the
court that the case was tried before.
Reduced jurisdiction of the Judiciary in general
On July 12, 2012 President Morsi ratified Law No. 79 for 2012 271 that set the criteria for
the election of the Constituent Assembly, known as “the law of immunity”. This law was
prepared by the Parliament - before it was ruled to resolve it- by coordination with the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the political forces. The SCAF refused to ratify
the law at the time, and instead issued a Constitutional Declaration on June 17, 2012.
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It is clear from the first Article of the law that the law aimed to prevent the
Administrative Court from deciding on the legality of the decisions of the Assembly, in
order to fortify the decisions of the Assembly and prevent the Administrative Court from
trying the issue of dissolving this Assembly. On October 23, 2012, the Administrative Court
suspended the trials of 43 cases, demanding the invalidity of the second formation of the
Constituent Assembly. The court referred these cases to the Supreme Constitutional Court
to adjudicate on the constitutionality of the contents of the first Article of the Law No. 79
for 2012 of the standards for the election of the members of the Constituent Assembly.
The SCC ruled on the unconstitutionality of the law and said in its merits: “The Law of
the Standards to elect the members of the second Constituent Assembly intended to
prevent the Administrative Court from reviewing the criteria of the selection of the
members”. The law considered the selection as a parliamentary or legislative decision,
which may not be reviewed by the Administrative Court, and gave the authority to the
Supreme Constitutional Court to review the decision. The reality is that the decision was
an administrative decision and should be reviewed by the Administrative Court. The court
added that the first Article of the law meant to fortify the decision of the formation of the
Constituent Assembly from judicial review, in a suspicion way of abuse of legislative
authority and the deviation of the legislation.
This incident was the start of a new trend of attacking the independence of the Judiciary
and the rule of law. The ruling party and its allies tried to pass a law to tie a specific court’s
hands from hearing a specific case. The practice was different this time, old regimes acted
in the same way when necessary, but the umbrella was always wider, and more general.
Old regimes seemed to care about their images and the public opinion, while the new
regime assumes they already have full control over the country and they can act as severe
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as they wish. Especially, the MB and their allies had control over the Executive and the
Parliament, so they assumed that there was no real opposition or threat to their rule.
The disrespect of the authority of the judgments and bypassing the implementation of them
On July 8, 2012 President Morsi issued Decree No. 11 for 2012 including the withdrawal of
decree No. 350 to dissolve the Parliament, and the return of Parliament to exercise its powers is
mentioned in Article No. 33 of the Constitutional Declaration. Parliamentary elections shall be
held within 60 days from the date of the approval of the new Constitution. The decree was issued
for Parliament to be held for 24 hours in a fraudulent act to allow the Parliament to issue on the
same day, a law to fortify the Constituent Assembly formation.
This decision has been an inherent contradiction to the rule of the Supreme Constitutional
Court issued on June 14, 2012 on case No. 20 that ruled the unconstitutionality of the
parliamentary elections law. This law granted political party members the right to run for a seat
in the Parliament for the districts allocated to the individual’s seats.
The non-implementation of judicial rules and the avoidance of the implementation
represented a very serious threat to the rule of law, the separation of powers, and independence
of the Judiciary. The Executive tried to justify the president’s decision by arguing that it focused
on the withdrawal of the SCAF decision No. 350 for 2012 as an administrative decision that was
issued by a temporary administration, which was a false and fake argument. The SCAF decision
was not an administrative decision to dissolve the Parliament, but the decision, pursuant to the
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judgment of the Constitutional Court, which declared unconstitutional certain provisions of Law
No. 38 of 1972 and therefore the Parliament was dissolved. The SCAF decision was just to execute
the court ruling.
The Constitutional Declaration to provide immunity for the president’s decisions
On November 22, 2012, President Morsi issued a Constitutional Declaration 272 to immunize
all his decisions from any judicial oversight.
This Declaration included several provisions that represented severe encroachment on the
independence of the Judiciary:
• The provisions of the Constitutional Declaration contradicted each other, as it stated,
“taking into account, the provisions of the Constitutional Declaration issued in March
2011”, and then it did not take this former Declaration into account. The Declaration
of March 2011 stated that the Judiciary is independent and had no authority to
intervene in the course of justice. The president issued this Declaration as the head
of the Executive, ignoring all constitutional principles and the Constitutional
Declaration issued on March 2011, and severely intervened in the Judiciary by
immunizing his decisions from judicial review, and prohibiting a challenge of them in
any way and providing for the expiration of all related lawsuits.
• This Declaration breached the constitutional right of a person to resort to the courts,
as included in the Declaration was the expiration of the law cases relating to the
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appeal on the Constituent Assembly and the Shura Council, which gave the Assembly
the right to continue to make the Constitution.
• The Attorney General (AG) is a judicial office determined by considerations of justice
and specialization provided by the law of the Judiciary. By law the AG shall not be
removed from the office, it is a lifetime position, which guarantees the course of
justice. The Constitutional Declaration issued by the president has ravaged this
immunity and the continuation of the Attorney General in the performance of his
duties.
• The Constitutional Declaration ignored the Judiciary Law as a complementary law to
the Constitution, which lives up to the rank of the Constitution. By omitting the
approval of the Supreme Judicial Council to isolate the Attorney General, and
appointing the new AG without the approval of the Supreme Judicial Council, this
infringed the first Article of the Law No. 142 of 2006, “the Judiciary Law”, which
necessitated the approval of the Supreme Judicial Council on the appointing of the
AG.
• The Constitutional Declaration breached the constitutional principles of the
inadmissibility of punishing a person for a single act twice. Moreover, the
Constitutional Declaration applied the law retroactively when it authorized the retrial of cases that had already been seen by the court. The main goal was to accuse
officials of the former regime and omit a litigant’s right to appeal, which means a
breach of the constitutional rights of citizens to resort to the courts and to challenge
the judgments.
• In parallel with the Constitutional Declaration, and on the same date, the President
issued " the Law on the Protection of the Revolution", including many of the
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provisions, which is an exception to the Code of Criminal Procedure, and includes, in
fact, disrupting the courts and obstructing the judiciary from functioning.

The violations of the independence of the Judiciary
As a result of prejudice and attempts by both the legislature and the Executive to violate the
independence of the Judiciary, there were many acts on the ground that violated the
independence of the Judiciary, some of these acts are criminal under the law, and are as follows.
First: The continuation of military trials for civilians
After January 25, 2011 and under the rule of the Military Council, the SCAF continued the
use of special courts established by the emergency law and have referred more than
13,000 civilians to military courts since January 2011, more than the total number of
civilians who had been tried before military courts over the past 30 years.
Continued military trials after the ouster of Mubarak’s regime, and no development to
the freedom of expression, meant that journalists were still being investigated and tried
because of their opinions or the nature of their work.
Generally, the numbers of civilians, including journalists and broadcasters, that were
tried before the military courts had increased.
In a press conference on September 5, 2012, Major General Adel Morsi, head of the
military courts, said that in the period between January 28 to August 29, 11,879 civilians
were tried before military courts. Military courts convicted 8071 defendants, 1836 had
their sentences suspended, and 1225 convicted people were awaiting ratification by the
military of their judgments.
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Most importantly, the type of the cases that were referred to military courts were
different, one of the most controversial cases was the “Alqrsaiah” case. 273 The military in
this case was a party as business organization, a market player, against a group of people
who had a judgment against the military from the State Council, who had the general
jurisdiction over the case.
This case has the largest number of known civilians who were being tried militarily, after
the adoption of the 2012 Constitution. The dispute was between the citizens and the
armed forces about the ownership of the land of Alqrsaiah Island. In November 2012, the
military forces entered the island, and tried to spread within the land in dispute, which led
to clashes with residents, and the killing of a person with bullets, according to a forensic
report. Twenty-five residents of the island were tried for charges of incitement, and the
infringement of property of the members of the armed forces.
Although the State Council on November 16, 2008 (Case No. 782 for the year 62
Judiciary) and the Supreme Administrative Court in February 2010 ruled in favor of the
people who live on the island, the military forces attempted to evacuate the island by
force, and referred 25 of the residents to a military court. The military here is the opponent
and the judge at the same time.
The trial was based on Article 198 of the 2012 Constitution, which read, “civilians shall
not be tried before military courts, but for the crimes that harm the armed forces, and the
law defines those crimes”.
Second: The siege of the Supreme Constitutional Court
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On December 2, 2012, a large number of MB and other Islamist demonstrators surrounded
the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, to threaten the judges and intimidate them to
prevent them of seeing the case of the constitutionality of the new constitution
committee. The siege continued and on December 16, Chief Justice Maher Beheiri, the
head of the Supreme Constitutional Court, was denied access to the court by the mob.
Most importantly, there were many reports that president Morsi of the MB agreed with
the siege, or at least did nothing to stop his MB members and followers from doing their
criminal acts to influence the highest Egyptian court.
The protesters were against any ruling that contradicted with their interests, they tried
to disrupt the court and prevent them from taking legal proceedings relating to the
consideration and adjudication of constitutional cases.
Third: The siege on Nasr City Public Prosecution
After the arrest of Ahmed Arafa - a member of the “Hazimoun” movement, the supporters
of Hazem Abo Ismael, an Islamist figure - for illegal possession of a machine gun, other
members in the movement surrendered the public prosecution office and demanded the
release of the defendant.
The Public Prosecutor released the defendant on bail of 1000 Egyptian pounds.
Immediately, all the supporters refused to leave and insisted on the release of the
defendant from the prosecutor’s office, and the police were forced to comply.
This incident clearly indicates the gravity of the interventions in the course of justice,
and the independence of the Public Prosecution, which resulted in the release of the
defendant regardless of the seriousness of the charge against him.
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Fourth: “Elethadiah” Palace incident
On December 7, 2012 hundreds of protesters expressed their opposition to the president's
policies. They were confronted by members of the MB who supported the president and
7 people from the protesters were killed and many were injured. MB members illegally
detained a number of the demonstrators, and tortured some of them on the scene.
Essam el-Erian, the vice president of the Freedom and Justice Party, gave a statement
to the TV channel, Egypt 25, to call his people to take to the perimeter of the Federal Palace
and to detain all of those who represented the counter-revolution.
He said it is now between the supporters of the revolution and counter-revolution who
want a coup against legitimacy. He described what happens between peaceful
revolutionaries and those who want to usurp the power and forming a presidential council.
El-Erian provoked and incited for the killing and the illegal detention of protesters
against the MB regime.274
His statement was a clear incitement to supporters of President Morsi to the bloody
clashes that broke out there.
Accordingly, the East Cairo Attorney General opened a case to investigate these events.
Not one of the MB members were arrested, so the Attorney General released 137
defendants due to the absence of sufficient evidence to incarcerate them. Following this
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decision, the Attorney General transferred 275 Mustafa Khater, the East Cairo public
prosecutor to the East Beni Suef office, in order to prevent him from proceeding in the
case, and as a punishment for not complying with the orders of the Attorney General.
This decision was an aggression against the independence of members of the Judiciary.
As a result, and to defend their independence, the members of the East Cairo Public
Prosecutor’s office suspended the work in their offices, and called for an emergency
meeting of the Judges Club to discuss the matter with the judges. It ends up with the
General Attorney to retract his decision.
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Resolution No. 2182 for the year 2012.
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Conclusion
“Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in
webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be
those webs”. 276
“Law, here, there, anywhere, is part of a distinctive way of
imagining the real”. 277
The Egyptian republic was born in 1952 under the state of exception; emergency laws were
always applied officially or as a de facto state. The justifications for the state of exception and
the application of the emergency law never ended. The normalization of the state of exception
corrupted the rule of law and the way citizens perceived the legal rules in general making reform
or change impossible. It became part of the culture to disobey in one way or another. The state
itself, by breaking the law, started this vicious circle, and it is really hard now to break it and start
to change the culture.
In fact because they pursued only their own personal interest, all the regime’s actors
participated in one way or another in corruption and manipulating laws in order to achieve either
personal gains or political gains for the Executive.
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In order to make up for the rule of law and to raise the value of democracy, the Judiciary has
to play an important role. The Judiciary must be fully independent in order to play this role, real
independency in practice, not only as a text in the law. The Judiciary struggled to gain full
independency, but it was never allowed.
The police force has to be neutralized and completely obey the law, not just obeying the orders
from its superintendents. Police forces have to be under complete supervision by the Judiciary
to make sure they obey the law in all of their work. The way the police forces are seen culturally,
make them key players in upholding the rule of law. The police force is the Executive’s arm to
enforce the law, it is the only regime actor that many of the citizens deal with as a representative
of the regime itself. If change is to come, a good place to start is with the police. By having the
police forces strictly apply the laws in an equal way, this is the first step to change the culture.
The World Justice Project defines the rule of law as a system in which the following four
universal principles are upheld:
1. The government and its officials and agents as well as individuals and private entities
are accountable under the law.
2. The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just; are applied evenly; and protect
fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property.
3. The process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible,
fair, and efficient.
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4. Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representatives
and neutrals who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the
makeup of the communities they serve. 278
As shown in my research none of these four principals are upheld in Egypt.

The Judiciary and the culture of corruption
Egyptian society accepts corruption and people expect the corruption and co-exist with it.
Corruption in Egypt started with the political behavior of the regime and penetrated all
government bodies to the extent that we can say that the culture of corruption is widespread
and exists in all aspects of life in Egypt. The citizens are convinced that corruption is there and
they have to coexist with different forms and patterns of it. The corruption phenomenon has
become culturally acceptable and practiced during the everyday lives of the citizens. Is it in the
DNA of the country? If so what can be done to change it?
As seen, one of the reasons behind the corruption in Egypt is the feeble legal deterrence and
the lack of the rule of law. Hence it became a vicious circle, the corruption is behind the lack of
the rule of law, and is a result of the lack of the rule of law, and it is really unbreakable to start at
many levels to change this culture of corruption acceptance and make up for the rule of law.
Organizational structure is also one of the causes of corruption, the methods of the
management of governmental institutions, as well as the failure to define the tasks and duties
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accurately in these institutions. All of this was easily manipulated not because the wrong
mechanism were in place but because the wrong people were always in charge. In addition, the
huge number of laws and regulations, books, and periodicals, which govern the work of the
government, lead to a kind of fragmentation in government work, so that the citizens do not
know specifically what rules to apply, and leads to the dispersion of responsibility of the violations
between government officials. Citizens must feel that the law is a necessary part of their culture.
In Egypt, there are decent laws, but how people interact with the laws and how the state
applies the rule of law are the main issues. The laws were just window dressing.

Effectiveness of the law
Research on legal socialization did not show a big difference between it and socialization in
general, it is the way individuals interact with each other and with the society as a whole. The
individual socialization phenomenon was developed on three levels: psychology, anthropology,
and sociology.
Psychologists look at the way the individual interacts with others but emphasize the
construction of the personality, and why people will react to the same rule differently even if
they live in the same society.
On the contrary, anthropologists and sociologists study the society as a whole and start with
the culture and the principles that the society as a whole holds.
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The interaction is the key in socialization in general and in legal socialization as well, the way
children interact with others or other groups within the family or at school, has an important
influence on the way they grow to obey or disobey the legal rules. Yet, a difference in personality
between individuals will make a difference in the outcome.
Sociologists see the family as the unit where the child starts to form his social identity. 279 The
way the meaning and the value of laws is transmitted to children, will form their understanding
of the importance of obeying the law.
According to Chantal Kourilsky-Augeven, “Children face the diversity of law in their everyday
life, either because they hear about law, either because they are themselves involved in or
witness the application of law. Partially legal socialization is based on the inculcation, albeit
informal, of concepts relating to law, justice and traditional figures of authority, in relation to the
notions of allowed and forbidden within the family, school or media language”. 280
Citizens gain their common knowledge from the society they live in, the way the society sees
laws and how they are made, and if they are a reflection of the reality and the needs of the people
is very critical in order to respect the law.
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The independence of the Judiciary and the observation of the police rule is the first and the
most direct step in order to change the way people see and interact with the law.
The indirect and long term plan to change this culture can be done through education and
media. Educating young children and implanting the culture of the rule of law is important, but
in order to succeed in this the children and adolescents must see the way their parents interact
with the law. They will listen to conversations in their everyday life that will form their culture. It
has to be a collective effort between the Executive, the Judiciary and all the units that children
interact with in their social environment (family, school, peers, and other groups to which they
belong).
Egyptian media used to play an important role and their role has to continue in a way that
provokes people to obey the law, understand the consequences for disobeying the law, and that
the law is equally enforced against all people and all branches of the government.
Under the Nasser regime, the state used to play this role through the media production
companies owned by the state itself. There are no such companies currently owned by the state,
but the Executive can play this role by giving incentives to media production companies to play
this role, or give grants to young directors or small media companies in order to achieve this goal.
In order to make up the rule of law, the state needs to participate and allow other NGOs to
participate in the way citizens acquire their legal knowledge.
NGOs can play a very important role in getting freedom to work in society.
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From my research I found out that Egypt may have good laws, but the application of these
laws and the way the people and the regime interact with the laws is the real issue.
The deconstruction of the rule of law was started by the state actors, and state actors have to
reverse the cycle. The whole society has to play its role in order to raise the new generation on
the culture of the rule of law.
I believe this research is critical to the future of Egypt. After the overthrow of Mubarak and
his regime the country had a great opportunity to form a new regime based on the rule of law
and democracy. People were very optimistic about the future, but unfortunately the political
culture and corruption were stronger than the people’s desire for change.
Everyone looked for short term plans and benefits to gain from the failure of the state in the
stepping down of Mubarak. The key players in the political life, or I can call them the shareholders
of the Mubarak regime, had their own agenda and they did not accept any political changes. All
of these players did not care or aim for the country’s best interest, but wanted to cover their past
violations and tried to recover as much power as possible. The military had their own agenda to
have the control and the power they used to have, in order to protect the economic gains that
they received under Mubarak’s regime.
The elite businesspersons looked for their own benefits in light of the economic recession and
the fear that they would be put on trial for the violations of the law that were done and covered
up by Mubarak’s regime.
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The Islamists, especially the MB, found a great opportunity to have control over the country
after decades of attempting to just have seats in the Parliament.
Between the hammer and anvil of these political powers, the activists who ignited the uprising
and overthrew Mubarak and his regime did not have the chance to apply their goals and
principles.
It is critical now to aim for the country’s best interest in the long run, and this is the only way
to do it, by raising the rule of law and democratic principles.

The whole society has to play its role to raise a new generation of rule of law. Children are
growing up in a very different world because of globalization all the connection to the world they
have. The legal culture of the new generation is developed beyond their boarders, they have
higher expectation from their government, and the Egyptian Legislative and Executive have to
put this in mind.

Giving the globalization and the revaluation in the media and ways of the

communication, the new generation realized that there is another slandered of living that exists
, and it is not only what their parents accepted as a slandered of living.

Children are exposed to different culture of legal order; they look differently to what is fair
and what is rule of law and how rule of law by definition should be applied equally to all citizens.
The rule of law can be internalized based on the global definition and application of rule of law.
This generation will be the leader of the future, and the hope is this generation can change this
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culture; otherwise, the existing culture will corrupt them. Democratic practice shall enable the
new generation of leaders to change the future, only if the current leaders allow peaceful change
of power, to allow normal citizens to lead and not to inherit the powers to their elites.
The only way is to start from the ground up, from schools to teach the new generation the
idea of Pluralism, and how people can have many different faiths and many different ways to live
their lives so that they will be respected and one doesn’t trump the other.
The new generation has to learn to channel the best of religious convictions in that direction
or religion will always trump politics. The current religious practice in Egypt blocks these kinds of
democratic principles.

The hope is for this new generation to reach power and to change society from the top down
in a way that enables them to see and live with the rule of law and democracy.
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